Benitez v. Garcia
| Decision Date | 07 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02CV0489DMS (AJB).,02CV0489DMS (AJB). |
| Citation | 419 F.Supp.2d 1234 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | Cristobal Rodriguez BENITEZ, Petitioner, v. Sylvia GARCIA, Warden, et al., Respondents. |
Barbara K. Strickland, Law Offices of Barbara K. Strickland, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner.
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Respondents.
ORDER ADOPTING RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE IN PART AND DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
On March 14, 2002, Petitioner Cristobal Rodriguez Benitez ("Petitioner" or "Benitez"), a state prisoner proceeding with the assistance of counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). Petitioner previously had been extradited from Venezuela to the United States on a charge of murder, and later convicted of that offense by a state jury. In his Petition, Benitez claims the punishment he received from the state court violates the terms of the extradition treaty between the United States and Venezuela, and the trial court committed error when it instructed the jury.
On September 8, 2003, following briefing by the parties, the Magistrate Judge formerly assigned to this case issued a Report and Recommendation ("Report"). The Report concludes the California District Court of Appeal ("state court") erred in upholding a 19-years-to-life indeterminate sentence because the sentence violates the Venezuelan extradition decree, which limits Petitioner's punishment to no more than thirty years incarceration. The Report, however, recommends the Petition be denied without prejudice because Petitioner has not yet served a term in excess of thirty years. It further recommends that Petitioner be able to pursue his claim after thirty years incarceration without a statute of limitations bar. In the alternative, it recommends the matter be remanded to state court for resentencing, to incorporate the extradition decree's thirty year maximum prison term.
On September 24, 2003, Respondents filed Objections to the Report, contending the Report fails to give sufficient deference to the state court decision and fails to provide an adequate analysis under the stringent habeas review standards imposed by the Anti—Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Petitioner submitted no Objections to the Report.1
After review and consideration of the Petition, Answer, Traverse, Report, Objections to Report and Recommendation, and all relevant authorities, the Court adopts the Report in part and DENIES the Petition in its entirety. As discussed below, the state court's conclusion that Petitioner's indeterminate sentence does not violate the treaty is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
On September 13, 1993, Petitioner's brother, Ricardo Rodriguez, had an altercation with Isidro Valle that resulted in Petitioner shooting and killing Valle. After the shooting, Petitioner and Rodriguez retrieved their belongings and fled. Nearly four years later, Petitioner was arrested in Caracas, Venezuela.
On June 25, 1997, the United States requested that Petitioner be extradited, pursuant to the extradition treaty between the United States and Venezuela. The treaty authorizes extradition of fugitives for crimes of murder and other enumerated offenses, and provides that Venezuela may "decline to grant extradition for crimes punishable by death and life imprisonment" unless it receives "satisfactory assurances that in the case of conviction the death penalty or imprisonment for life will not be inflicted." See Treaty, and Additional Article, Between the United States and Venezuela for Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, 1924 WL 23796, 43 Stat. 1698, Arts. II & IV (Jan. 2, 1924).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Venezuela sought assurances from the United States Embassy that Benitez would not be sentenced to death, and on November 4, 1997, the United States certified that a death sentence would not be imposed. (CT 54.) The United States further informed the Ministry that the California sentencing guideline penalty for conviction of first-degree murder would be a sentence of 25-years-to-life, with additional terms of three, four, or five years if the allegation of using a gun was proven. (Id.) The United States also described California's sentencing guidelines regarding parole and lesser charges. (Id.) The Ministry was advised that Benitez would receive a "minimum mandatory prison term of 19 years, 2 months" if convicted of first degree murder, or less if convicted of a lesser degree of murder, and that he "would have a right to a parole request" after serving a minimum mandatory term. (Id.)
