Bennett v. City of Redfield

Decision Date20 September 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-1073,88-1073
Citation446 N.W.2d 467
PartiesHoward BENNETT, Appellee, v. CITY OF REDFIELD, Iowa, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

David J. Welu and Constance C. Welu of Welu & Welu, Redfield, for appellant.

Thomas Mann, Jr., of Mann & Mann, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by LARSON, P.J., and CARTER, NEUMAN, SNELL and ANDREASEN, JJ.

ANDREASEN, Justice.

Howard Bennett was employed by the City of Redfield for approximately twenty-five years. On September 3, 1985, the City took action at a regular council meeting to terminate his employment as street superintendent. A written notice of termination was filed with the city clerk and a copy mailed to Bennett informing him of the reasons for termination effective September 20, 1985. The notice listed the following reasons for his discharge: (1) failure to follow orders, (2) inattention to duties, (3) reduction and consolidation of city employment positions, (4) misuse of city time. On September 18, Bennett requested a public hearing upon his discharge.

The public hearing was held on October 17, 1985. Bennett and his attorney appeared before the city council at the special council meeting. The city mayor stated the purpose for the special council meeting and the reasons for Bennett's discharge. Bennett and his attorney were given the floor to respond to the issues concerning the discharge. Bennett, his attorney, members of the council, and others attending the meeting made comments and expressed their opinions. A motion to rehire Bennett as street superintendent was defeated. Bennett refused the City's offer of part-time employment.

On March 3, 1986, Bennett filed suit in Iowa district court. In his 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claim, Bennett alleged his civil rights had been violated by the manner in which the City had discharged him and conducted the public hearing. He claimed he was deprived of his property and his liberty without due process. In a separate count, he alleged the City wrongfully discharged him in violation of public policy. The City denied the allegations and asserted that Bennett was an employee at will who had no constitutional right to due process upon his employment termination. The City alleged it had complied with the notice and hearing requirements of Iowa Code section 372.15 (1987).

Both parties filed motions for summary judgment urging there were no material disputed facts. On September 18, 1987, Judge Brown granted summary judgment to the City upon Bennett's property interest due process claim and his wrongful discharge claim. The court denied summary judgment to the City upon Bennett's liberty interest due process claim. The court denied Bennett's motion for summary judgment and his motion to amend.

The case was tried to a jury upon Bennett's liberty interest due process claim. The jury returned a $65,000 verdict for Bennett. Judge Keller entered judgment upon the verdict. The court denied Bennett's application for attorney fees. The City appealed from the judgment and post-trial rulings of the court. Bennett filed a cross-appeal on the court's failure to grant his motions for summary judgment, amendment, attorney fees, and other trial motions.

I. The City's Appeal.

At the close of Bennett's evidence at trial, the City moved for a directed verdict. The City claimed Bennett had failed to offer substantial evidence to support each of the elements of his liberty interest due process claim. It urged that Bennett's own evidence established that a name clearing hearing had been provided by the City and thus Bennett had failed to prove his request for a hearing had been denied. The City cited the case of Campbell v. Pierce County, 741 F.2d 1342 (11th Cir.1984), as authority. The City renewed its motion for a directed verdict at the close of all evidence. The motion was again denied. After the jury returned with its verdict for Bennett, the City filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 243. The City appealed from the trial court's denial of this motion and its entry of a judgment upon the jury verdict.

We must determine whether there was substantial evidence to support each element of Bennett's claim. If there was not, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, urged upon the same grounds as the motion for directed verdict, should have been granted. Lala v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 804, 806 (Iowa 1988). If there was substantial evidence to support each element of the claim, then the court properly denied the motion.

Liberty Interest Due Process Claim.

To prevail upon his section 1983 claim, Bennett must establish (1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution, and (2) the deprivation of that right by persons "acting under color of state law." Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 26 L.Ed.2d 142, 150 (1970). Bennett claims the City deprived him of his constitutional right of liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. While "liberty" is most clearly deprived when a state takes an individual into custody, the state also may deprive a person of his or her liberty by damaging the person's reputation so severely that associational or employment opportunities are impaired or foreclosed. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 558-59 (1972); 4 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations 3d, sec. 12.260, p. 503 (1985). This may occur when a city discharges a public employee. See, e.g., Anderson v. Low Rent Hous. Comm'n, 304 N.W.2d 239, 243 (Iowa 1981).

To establish a liberty interest due process claim, the claimant must prove that the employer published 1 false 2, stigmatizing 3 charges in connection with the discharge 4 which were denied by the claimant 5 and which seriously damaged the claimant's employment opportunities or standing and associations in the community, 6 all without notice and opportunity to be heard in a name clearing hearing 7 requested 8 by the claimant.

Therefore, if the claimant has been afforded notice and opportunity to be heard in a name clearing hearing, no liberty interest claim arises. As stated in Nelson v. City of McGehee, 876 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir.1989), "[i]t is the denial of due process, not the alleged defamation per se, which triggers a federal cause of action." The due process requirement is satisfied where the employee is notified of the reasons for discharge and furnished the opportunity of a name clearing hearing. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, 92 S.Ct. at 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d at 558-59. Where a property interest in public employment is at issue, a pretermination hearing is required. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494, 503-04 (1983). However, where an employee's liberty interest is at issue, a post-termination hearing is sufficient. As expressed by the Supreme Court:

[L]iberty is not offended by dismissal from employment itself, but instead by dismissal based upon an unsupported charge which could wrongfully injure the reputation of an employee. Since the purpose of the hearing in such a case is to provide the person "an opportunity to clear his name," a hearing afforded by administrative appeal procedures after the actual dismissal is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Due Process Clause.

Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 157, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1646, 40 L.Ed.2d 15, 35 (1974).

If a name clearing hearing is requested, even a special purpose hearing before the governing body that discharged the employee may satisfy due process requirements. See Rosenstein v. City of Dallas, 876 F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir.1989); Campbell v. Pierce County, 741 F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (11th Cir.1984). Due process requires only that the claimant be accorded notice of the charges and opportunity to present arguments and evidence at a public forum. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d at 503-04; Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 156-57 (8th Cir.1973).

On our review of the record, we find the City notified Bennett of the reasons for his removal in accordance with Iowa Code section 372.15. A public hearing was held within thirty days of Bennett's request for a hearing. At the hearing, Bennett and his attorney, Linda Pettit, responded to the reasons given for his discharge. They offered petitions signed by persons in the community. Pettit testified they brought out everything that Bennett had to say at that hearing. Bennett had no disagreement with her testimony. Bennett did not present substantial evidence that he was denied an opportunity to be heard in a name clearing hearing. Therefore, the district court erred in denying the City's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

In addition, Bennett failed to present substantial evidence on another element of his claim. He did not produce substantial evidence that the City gave stigmatizing reasons for his dismissal. To violate the constitutionally protected liberty interest, the accusations must be of grave consequence. Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Comm'n, 304 N.W.2d at 244. They must involve allegations of dishonest, immoral, or illegal conduct that call into question the terminated employee's honesty, reputation, or good name. Id.

It is undisputed on appeal that the first three reasons given by the City for discharging Bennett were not stigmatizing in nature. However, even a charge of "misuse of city time" does not stigmatize an individual unless other circumstances show that dishonest, immoral, or illegal conduct is implied in the allegation. Bennett failed to produce such other evidence. A charge of "misuse of city time" may imply that the employee, through no character fault of the employee, failed to establish priorities or to use city time efficiently. See, e.g., Nathanson v. United States, 630 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (8th Cir.1980) (charge of failure to follow procedures not...

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