Benedick v. Potts
| Citation | 40 A. 1067,88 Md. 52 |
| Parties | BENEDICK v. POTTS. |
| Decision Date | 28 June 1898 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Appeal from circuit court, Queen Anne county.
Action by William H. Benedick against William A. Potts. From the judgment on a verdict directed for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before MCSHERRY, C.J., and BRISCOE, BRYAN, BOYD, and FOWLER JJ.
A. Constable, H. W. Vickers, and John B. Brown, for appellant. H. H. Barroll, for appellee.
This is an action to recover damages for a personal injury, and the single question which the record presents is whether there was legally sufficient evidence of the defendant's imputed negligence to carry the case to the jury. The facts are few and simple. The defendant, who is the appellee in this court, was, at the time the occurrences about to be stated took place, engaged in running amusements at Tolchester Beach, a pleasure or excursion resort in Kent county. He owned and operated a mimic railway, called "Pike's Peak Railroad." This is a wooden structure covering a space 150 feet long and 65 feet wide. It is elevated 35 feet at its highest point. From this point a circular, or, rather, an elliptical, inclined track runs downward, making three circuits before reaching the ground. The total length of this spiral track is about 2,000 feet. Open and uncovered cars, weighing about 600 pounds, and having two horizontal seats, wide enough for two passengers each, are hoisted up an incline to the highest point of the railway, and are then run by gravity down and around the circular track to the ground. In making the descent, the cars pass through a tunnel, which is part of the structure, and which is located about the middle of the last circle, nearest the ground. This tunnel is 150 feet long, and completely incases that portion of the track, and hides the cars and their occupants from all observation when passing through it. The roof of the tunnel is flat, and is covered with tongued and grooved boards, running crosswise, and securely nailed to rails. Down the center of this roof, and on its inner surface, there is a narrow board, 2 1/2 or 3 inches wide, which is fastened to the roof by wire nails that are clinched on the outside. The cars are provided with handles for the occupants to grasp during the rapid descent. In August, 1895, the appellant, in company with his wife, his sister-in-law, and Miss Magee, visited Tolchester Beach. While there, he, his sister-in-law, and Miss Magee entered one of these cars; the two ladies occupying the front seat and the appellant the rear one. The car was started, and made the descent; but when it reached the ground, at the end of the track, the appellant was not in it, though as it entered the tunnel he was seen to be upon it. Search was at once made, and he was found inside the tunnel, in an unconscious condition, with a wound upon his head. He was carried out, and taken back to Baltimore, and, after several days, was restored to consciousness. For the injuries thus sustained, this suit was brought. There was some evidence tending to show that a part of the board running down the center of the tunnel roof had been slabbed off at one point, but there was nothing to indicate when that had happened. The car did not leave the track, no part of it was shown to be out of repair, the track was not defective, and no explanation is given in the record as to what caused the injury. The appellant distinctly stated that he made no effort to rise as he passed through the tunnel, and that he did not release or relax his grasp on the sides of the car. He was on the car when it passed into the tunnel. He was not on it when it emerged. How he got off is not shown. Upon this state of facts, the trial court instructed the jury that there was no legally sufficient evidence to show that the defendant (the appellee) had been guilty of negligence, and the verdict and judgment were accordingly entered for the defendant. Thereupon the plaintiff brought up the record to this court by appeal.
It is a perfectly well settled principle that, to entitle a plaintiff to recover in an action of this kind, he must show, not only that he has sustained an injury, but that the defendant has been guilty of some negligence which produced that particular injury. The negligence alleged, and the injury sued for, must bear the relation of cause and effect. The concurrence of both, and the nexus between them, must exist, to constitute a cause of action. As an injury may occur from causes other than the negligence of the party sued, it is obvious that before a liability on account of that injury can be fastened upon a particular individual, it must be shown, or there must be evidence legally tending to show, that he is responsible for it; that is, that he has been guilty of the negligence that produced or occasioned the injury. In no instance can the bare fact that an injury has happened--of itself, and divorced from all the surrounding circumstances--justify the inference that the injury was caused by negligence. It is true that direct proof of negligence is not necessary. Like any other fact, negligence may be established by the proof of circumstances from which its existence may be inferred. But this inference must, after all, be a legitimate inference, and not a mere speculation or conjecture. There must be a logical relation and connection between the circumstances proved and the conclusion sought to be adduced from them. This principle is never departed from, and, in the very nature of things, it never can be disregarded. There are instances in which the circumstances surrounding an occurrence, and giving a character to it, are held, if unexplained, to indicate the antecedent or coincident existence of negligence as the efficient cause of an injury complained of. These are the instances where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applied. This phrase, which, literally translated, means that "the thing speaks for itself," is merely a short way of saying that the circumstances...
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