On February 27, 1998, the Attorney General of Venezuela noted the United States's assurances and summarized Petitioner's potential punishment, as follows:
[T]he legal punishment corresponding to the crime attributed to the accused might be capital punishment, ... life imprisonment without the possibility of preparatory freedom ..., or imprisonment ... for a term of 25 years to life ...[¶] Considering the above, we can see that there appears on the record .. . that, if extradited, ... BENITEZ shall not be sentenced to death. [¶] It is also expressed that if he is sentenced for murder in the first degree, he shall receive prison from twenty five (25) years to life imprisonment, with an additional increase from 3, 4 or 5 years, if it is proven the allegation that he used a fire weapon. If he received the maximum sentence, he shall be entitled to make a request for parole, after having served the minimum mandatory term in prison of nineteen (19) years and two (2) months. [¶] Considering this situation, it has been fully determined that capital punishment shall not be applied in any case, and, in principle, not even life imprisonment.2
(CT 75-76) (emphasis added).
The diplomatic exchange reveals Venezuela had, at least prior to Petitioner's extradition, satisfied itself Petitioner would not be subject to punishment proscribed by the treaty, that is, death or "imprisonment for life," as that term is used in the treaty. The Attorney Generally specifically noted Petitioner could "make a request for parole" and thus, "in principle, not even life imprisonment" would be imposed. (CT 75-76.)
Thereafter, on June 4, 1998, Venezuela's Supreme Court of Justice issued a decree that granted Petitioner's extradition, but with an added provision that Petitioner was not to receive "punishment depriving his freedom for more than thirty years, pursuant to the rules [found in the Constitution of Venezuela and the Criminal Code]."3 (CT 88.) The record reveals no assurances were requested by Venezuela regarding the decree or its thirty year sentencing limitation, and none were provided by the United States.
On August 17, 1998, the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the United States Embassy of the extradition decree. (CT 60.) The notice provided that, "Said extradition is conditioned to the understanding that [Benitez] will not be sentenced to death or life in prison or incarceration for more than thirty (30) years . . . .." (Id.) Petitioner was extradited from Venezuela by a San Diego Police Sergeant and a United States Marshal on August 28, 1998. (CT 119.)
On July 16, 1999, over ten months after Petitioner's extradition, and after receiving information from Petitioner's California criminal defense counsel immediately before commencement of trial, the Venezuelan Embassy sent a letter to the United States Department of Justice, voicing its concerns regarding the "features" of an indeterminate sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life. (CT 116.) The Embassy expressed its unease with the potential violation of the extradition treaty, "as well as the conditions established in the sentence of the Supreme Court of Venezuela which approved the extradition request presented by the Government of the United States." (Id.) Based upon the exchange between Petitioner's trial counsel and the Venezuelan Embassy, it appears the Embassy was concerned that an indeterminate sentence (if Petitioner was repeatedly denied parole) might run afoul of the treaty's ban on imprisonment for life or the thirty year sentencing cap referenced in the extradition decree.
At trial, defense counsel initially moved for dismissal based on the trial court's lack of jurisdiction, arguing the United States had violated the provisions of the extradition treaty by not clarifying to Venezuela that Petitioner "was in fact subject to actually serving a life sentence" in the event he was not paroled. (CT 42.) Counsel further argued there was no "meeting of the minds" between the United States and Venezuela because Venezuela extradited Petitioner "under the mistaken belief he would not be subject to more than thirty years in prison." (Id.) (emphasis in original). In response, the district attorney argued nothing in the treaty precluded Petitioner from being tried in a country that had a possible indeterminate sentence. (RT 24.) The trial court denied the motion and found that Petitioner could be tried for murder because he had been represented by counsel in Venezuela, the United States did not commit fraud in the request for extradition, and Venezuela extradited him with knowledge of California's sentencing guidelines. (RT 27-29.) After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder. (CT 196.)
On August 30,1999 (the day before Petitioner's sentencing hearing), the District Attorney's office received a letter from the United States Department of State, recommending that Petitioner not serve a life sentence. (Lodg.1, Ex. 5.) However, the letter further clarified: "We do not believe the Office of the District Attorney is required to make such a recommendation, as the United States was explicit regarding the...
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