Benjamin v. Foidl

• Decision Date: 15 November 1954
• Citation: 379 Pa. 540,109 A.2d 300
• Parties: Yetta BENJAMIN et al., Appellants, v. John FOIDL, President, et al.; Local Union 420 et al.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 300

109 A.2d 300

379 Pa. 540

Yetta BENJAMIN et al., Appellants, v. John FOIDL, President, et al.; Local Union 420 et al.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Nov. 15, 1954.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 13, 1954.

Peter P. Zion and Leonard A. Green, Philadelphia, for appellants.

Myron Jacoby, Jacoby & Maxmin, Homer H. Hewitt, 3rd, Louis H. Wilderman, Richard H. Markowitz, Paula R. Markowitz, Joseph Rappaport and Rappaport & Lagakos, Philadelphia, for appellees.

Geoffrey J. Cuniff, Philadelphia, for York Corporation & Daniel J. Keating Co.

Candor, Youngman & Gibson and John C. Youngman, Williamsport, David H. Kinley, Philadelphia, for E. Keeler Co.

Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO and ARNOLD, JJ.

ARNOLD, Justice.

Plaintiffs brought this bill in equity against the defendants and charged that by means of conspiracy they sought to and did deprive them of employment. The court below granted a preliminary injunction, and after hearing on its continuance sustained the objections of the defendants and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs appealed.

The plaintiffs are holders of certificates of convenience from the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission, and are engaged in the business known as rigging, hoisting, hauling, loading and unloading and installing in place and placing on foundations all forms of heavy and intricate machinery and other equipment. The complaint charged, inter alia, that the defendants entered into a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs of employment by means not now necessary to set forth. It suffices to say that the allegations of the bill in equity and the proof of the plaintiffs showed a common law conspiracy. The court below sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the bill on the theory that since union labor was involved (two labor unions being cited as a part of the defendants' conspiracy), the resort of the plaintiffs was to the National Labor Relations Board, although it was not shown at the hearing on continuance of the injunction that the plaintiffs were engaged in interstate commerce.

The principal support of the court was the case of Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local Union No. 776, 373 Pa 19, 94 A.2d 893, affirmed, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161.

But that case does not govern here. That was a case brought to enjoin picketing which constituted an unfair labor practice. After the Garner case the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of United Construction Workers Affiliated with United Mine Workers of America v. Laburnum Construction Corporation, 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833, 836, which case was a common law tort action for compensatory and punitive damages. In the instant case the compensatory and punitive damages are covered by the prayer for general relief. In the Laburnum case it was held that the jurisdiction of the state courts of Virginia was not ousted by the Labor Management Relations Act, although the United States Supreme Court stated: '* * * we assume the conduct before us also constituted an unfair labor practice' within the provisions of Section 8(b) and other sections of of the so-called Taft Hartley Law, and denied the contention that the Act of 1947, Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., had occupied the labor relations field so completely that no regulatory agency, other than the National Labor Relations Board, and no court, may assert jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, as defined by it. The United States Supreme Court held that 'Here Congress has neither provided nor suggested any substitute for the traditional state court procedure for collecting damages for injuries caused by tortious...