Benjamin v. Malcolm

• Citation: 626 F. Supp. 1264
• Decision Date: 30 January 1986
• Docket Number: No. 75 Civ. 3073 (MEL).,75 Civ. 3073 (MEL).
• Parties: James BENJAMIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Benjamin J. MALCOLM, Commissioner of Correction of the City of New York; et al., Defendants, v. Mario CUOMO, et al., Third-Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

626 F. Supp. 1264

James BENJAMIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Benjamin J. MALCOLM, Commissioner of Correction of the City of New York; et al., Defendants, v. Mario CUOMO, et al., Third-Party Defendants.

No. 75 Civ. 3073 (MEL).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

January 30, 1986.

Theodore H. Katz, Dale A. Wilker, Jonathan S. Chasan, Legal Aid Soc., Criminal Appeals Bureau, Prisoners' Rights Project, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Frederick A.O. Schwartz, Jr., Corp. Counsel, New York City, for defendants; Leonard Koerner, Litigating Asst. Paul Rephen, of counsel.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of N.Y., New York City, for third-party defendants; Barbara B. Butler, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel.

LASKER, Senior District Judge.

This class action concerns overcrowding in the House of Detention for Men on Rikers Island ("HDM"). Three years after relief was granted against the state defendants in this case, the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) ("Pennhurst II"), holding that federal courts have no jurisdiction to enjoin state officials on the basis of a state law violation. Relying on that authority, Governor Mario Cuomo¹ and Thomas A. Coughlin III, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("the State defendants") move to vacate the order of August 20, 1981 requiring the State to accept "state ready" inmates within forty-eight hours after processing and to dismiss the State defendants on the ground that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

On September 28, 1979 Benjamin J. Malcolm, Commissioner of Correction of the City of New York, and other City officials (collectively "the City defendants" or "the City") entered into a "Stipulation for Entry of an Order" with the inmates "to secure plaintiffs' rights to be housed under constitutional conditions." By opinion dated August 27, 1980², it was held on the basis of the parties' stipulation that HDM was unconstitutionally overcrowded and, on the basis of additional evidence presented, the City was ordered not to house more than 1,200 inmates at HDM. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F.Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y.1980).

Although the City defendants conceded that HDM was overcrowded, they took the position early in the litigation that the overcrowding was partially attributable to the presence of inmates who properly should have been in the State's custody and that the State's failure to assume responsibility for the confinement of the inmates was restricting the City's ability to comply with court orders. By order to show cause on June 4, 1981 the City moved to join the State defendants as indispensable parties pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 and 20.

After evaluating what we determined were the controlling factual considerations, the City's motion was granted.³ Moreover, relying upon the prudent jurisprudential approach of not deciding constitutional questions when an adequate state law basis for relief exists, we concluded that New York law clearly obligated the State to do what the City was requesting:

There is no doubt that the situation in the state system is a grave situation, as it also is in the city system. However, with regard to the question of legal obligation of the parties it is the legal obligation of the state to remove state readies forthwith, as the statute says referring to N.Y.Crim.P.Law § 430.20 (McKinney 1983).

Transcript at 129 (July 29, 1981).

The State defendants were instructed to accept inmates from HDM within forty-eight hours of their becoming state readies, and on August 20, 1981 an order was issued to that effect.⁴ It is this order which the State defendants seek to vacate through the instant motion.

The State defendants argue that the 1981 order must be vacated because Pennhurst II prohibits a federal court from ordering state officials to comply with state law and that the Eleventh Amendment permits a federal court to enjoin the actions of state officials only when the officials are acting unconstitutionally. In this case, they maintain, the only assertion that the United States Constitution has been violated is plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against the City, and there is no cause of action by either plaintiffs or the City against the state for depriving the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. Moreover, citing such classic decisions as Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), the State defendants argue that the City is precluded from raising such a claim because it lacks the requisite standing to do so.

The City defendants vigorously contest the State's construction of Pennhurst II. Relying primarily on our suggestion in a previous decision that the State's behavior may be of constitutional significance,⁵ the City answers that "this Court's determination to join the State defendants and to impose a remedy against them was designed to effectuate the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and secondarily involved a discussion of state law." Defendants' Memorandum of Law at 7 (Feb. 27, 1985). Pennhurst II, as the City interprets it, is not controlling where, as here, the State defendants' presence in the litigation is needed to promote the vindication of federal rights.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, view the dispute as one between the City and the State and have not formally responded to the motion except to submit a letter-brief in which they substantially agree with the City's analysis of the law and the background facts. The heart of plaintiffs' position was expressed as follows:

Our consistent concern in this litigation has been compliance with this Court's Orders that require constitutionally acceptable population levels in the City jails, regardless of the outcome of disputes between the City and State regarding their respective responsibilities for various categories of inmates. The outcome of the pending motion should not, we believe, have any bearing on the City's liability under those Orders.

Letter of Theodore H. Katz, et al. (Feb. 28, 1985). Plaintiffs have never asserted any claims against the State defendants and have indicated that they have no present intention of doing so.

A.

Resolution of the issue at hand requires a determination as to the reach of Pennhurst II. Any such analysis would be incomplete without consideration of that litigation's history.

In Pennhurst II mentally retarded citizens brought a class action against various Pennsylvania state and county officials challenging the fact and conditions of their institutional confinement. The District Court held that the conditions of Pennhurst State School and Hospital violated plaintiffs' rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V), and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, Pa.Stat. Ann., tit. 50 §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 & Supp.1982).

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit substantially affirmed the District Court's ruling, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.1979) (en banc), but grounded its conclusion that plaintiffs had a right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976). The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that 42 U.S.C. § 6010 did not create any substantive rights. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals "to determine if the remedial order could be supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act." Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 31, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1547, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981).

On remand the Court of Appeals never reached the remaining issues of federal law, instead concluding (en banc) that the state statute fully supported its earlier judgment. 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.1982). In upholding the prior judgment the Court of Appeals rejected the State defendants' arguments that the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal court from considering the State law claim. Relying on Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 29 S.Ct. 451, 53 L.Ed. 753 (1909) ("an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction," Pennhurst II, 104 S.Ct. at 905), the Court of Appeals determined that the Amendment did not bar a federal court from granting prospective relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim:

The Supreme Court's remand for further consideration of the federal constitutional questions establishes as law of the case for this court the substantiality of the federal question supporting jurisdiction.

673 F.2d at 658-59.

The Supreme Court disagreed. Pennhurst, the Court reasoned, was distinguishable from the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (federal court may enjoin state official from enforcing unconstitutional statute), because unlike Young, the need to reconcile the promotion of the supremacy of federal rights with the constitutional immunity of the States "is wholly absent ... when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has violated state law." Pennhurst II, 104 S.Ct. at 911 (emphasis in the original). The Court accordingly concluded:

a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh Amendment when—as here— the relief sought and ordered has an impact directly on the State itself.

Id. at 917.

Further, rejecting plaintiffs'-respondents' numerous public policy arguments,⁶ the majority held that neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of...