Benitez v. JMC Recycling Sys. Ltd.

• Decision Date: 28 June 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13-2737
• Parties: ANTHONY BENITEZ, Plaintiff, v. JMC RECYCLING SYSTEMS LTD., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

ANTHONY BENITEZ, Plaintiff, v. JMC RECYCLING SYSTEMS LTD., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13-2737

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

June 28, 2017

Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez

OPINION

This matter is before the Court on motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Strip Technology, Inc.[Dkt. No. 61].The Court heard oral argument on the motion on April 25, 2017 and the record of that proceeding is incorporated here.For the reasons placed on the record that day, and those set forth below, Strip Technology Inc.'s motion for summary judgment will be denied.

I.Background

This case involves claims arising from a workplace accident which occurred on May 5, 2011 when PlaintiffAnthony Benitez was operating a metal recycling machine during the course of his employment at Former Defendant Doctor Copper, a metal recycling facility in Pennsauken, New Jersey.The metal recycling machine at issue is described as an "alligator shear" and is manufactured and distributed by Former DefendantJMC Recycling System Ltd.Defendant Strip Tech is a vendor of recycling equipment and sold the alligator shear at issue to Dr. Copper.See Compl., Ex.A;seealsoAlexanderDep. Tr., Ex. C, at 22:21 -23; 34:10-14; 14:7-9; 25:5-31:7

The alligator shear is a machine used to cut and manipulate scrap metal, of various shapes and sizes, by placing the metal between two blades that resemble an alligator's jaws.See Def. Sta. of Mat.Facts; Alligator Shear Operation and Maintenance Manual, attached to Coleman Dec. as Ex. "D."The machine is operated through the use of a foot pedal that regulates the opening of the blades and the compression of the blades through a metal object.When the pedal is releases, the blades return to an open position.Seeid. at p. 1.The alligator shear machine is equipped with a safety guard, also referred to as a "cage guard" or blade guard" that covers the blades during operation, if it is manually pulled down.SeeAlexanderDep. Tr., Ex. C, at 44:5-45:2;seealsoManual, Ex. D, at p. 18.If utilized, the cage guard also functions as an "infeed clamp," which holds down the metal material that is being inserted into the shear to allow the user to cut material without placing his or her hands near the blades.SeePl.Dep. Tr., Ex. B, at 46:9-22;see alsoManual, Ex. D, at p. 18.Importantly, the machine operates even if the cage guard is not utilized.

The cage guard was not utilized on the day Plaintiff was injured.Benitez Dep. at 61:18-62:12.According to Plaintiff, he was injured when he was using the alligator shear to cut a copper pipe and he tripped on materials and debris on the floor, causing him to lose his balance.Seeid.at 72:25-73:3; 82:15 -85:13; 86:20-95:1.To brace himself for a fall, Plaintiff placed is left had onto the engaged alligator shear machine, causing significant injury to three fingers on his left hand.Seeid.at 86:20-95:1; 102:12-15.

As against moving Defendant Strip Tech, Plaintiff asserts violations of the New Jersey Products Liability Act ("NJPLA"), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-2(Counts II, II, IV), a claim of negligence (Count VI), and consumer fraud (Count V).Defendant JMC Recycling was dismissed from this action for lack of personal jurisdiction on April 10, 2015.The claims against Doctor Copper were voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff.[Dkt. No. 10].

Strip Tech moves for summary judgment on all counts, arguing that it had Plaintiff fails to present admissible expert testimony to establish a prima facie case of product liability.Strip Tech argues that the testimony of Plaintiff's expert, George H. Meinschein, P.E. is unreliable, based entirely on speculation and unsupported conclusions rather than upon facts in the record and scientific methodology.Defendant argues, therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish proximate cause for his design defect and failure to warn claims.In addition, because Plaintiff fails to identify an affirmation or promise made by Strip Tech, summary judgment should be granted as to the breach of warranty claim.

In his Opposition papers and on the record during argument, Plaintiff conceded that summary judgment is appropriate on the claim of defective or inadequate warning and the claim for breach of express warranty.As a result, summary judgment is granted in favor of Strip Tech as to those claims.For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgement.Plaintiff's expert's testimony is admissible and questions of fact germane to the establishment of a prima facie case of product liability and on causation merit denial of the remained of Strip Tech's motion.

II.Standards of Review

A.Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) generally provides that the "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" such that the movant is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).Such a showing must be supported by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically storedinformation, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(1)(A).

A "genuine" dispute of "material" fact exists where a reasonable jury's review of the evidence could result in "a verdict for the non-moving party" or where such fact might otherwise affect the disposition of the litigation.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248(1986).Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts, however, will fail to preclude the entry of summary judgment.Id.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and must provide that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences.Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378(2007);Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287(3d Cir.2014).Any such inferences "must flow directly from admissible evidence[,]" because "'an inference based upon [ ] speculation or conjecture does not create a material factual dispute sufficient to defeat summary judgment.'"Halsey, 750 F.3d at 287(quotingRobertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n.12(3d Cir.1990)(citingAnderson, 477 U.S. at 255)).

Accordingly, the moving party initially has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323(1986).Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.Id.;Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1254, 1258(D.N.J.1994).Again, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party.Andersen, 477 U.S. at 256-57."A nonmoving party may not 'rest upon mere allegations, general denials or . . . vague statements . . . .'"TrapRock Indus., Inc. v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 982 F.2d 884, 890(3d Cir.1992)(quotingQuiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500(3d Cir.1991)).Indeed,

the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.The movant can support the assertion that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed by showing that "an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the [alleged dispute of] fact."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B);accordFed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).

In deciding the merits of a party's motion for summary judgment, the court's role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249(1986).Credibility determinations are the province of the factfinder.Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363(3d Cir.1992).Finally, "[t]he standard by which the court decides a summary judgment motion does not change when the parties file cross-motions."United States v. Kramer, 644 F. Supp. 2d 479, 488(D.N.J.2008).Consequently, the court's evaluation of the pending motions remains unaltered: "the court must consider the motions independently and view the evidence on each motion in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."Id.(citation omitted).

B.The New Jersey Products Liability Act

A manufacturer or seller of a product shall be liable in a product liability action only if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the product causing the harm was not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended purpose because it: a. deviated from the design specifications, formulae, or performance standards of the manufacturer or fromotherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications or formulae, or b. failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions, or c. was designed in a defective manner.

N.J.S.A. § 2A:58C-2.Three causes of action are established under the Act: claims for design defect, manufacturing defect, or warnings defect.Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc., 654 A.2d 1365, 1380(N.J.1995).

A successful design defect claim under the NJPLA requires that the product was defective, that the defect existed when the product left the defendant's control, and that the defect caused injury to a reasonably foreseeable user.Jurado v. Western Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1317(N.J.1993)."Whether a product is defective depends on whether it 'is not reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes.'"McGarvey v. G.I....