Bennett v. City of Kingman
| Citation | 543 F.Supp.3d 794 |
| Decision Date | 14 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-19-08001-PCT-MTL,CV-19-08001-PCT-MTL |
| Parties | Robert E BENNETT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF KINGMAN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Robert E. Bennett, Kingman, AZ, Pro Se.
Judith D. Bennett, Kingman, AZ, Pro Se.
Catherine Mary Bowman, Law Office of Catherine M Bowman, Mesa, AZ, for Defendant.
Before the Court are Plaintiffs Robert and Judith Bennett's (collectively, the "Bennetts") Request for Writ of Mandamus Motion to Void Kingman City Ordinance 1471 (Doc. 40) and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 48), and Defendant City of Kingman's (the "City") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 47).
The Court now rules.1
The Bennetts own five acres of real property in Mohave County, Arizona (the "Property"). (Doc. 23 ("FAC") ¶ 1.) Storage units exist on the eastern portion of the Property; the remaining 3.4 acres of land are unimproved. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) The Bennetts intend to one day expand their storage business onto the unimproved portion of their land. (Id. ¶ 11.) That expansion, or lack thereof, is at the heart of this case.
The facts relevant to this case date back to 2003, when the Kingman City Council considered annexing certain unincorporated land, including the subject Property. The City obtained the Bennetts’ written consent, which, according to the Bennetts, was conditioned on the City's verbal promise that they could someday build additional storage units on the Property. (Id. ¶ 17; Doc. 52 at 19.)2 The City annexed the Property shortly thereafter. (Doc. 47–1 ¶ 6.)
The City Council then amended the Kingman Zoning Ordinance by establishing a C-2-HMR zoning district. (FAC ¶ 19; Doc. 26 ¶ 19.) Building storage units, like those on the Property, is not permitted on C-2-HMR property. (FAC ¶ 21; Doc. 26 ¶ 19.) In 2005, the City Council passed Ordinance 1471, which rezoned certain commercial land, including the Bennetts’ Property, to C-2-HMR. (FAC ¶ 20; Doc. 47–1 ¶¶ 11–13.)
Seven years later, in September 2012, the Bennetts learned that Ordinance 1471 had been passed and that their land had been rezoned. (FAC ¶ 88.) In 2013, the Bennetts applied for a conditional use permit ("CUP") to build additional storage units on the Property. (Id. ¶ 25.) The Bennetts also asked the City to rezone the Property back to C-2 Commercial Community Business. (Id. ¶ 27.) The City Council denied the rezoning request but passed an ordinance allowing storage units to be constructed on C-2-HMR property if a landowner obtained a CUP. (Id. ¶ 30.) The Council then approved the Bennetts’ CUP application. (Id. ; Doc. 52 at 68–74.)
By the terms of the Kingman Zoning Ordinance, the Bennetts’ CUP would expire if they did not receive a building permit one year from the date of approval. See Kingman, Ariz., Kingman Zoning Code § 29.410(1). This one-year expiration is common to all CUPs issued by the City of Kingman. Id. Due to engineering delays, the Bennetts sought, and the City approved, two one-year extensions of the CUP. (FAC ¶¶ 33–41.) In 2016, the Bennetts sought a third extension. (Id. ¶ 43.) The Planning and Zoning Commission held a public hearing on the Bennetts’ request and unanimously recommended denying the extension. (Doc. 52 at 97–98.) On January 3, 2017, the City Council considered the request at a public hearing. (Id. ) A Development Services Director gave a presentation on the issue, and the City subsequently allowed public comment. (Id. )
Four residents addressed the City Council. (Id. ) Each resident opposed the Bennetts’ request, citing concerns of trash accumulation, increased traffic, negative impacts on surrounding property values, and threats to neighborhood safety. (Id. ) The City Council unanimously voted to deny the Bennetts’ request for extension. (Id. at 99.) Two days later, on January 5, 2017, the CUP expired. The Bennetts applied for a new CUP in 2018. (FAC ¶ 51.) On November 6, 2018, after a public hearing, the City denied their application. (Id. ¶ 52; Doc. 52 at 100–02.)
