Bennett v. Com., Dept. of Social Services, Div. of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Waters, 1505-91-1
Decision Date | 29 September 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 1505-91-1,1505-91-1 |
Citation | 422 S.E.2d 458,15 Va.App. 135 |
Parties | William C. BENNETT v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Division of Child Support Enforcement, ex rel. Dianne Elaine Waters. Record |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Alan S. Mirman, Norfolk, for appellant.
George B. Pearson, Asst. Com. Atty., for the City of Chesapeake, for appellee.
Present: KOONTZ, C.J., and BAKER and COLEMAN, JJ.
William C. Bennett, appellant, appeals an order entered in the Family Court of the City of Chesapeake (family court) pursuant to the provisions of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), Code §§ 20-88.12, et seq., awarding Dianne Waters, appellee, 1 a judgment for partial spousal support arrearages accumulated under a 1977 New Jersey divorce decree. Bennett asserts that Code § 8.01-252 operates as an absolute bar to the entry of any judgment against him because the New Jersey decree was entered more than ten years before Waters commenced the URESA proceedings. Waters cross claims and asserts that the family court erred in applying Code § 8.01-252 to the URESA proceedings, thereby limiting the amount of the judgment and denying her a judgment for the full amount of the arrearages accumulated under the New Jersey decree. For the reasons that follow, we hold that Code § 8.01-252 is not applicable in a URESA proceeding where the judgment of another state which is the basis of the proceeding does not adjudicate a sum certain due and owing but, rather, establishes only an ongoing, unliquidated support obligation. Accordingly, we affirm the family court's award of a judgment for partial spousal support arrearages, reverse its failure to consider the full amount of the arrearages due under the New Jersey decree, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The facts from which this controversy arose are presented to us in an agreed statement of facts. We further summarize the pertinent facts here. On February 3, 1977, the New Jersey court entered a final decree of divorce between the parties and ordered Bennett to pay Waters weekly spousal and child support. Waters remarried on August 29, 1982. Bennett's ongoing spousal support obligation terminated on that day. On September 12, 1990, Waters filed a URESA petition in the New Jersey court seeking spousal support arrearages accumulated prior to her remarriage. The petition was appropriately processed and came on for a hearing in the Virginia court on July 22, 1991. No testimony was taken at this hearing. The case was heard on the records, Bennett's motion to dismiss pursuant to Code § 8.01-252, and argument of counsel for both parties.
On August 31, 1991, the family court entered an order reflecting its rulings that: (1) Code § 8.01-252 acts as a statute of limitations on claims more than ten years old and, thus, bars Waters' claim for arrearages accruing prior to September 20, 1980 (ten years preceding the filing of the URESA petition on September 12, 1990); (2) all sums accruing from September 20, 1980 to August 29, 1982 (the date of Waters' remarriage) were due and owing by Bennett; and (3) Waters was entitled to a judgment in the amount of $6,630 for these arrearages. This appeal followed.
Code § 8.01-252 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "Every action upon a judgment rendered in another state ... shall be barred, if such action would there be barred by the laws of such state ..., and in no event shall an action be brought upon any such judgment rendered more than ten years before the commencement of the action." (emphasis added).
Bennett does not assert that the present URESA proceedings would be barred by the laws of New Jersey. He does not contest the amount of the arrearage accumulated under the New Jersey decree. We also initially note that we are not presented with an issue, pursuant to Code § 20-88.18, whether the family court had jurisdiction to determine the full amount of arrearages accruing under the New Jersey decree while Bennett was present in Virginia. See Scott v. Sylvester, 220 Va. 182, 257 S.E.2d 774 (1979). We are also not presented an issue whether New Jersey or Virginia law applies to the determination of the amount of the arrearages actually due. See Scott v. Sylvester, 225 Va. 304, 302 S.E.2d 30, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961, 104 S.Ct. 395, 78 L.Ed.2d 338 (1983). Rather, we are presented with an issue of Virginia law, specifically, the proper application of Code § 8.01-252 to a proceeding under Code § 20-88.30:6.
