BENGE v. JOHNSON

Decision Date31 March 2011
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 08-78-GMS
PartiesJOHN H. BENGE, Petitioner, v. G.R. JOHNSON, Warden, and JOSEPH R. BIDEN, III, Attorney General of the State of Delaware, Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Delaware

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

John H. Benge. Pro se petitioner.

Elizabeth R. McFarlan Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

March 31, 2011

Wilmington, Delaware

Sleet, Chief Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner John H. Benge ("Benge") is an inmate at the Sussex Correctional Center in Georgetown, Delaware. Benge filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus ("petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (D.I. 1) For the reasons that follow, the court will dismiss his petition.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts of Benge's case are as follows:

In response to a 911 call, the Rehoboth Beach Police arrived at the Oak Grove Motor Court Inn to find Benge and Edward Stacey Smith involved in an altercation outside the motel. Smith, who was on top of Benge at the time the police arrived, had sustained a gunshot wound to his chest. At the scene, the police recovered two loaded handguns, two speed loaders, several live, loose .22 caliber rounds, and two holsters which were attached to Benge's belt.

This incident was the result of the deterioration and later dissolution of the marriage between Benge, and his ex-wife, Donna Kay Lovett. Lovett informed Benge that she wanted to separate and moved into her brother's North Wilmington home. In fact, Benge had checked her phone records, and placed a recording device under Lovett's bed with a microphone attached to the mattress. After some time, Lovett returned to the couple's home in Centreville. From that point on, Benge continually sought reassurance from Lovett that she had not fallen in love with someone else.

In October 2001, Lovett filed for divorce, left the Centreville home, and permanently moved to her brother's house in North Wilmington. After Lovett left, Benge took a set of her new house keys and duplicated them. He then used those duplicate keys to enter the North Wilmington home on several occasions, continuing to do so even after the divorce had become final. On one of these occasions he placed a voice-activated tape recorder in the dresser located in Lovett's bedroom. Furthermore, her brother, the owner of the North Wilmington home, saw Benge driving near the house around the time of the break-in.

After the divorce was final, Lovett began a new relationship with Smith, a man whom she had known for several years. Smith was an elementary school teacher and worked during the summer as a maintenance man at Oak Grove, which Lovett's family owned.

In October 2002, Benge drove to the motel and took with him two loaded handguns with holsters, extra ammunition in two speed-loaders, a pair of wirecutters, and a can of high-intensity pepper spray. When Benge reached the motel, he illegally entered room number five, using a duplicate set of keys. After consuming alcohol, he left the motel room and went in search of Lovett and Smith. Once outside the motel, Benge cut the telephone line that ran to the facility. He then entered the motel office, which has separate apartments on each side. Benge entered one of the apartment bedrooms where he found Lovett. He confronted her, demanding to know where Smith was. After apparently failing to get the answer he wanted, Benge sprayed Lovett in the face with pepper spray. Lovett ran from the bedroom to the living room and tried to unlock the door of the apartment. Benge then pulled her back and sprayed her again.

Smith heard Lovett screaming and entered the room from the other apartment. When Smith entered the room Benge released Lovett, whom he had been holding with a weapon at her face. Lovett then fled to the motel office and managed to call the police on her cell phone. Lovett observed Benge and Smith struggling in the apartment and heard two gunshots.

After Benge released Lovett, he sprayed Smith in the face and chest with the pepper spray. A struggle ensued and Benge drew one of his handguns. Smith heard gunshots and tried to push Benge out the door. As a result of the struggle, Smith sustained a gunshot wound to his chest, a punctured right eardrum, irritated eyes, a gouge in his left foot, and other less serious injuries.

At trial, Benge testified that he had been so distraught over the divorce that he had decided to kill himself and claimed that he wanted to commit suicide in front of Lovett and Smith. Benge expressly denied any intention to harm anyone else. Benge further claimed that once inside the motel office, however, he decided against suicide, but panicked when he saw Lovett and as a result sprayed her with the pepper spray. When Smith charged him, he also sprayed Smith. Benge also testified that during the struggle, he could not see what was going on because his sweatshirt was pulled over his head. Although Benge acknowledged that his gun went off, he denied pulling the trigger. Benge did admit, however, that he had duplicated Lovett's keys and used those keys to enter the North Wilmington home where he had placed the tape recorder.

Benge v. State, 862 A.2d 385 (Table), 2004 WL 2742314 (Del. Nov. 15, 2004).

In January 2003, the grand jury indicted Benge, charging him with various offenses stemming from the October 20th incident. Three counts of the indictment charging Benge with possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited (count six) and criminal contempt of a domestic violence protective order (counts eleven and twelve) were severed from the other counts in July 2003.1 The severed counts were set for trial in January 2004, but on the day scheduled for trial, Benge elected to plead guilty to all three counts. On count six, Benge was originally sentenced to two (2) years at Level V, suspended after serving the mandatory term of six (6) months, followed by eighteen (18) months of probation. Benge was sentenced to a minimum mandatory term of fifteen (15) days at Level V on count eleven, as well as another minimum mandatory term of fifteen (15) days at Level V on count twelve. (D.I. 14 at A170) On November 7,2005, the probationary portion of Benge's sentence for the weapons conviction (count six) was modified from eighteen (18) to twelve (12) months, and was to run concurrently with the non-incarcerative portion of the sentences imposed for his August 2003 convictions. (D.I. 14)

Benge did not appeal. Instead, in December 2006, he filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61 motion") and a motion to correct sentence pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 35 ("Rule 35 motion"). The Superior Court denied both motions in May 2007. State v. Benge, 2007 WL 1520032 (Del. Super. Ct. May 2, 2007). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision on appeal in January 2008, and denied Benge's motion for reargument without comment in April 2008. See Benge v. State, 945 A.2d 1099 (Del. 2008).

Benge filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and the State filed an answer. (D.I. 1; D.I. 21) Benge filed a response. (D.I. 23)

Benge's petition is ready for review.

III. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") "to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences ... and to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism." Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal court may consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner only "on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). AEDPA imposes procedural requirements and standards for analyzing the merits of a habeas petition in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002); see Woodford, 538 U.S. at 206.

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Absent exceptional circumstances, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner has exhausted all means of available relief under state law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-44 (1999); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). AEDPA states, in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that -

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or

(B) (i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

The exhaustion requirement is based on principles of comity, requiring a petitioner to give "state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O 'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844-45; Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by demonstrating that the habeas claims were "fairly presented" to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997)(citations omitted); Coverdale v. Snyder, 2000 WL 1897290, at *2 (D. Del. Dec. 22, 2000).

A petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies will be excused if state procedural rules preclude him from seeking further relief in state courts. Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000); Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d...

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