The Bennetts initiated this action on January 2, 2019. (Doc. 1.) Their First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleges six claims for relief: (1) violation of the federal Takings Clause; (2) violation of the Arizona Constitution's Takings Clause; (3) vested rights violation; (4) Due Process Clause violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (5) taking without just compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; and (6) breach of contract. (Doc. 23.) The Bennetts, who are now proceeding pro se , have filed a Request for Writ of Mandamus to Void Kingman City Ordinance 1471 (Doc. 40), to which the City filed a response (Doc. 54). The Bennetts have also moved for partial summary judgment. (Doc. 48.) The City moves for summary judgment on all claims. (Doc. 47.) The Court will first address the Bennetts’ request for mandamus relief. An evaluation of the summary judgment motions follows.
The Bennetts request mandamus relief to void the City's annexation of the Property and Ordinance 1471. (Doc. 40.) The Bennetts do not clearly articulate whether they seek mandamus under federal or state law. For purposes of evaluating the motion, the Court will first apply federal law.
The Federal Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, "provides district courts with mandamus power ‘to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.’ " Indep. Mining Co. v. Babbitt , 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1361 ) (emphasis added). "Federal courts have no jurisdiction or authority"—under the Federal Mandamus Act—"to issue mandamus to direct non-federal entities or officials in the performance of their duties." Andrade v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. , No. 5:21-CV-00202, 2021 WL 412267, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2021) (citations omitted); see also Clark v. Washington , 366 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966) (); Fox v. City of Pasadena , 78 F.2d 948, 950 (9th Cir. 1935) (); Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colo. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 879 F.2d 789, 790 (10th Cir. 1989) (). The City is neither an "officer or employee of the United States" nor an "agency thereof." See 28 U.S.C. § 1361. The Court therefore denies the Bennetts’ request for mandamus relief to the extent it derives from the Federal Mandamus Act.
To the extent that the Bennetts seek relief under Arizona law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Federal courts "have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to [the original jurisdiction claims] that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). District courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if "(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the [original jurisdiction claims], (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances." Id. § 1367(c).
Grounds to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a mandamus action arising under Arizona law exist under factors one and four. Specifically, "[c]onsiderations of federalism and comity, not generally present with typical ‘pendent’ state claims, loom large in the case of state mandamus proceedings." Clemes v. Del Norte Cnty. Unified Sch. Dist. , 843 F. Supp. 583, 596 (N.D. Cal. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Maynard v. City of San Jose , 37 F.3d 1396, 1403–04 (9th Cir. 1994). "Mandamus proceedings to compel a state [or municipal entity] to act are actions that are uniquely in the interest and domain of state courts." Id. A federal court should not, through the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, impose itself on such matters. Id. ; see also Tomlinson v. Cnty. of Monterey , No. C-07-00990, 2007 WL 2298038, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2007) (). And the Court will not do so here. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Bennetts’ mandamus request without prejudice so that they may renew the claim, if they so choose, in state court.
Both parties have moved for summary judgment. The Bennetts move for summary judgment on their vested interest and Due Process Clause claims.3 The City moves for summary judgment on all claims. As a threshold matter, the Bennetts argue that the Court should not consider the merits of the City's summary judgment motion because it was filed one day after the dispositive motion deadline expired. (Doc. 51.) The Court agrees that the City's motion was untimely but otherwise rejects the Bennetts’ request. (See Doc. 37 at 2.)
When a party fails to timely act, a court may extend the time to act—and thereby consider an untimely motion—for good cause if that party failed to act because of excusable neglect. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). "To determine whether a party's failure to meet a deadline constitutes ‘excusable neglect,’ " the Court "must apply a four-factor equitable test, examining: (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith." Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc. , 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship , 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) ).
Rule 6(b)(1)(B), "like all the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is to be liberally construed to effectuate the general...
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