Beneteau v. Detroit Free Press

• Citation: 117 Mich.App. 253,323 N.W.2d 498
• Decision Date: 01 September 1982
• Docket Number: Docket No. 56742
• Parties: Marie T. BENETEAU, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DETROIT FREE PRESS and Travelers Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellants. 117 Mich.App. 253, 323 N.W.2d 498
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

Page 498

323 N.W.2d 498

Marie T. BENETEAU, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DETROIT FREE PRESS and Travelers Insurance Company,

Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 56742.

117 Mich.App. 253, 323 N.W.2d 498

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 16, 1982.

Decided May 27, 1982.

Released for Publication Sept. 1, 1982.

[117 MICHAPP 254] Miller, Cohen, Martens & Sugarman, P. C. by Murray A. Gorchow and Peter A. Caplan, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Lacey & Jones by Stephen Jay Schwartz, Detroit, for defendants-appellants.

Before J. H. GILLIS, P. J., and V. J. BRENNAN and LAMBROS ^*, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff was employed by defendant Detroit Free Press and worked at the Free Press Building in downtown Detroit. On May 7, 1973, plaintiff drove to work at approximately 7 a. m. and parked her car at a parking garage located on Cass and West Lafayette. The garage was located diagonally across the street from the Free Press Building. While walking across West Lafayette Boulevard from the parking garage, plaintiff slipped and fell. West Lafayette Boulevard was the first street that plaintiff had attempted to cross. Plaintiff claimed that at the time of her fall she was carrying work materials that she had taken home to work on. Plaintiff claimed that because her arms were holding the materials, she fell straight on her knees and sustained injuries. Following the fall, plaintiff missed several periods [117 MICHAPP 255] of work. During her absences, plaintiff received wage continuation benefits as part of her benefit package from the Free Press.

On December 18, 1974, plaintiff filed a petition for hearing with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation alleging a personal injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. Following a hearing, the administrative law judge found for the plaintiff and ordered defendants to pay compensation with credit granted for wage continuation payments. The Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) affirmed the granting of compensation to plaintiff but concluded that defendants were not entitled to take credit for those payments made to plaintiff while she was off from work. Defendants appeal by leave granted.

The first issue for our consideration is whether the WCAB erred in finding plaintiff's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment.

Plaintiff asserted that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment as she was within the zone, environments and hazards of her work at the time of her fall. Alternatively, plaintiff asserted that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment as she was carrying work materials at the time of her fall.

The WCAB found that plaintiff was within the zone, environments and hazards of her work at the time of her fall. It did not render a finding as to whether the dual purpose rule applied, that is, whether her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment because she was carrying work materials with her. We will first address the question of whether plaintiff was within the zone, environments and hazards of her work at the time of her fall.

M.C.L. Sec. 418.301(1); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(301)(1) limits compensation[117 MICHAPP 256] under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act to employees receiving personal injuries "arising out of and in the course of" their employment. M.C.L. Sec. 418.301(2); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(301)(2) then provided:

"Every employee going to or from his work while on the premises where his work is to be performed, and within a reasonable time before and after his working hours, shall be presumed to be in the course of his employment."

The subsection was added to the act by 1954 P.A. 175.

Literally applied, M.C.L. Sec. 418.301(1); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(301)(1) requires that an injury occur on the employer's premises to be compensable. However, the definition of the word "premises" has been expanded by case law. In Lasiewicki v. Tusco Products Co., 372 Mich. 125, 125 N.W.2d 479 (1963), a portion of city-owned property used and maintained by the employer as a parking lot for its employees was determined to be part of its premises. In Jean v. Chrysler Corp., 2 Mich.App. 564, 140 N.W.2d 756 (1966), compensation was awarded to an employee who was injured on a public roadway lying between the employer leased parking area and the employer's place of business. Lasiewicki and Jean, supra, quoted with approval the language of Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 27, 148 N.W. 243 (1914), that:

"A workman might be on the premises of another than his employer, or in a public place, and yet be so close to the scene of his labor, within its zone, environments, and hazards, as to be in effect at the place and under the protection of the act."

[117 MICHAPP 257] The zone, environments and hazards principle was also employed to extend the reach of M.C.L. Sec. 418.301(1); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(301)(1) in Fischer v. Lincoln Tool & Die Co., 37 Mich.App. 198, 194 N.W.2d 476 (1971), lv. den. 387 Mich. 755 (1972). In Fischer, compensation was awarded to a plaintiff injured on a public sidewalk abutting his employer's property. Plaintiff had parked his automobile across the street from the employer's place of business and was on his way to work. The employer did not provide parking facilities for the employees. The Fischer Court concluded:

"From an analysis of the present case law we conclude that 'zone, environments and hazards' is substantially what is meant by the word 'premises' as contained in the workmen's compensation act.

"From the above, we can conclude that an employee is protected by the act when he is within said 'zone, environments, and hazards', while arriving at, departing from, or during the time of his employment by travelling his usual, customary and direct route.

"The appellee herein qualifies under the above rule as he was injured on the icy sidewalk abutting his employer's place of business. This was the conclusion of the appeal board below, which we now affirm." 37 Mich.App. 198, 203, 194 N.W.2d 476.

However, in Tedford v. Stouffer's Northland Inn, 106 Mich.App. 493, 308 N.W.2d 254 (1981), this Court refused to further extend the premises concept. In Tedford, plaintiff, a maid at Stouffer's Inn, was injured as she walked across a parking lot from her bus stop to the Inn. The parking lot was not part of the employer's premises. Sidewalks were available, but the path across the parking lot was the most direct. In denying compensation, the Court stated:

"Plaintiff seeks a further relaxation of the premises [117 MICHAPP 258] limitation. The present situation is otherwise distinguishable from the earlier cases. There is no claim here that defendant owned, leased or maintained the parking lot where the injury took place. Defendant had no control over the route Mrs. Tedford walked from the bus stop or, for that matter, over where the bus stop itself was located. The injury did not take place while Mrs. Tedford traversed between two separate areas under the hotel's control." 106 Mich.App. 493, 499-500, 308 N.W.2d 254.

The Court then distinguished Fischer and stated that the Fischer decision has been criticized for bootstrapping successive factual situations onto one another under the guise of liberally interpreting the compensation statute and, thus, avoiding line drawing to the detriment of the sound and efficient administration of the compensation apparatus. The Court quoted extensively from 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, Sec. 15.12, pp. 4-8 to 4-10. Further, the Court stated:

"The implicit trend in this manner of decision-making is a steady dilution of the legislative limitations on compensation. The Supreme Court has specifically disapproved of such judicial 'reform' of the compensation act. [McClure v General Motors Corp (On Rehearing), 408 Mich 191, 204; 289 NW2d 631 (1980) ]. While the statutory coming-and-going rule does not directly limit coverage to on-premises injuries, id., 222-223 (Levin, J., concurring), it must be remembered that the rule is an exception to the basic requirement that compensable injuries arise out of and in the course of the employment. Off-premises injuries should only be compensated when they satisfy that test or occur in circumstances which logically justify an expansion of the premises concept. In Lasiewicki, such an expansion was justified by the fact that the parking area, though publicly owned, was under the control of the employer. Likewise, in Jean, the employer created the necessity of traversing the highway by providing a parking lot so separated from the...