Bennett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 29 March 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:11–CV–0393–D.
• Citation: 936 F.Supp.2d 767
• Parties: Rodney BENNETT, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

936 F.Supp.2d 767

Rodney BENNETT, Plaintiff,

v.DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:11–CV–0393–D.

United States District Court,

N.D. Texas,

Dallas Division.

March 29, 2013.

Robert E. Goodman, Jr., Kilgore & Kilgore PLLC, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Annie Lau, Dianna D. Bowen, Fisher & Phillips LLP, Dallas, TX, Julie D. Loring, Fisher & Phillips LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER, Chief Judge.

This employment discrimination action brought by a veteran returning from service in Afghanistan and Iraq requires that the court decide whether a reasonable jury could find in his favor on claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq. Concluding that a reasonable jury could not find in his favor, the court grants defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismisses this lawsuit.

I

Plaintiff Rodney Bennett (“Bennett”) was employed by defendant Dallas Independent School District (“DISD”) as a police officer from February 2, 2001 until August 31, 2010.¹ As an armed police officer, Bennett was responsible for patrolling school grounds, preventing the commission of crimes, apprehending criminals, and responding to emergency situations within an environment made up predominantly of children.

Between March 2005 and June 2006, and again between May 2007 and March 2009, Bennett was called to active duty as a member of the United States Army in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively.² During his deployment to Iraq, Bennett was seriously injured when a rocket-propelled grenade (“RPG”) hit his vehicle. Consequently, he was assigned to Fort Benning, Georgia on a “medical holdover” until January 2009.³ Bennett reported his injury to DISD and also informed DISD of the cause of his injury and that he had undergone subsequent medical treatment at a military base hospital in Georgia. It is undisputed that Bennett was suffering from two disabilities when he returned from the military: a knee injury and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). DISD does not concede for purposes of the ADA, however, that Bennett was disabled or regarded as disabled.⁴

In May 2009, when Bennett was returning from military leave, DISD requested that he complete an Essential Functions Form (“EFF”). DISD also informed Bennett that, in order to return to his duties as a police officer, it would be necessary for him to submit to, and successfully complete, a psychological fitness for duty exam. DISD maintains that, due to his self-disclosed physical injuries, the EFF was necessary so that the DISD Police Department could determine which position Bennett was qualified to fill. According to Bennett's May 15, 2009 EFF, he could not perform the following “essential job functions of police officers” for six months: walking and running for long periods of time; jumping from elevated surfaces; navigating obstacles such as ditches, streams, or fences; balancing on uneven or narrow surfaces; using force to gain entry through barriers; maintaining a full range of motion of the neck and head; or bending over, reaching, crouching, climbing stairs, and lifting and dragging one's own body weight in the course of performing job-related duties. D. App. 258.

In June 2009, when Bennett returned to work at DISD, he was offered a light-duty position in the DISD Police Department as an unarmed security officer due to his physical limitations, as stated on the May 15, 2009 EFF. In this position, Bennett was still considered a police officer in the DISD Police Department, and his pay and benefits remained the same as they had been before Bennett was deployed in May 2007. DISD refused to issue Bennett a uniform because he was not functioning as a police officer due to his physical restrictions.

An EFF completed in January 2010 indicated the same limitations as Bennett's May 15, 2009 EFF, but did not indicate an estimated date of recovery. On April 6, 2010 Bennett's physician completed another examination and reported that his restrictions on running and bending were extended for at least 12 more months. Based on his physician's reports, DISD's ADA Committee determined in April 2010 that it would accommodate Bennett by assigning him to a police dispatcher position. In a meeting held later that month with DISD Assistant Chief of Police Isaac “Bill” Avera (“Avera”), DISD's Police Department Director of Operations Rene Ronquillo (“Ronquillo”), and Lieutenant Calvin Howard (“Howard”), Bennett was informed that he was being reassigned to a dispatcher position, but that his salary, status, and benefits would remain the same. Bennett was also advised that, before he could return to his duties as a police officer, it would be necessary to submit to, and successfully complete, a psychological fitness for duty examination. Finally, Bennett was told that, when he moved to the dispatcher position, DISD would not be able to continue carrying his police commission, which allows him to carry a gun at all times, on or off duty.

On May 10, 2010 Bennett submitted a new physical examination report from a physician indicating that, as of April 28, 2010, the temporary restrictions on walking, running, and bending were terminated, and clearing him for all essential physical duties of a police patrol officer. Rather than assign Bennett to the position of patrol officer, however, DISD continued to request that he submit to a psychological fitness for duty evaluation. Bennett refused to do so and did not report to work after June 23, 2010.

Bennett filed a grievance with the DISD Human Resources Department on May 10, 2010, asserting that he had been a victim of discrimination and a hostile work environment. In June 2010 Bennett filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging violations of the ADA. DISD terminated Bennett's employment on August 31, 2010 for job abandonment and for insubordination based on his failure to undergo the required psychological evaluation.

After receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, Bennett filed suit against DISD asserting claims for violations of the ADA and USERRA. DISD moves for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all claims. Bennett opposes the motion.⁵

II

When a party moves for summary judgment on a claim for which the opposing party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can meet its summary judgment obligation by pointing the court to the absence of admissible evidence to support the opposing party's claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party does so, the opposing party must go beyond his pleadings and designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548;Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (per curiam). An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the opposing party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The opposing party's failure to produce proof as to any essential element of a claim renders all other facts immaterial. See Trugreen Landcare, L.L.C. v. Scott, 512 F.Supp.2d 613, 623 (N.D.Tex.2007) (Fitzwater, J.) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is mandatory if the opposing party fails to meet this burden. Little, 37 F.3d at 1076.

To be entitled to summary judgment on an issue for which DISD bears the burden of proof at trial, it “must establish ‘beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense.’ ” Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 878 F.Supp. 943, 962 (N.D.Tex.1995) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir.1986)). This means that DISD must demonstrate that there are no genuine and material fact disputes, and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Martin v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir.2003). “The court has noted that the ‘beyond peradventure’ standard is ‘heavy.’ ” Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sowell, 603 F.Supp.2d 914, 923–24 (N.D.Tex.2009) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (quoting Cont'l Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2007 WL 2403656, at *10 (N.D.Tex. Aug. 23, 2007) (Fitzwater, J.)).

III

The court turns first to Bennett's ADA discrimination claim.

A

The ADA mandates that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To prevail on this claim, Bennett must present direct or circumstantial evidence that his disability was a motivating factor for DISD's adverse employment actions. See, e.g., Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir.1999). “ ‘Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption.’ ” West v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 330 F.3d 379, 384 n. 3 (5th Cir.2003) (quoting Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 897 (5th Cir.2002)) (age discrimination case). “If an inference is required for the evidence to be probative as to [defendant's] discriminatory animus in firing [plaintiff], the evidence is circumstantial, not direct.” Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 897–98.

When a plaintiff does not present direct evidence of discrimination, the court applies the modified McDonnell Douglas approach. Seaman, 179 F.3d at 300 (holding that McDonnell Douglas framework, which is used in Title VII cases, applies to ADA cases when only circumstantial evidence of discrimination is offered). As modified, the McDonnell Douglas...