Bennett v. Beam

• Decision Date: 06 January 1880
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: JOHN M. BENNETT v. MARY E. BEAM.

4 N.W. 8

42 Mich. 346

JOHN M. BENNETT v. MARY E. BEAM.

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 6, 1880

In an action for breach of promise, the fact that a portion of the testimony may, if taken alone, tend to show a promise differing from that alleged, does not make such evidence inadmissible; the whole testimony is to be taken together. In an action for breach of promise, part of the testimony was as to a promise to marry when certain buggies were completed. Held, that the law would imply that they were to be completed within a reasonable time. Testimony as to effect of the breach upon the feelings of the plaintiff in such action is competent. In an action for breach of promise to marry evidence of the financial position of the defendant is proper as bearing on the question of damages, and the fact that the female plaintiff has been seduced under such promise is also admissible in aggravation of damages, and the amount allowable in such case is almost wholly in the discretion of the jury. Admission of evidence of offers of settlement made by defendant's brother, and rejection of evidence of certain interviews between defendant and plaintiff's father, in her absence, and of certain offers by defendant made after this action was commenced, to carry out the agreement to marry, held proper.

Error to Wayne.

Moore & Moore, for plaintiff in error.

G.V.N Lothrop, for defendant in error.

MARSTON C.J.

The action in this case was brought to recover damages for breach of a contract to marry.

1. It is alleged as error that the plaintiff was allowed to prove a promise to marry when certain buggies, which were in process of manufacture, were finished, while the declaration alleged a promise--First, upon request; second, within a reasonable time; and, third, generally.

This evidence was properly admitted. It was a part of the entire transaction of what was said by the parties, and it was for the jury to determine, not from any particular sentence or conversation, but from all the facts and circumstances of the case, the actual agreement entered into, if any, and whether the promise alleged in the declaration was proven. A particular conversation, one of several relating to the same subject-matter, or a part thereof, may tend to establish an agreement other or different from that set forth in the declaration; but so long as it forms but a part, or one of several, and is otherwise admissible, it cannot be rejected, because in apparent conflict with the contract alleged.

To reject such evidence would be to so clip and trim the facts as to present to the jury but a meager portion thereof, while they should hear all that was said by and what took place between the parties, relating to or fairly bearing upon the question of a promise to marry. Expressions used, when considered alone, might have a strong tendency to prove a promise to marry at a particular time, yet, when taken in connection with other facts and circumstances, the tendency might be very different. To so frame a declaration that each expression or distinct promise made would be counted on, would be of no benefit to the defendant, and would, we think, make the pleadings needlessly prolix, uncertain and misleading.

I am not satisfied but that this evidence, standing alone, would tend to support the declaration. It was of a promise to marry when certain buggies, then in process of manufacture, were finished. No time was then mentioned, nor did it otherwise appear when the buggies were to be finished. The law, therefore, would imply a reasonable time, and even if the buggies had never been made the party could not abandon his contract on such a ground, because, evidently, their completion had no important bearing on the contract.

2. It is alleged as error that the plaintiff and her father were allowed to testify as to the effect of the alleged refusal to marry upon her mind and feelings. That such evidence was admissible under the general allegations of the declaration we consider too clear to require argument. The effect upon her mind and feelings was one of the usual and natural results of the breach, and had an essential bearing upon the question of damages.

3. That it was not proper to show the financial standing of the defendant.

In this state it is a well-settled legal axiom that the just theory of an action for damages, and its primary object, are, that the damages recovered shall compensate for the injury sustained. There are exceptions to this rule, but it would not be claimed that this case comes within them.

Now the contract for a breach of which this suit was brought was one for a life association of interests, and it is one of the most obvious facts that the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant, as well as his social position, would largely influence any one's estimate of the damages suffered. This would be so even if the woman had in no manner taken the man's property into account in engaging herself to him, but the law always supposes that property considerations are not ignored in these cases.

In cases like the present, what loss is it that the plaintiff has sustained by a breach of the contract? To determine this we must look at the surroundings, and see what it was to which the defendant invited her. If it was to a home of poverty and a life of probable hardship and misery, the loss would apparently be small; but if it was to a home possessed of and surrounded by all the comforts and even...