The provisions of these Code sections invoke the facially circular assertions of the parties on the facts of this appeal. Based upon the above emphasized language of Code § 8.01-252, Bennett asserts that the New Jersey court "rendered" its "judgment" on February 3, 1977 and Waters commenced her URESA action more than ten years later, when she filed her URESA petition on September 12, 1990. Therefore, he asserts that Code § 8.01-252 operates as an absolute bar to the recovery for any arrearages accruing under the New Jersey decree. Bennett further asserts that Code § 20-88.30:6(C) permits him to assert those defenses that would be available to him "as defenses in an action to enforce a foreign money judgment." Thus, by equating a foreign "money judgment" to a "judgment rendered in another state" he asserts that Code § 8.01-252 provides one such defense in every URESA proceeding. In contrast, Waters asserts that Code § 8.01-252 has no application to a URESA proceeding. She asserts that the "duty to pay [spousal support] arrearages" is enforceable pursuant to Code § 20-88.20, no support order may be retroactively modified, except for the period during which there is notice to the responding party of a pending modification petition, pursuant to Code § 20-88.28:2 and, therefore, Code § 8.01-252 is not applicable to a URESA proceeding.
While the positions of the parties in this appeal are readily stated, the resolution of these contrasting positions is another matter. This is so, as will be shown, because the critical terms "support order," "judgment," and "money judgment" are used in different contexts in URESA and Code § 8.01-252 and must be interpreted and applied in the context of particular facts to ensure they are given the meaning intended by our legislature. Moreover, because a "support order" is a "judgment" but not necessarily a "money judgment," the resolution of the issues presented here are complicated further. To resolve the facially circular contentions of the parties invoked by the pertinent statutes, we begin our analysis with the distinctions which must be made among support orders that adjudicate an ongoing, unliquidated spousal support obligation and those that adjudicate a sum certain or liquidated amount due and owing for spousal support. We do so to bring into proper context the terms "support order," "judgment," and "money judgment" as used in the pertinent statutes and applicable to the present case.
In common practice in legal documents, statutes and court opinions, a "decree" for spousal support entered pursuant to Code § 20-107.1, the statutory authority for such a decree, or an "order" directing the payment of spousal support entered pursuant to Title 16.1 or Title 20, the statutory authority for such an order, is often interchangeably denoted a decree, order or judgment for spousal support. In a general sense, and in most cases, a decree or order for spousal support requires the payment of money. Code § 8.01-426 embraces the terms "decree or order requiring the payment of money" within the definition of "judgment" and, thus, provides the statutory justification for the interchangeable use of these terms by legal writers in the factual context of most cases. 2 However, while spousal support orders are judgments, the distinction between a spousal support order that only adjudicates an ongoing, unliquidated spousal support obligation and one that adjudicates a sum certain or liquidated amount due and owing will determine whether a particular spousal support order is properly considered a "money judgment" in the context of a URESA proceeding. In turn this distinction will determine the proper application of Code § 8.01-252 in a particular case.
In this Commonwealth, based upon the acknowledged uniqueness of a spousal support obligation, our legislature and our courts have drawn significant distinctions between spousal support orders and judgments for money. See Brown v. Brown, 5 Va.App. 238, 246, 361 S.E.2d 364, 368 (1987); Eddens v. Eddens, 188 Va. 511, 517, 50 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1948); West v. West, 126 Va. 696, 699, 101 S.E. 876, 877 (1920) ( ). See also Code §§ 8.01-458 and 8.01-460 ( ). We need not attempt to identify all essential similarities and differences between spousal support orders and money judgments. For purposes of our present analysis, it is sufficient that we clarify those spousal support orders that are and those that are not essentially identical to money judgments. This clarification necessitates a brief discussion of the nature of Virginia spousal support orders as applicable in the context of the present case.
In Virginia, a spousal support order is purely a creature of statute. Code § 20-107.1 limits the support obligation to the life-time of the obligor spouse. Absent a contrary specific stipulation or contract between the parties, Code §§ 20-109 and 20-110 limit the support obligation until the death of one of the parties or the remarriage of the obligee spouse. In addition, Code § 20-109 permits the court, under proper circumstances, to increase, decrease, or terminate spousal support that may...
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