Bennett v. United States

• Decision Date: 05 March 1912
• Docket Number: 2,178.
• Parties: BENNETT v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

194 F. 630

BENNETT v. UNITED STATES.

No. 2,178.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

March 5, 1912

Max Levy, for plaintiff in error.

Thomas H. Darby, Asst. U.S. Atty. (Sherman T. McPherson, U.S. Atty on the brief), for the United States.

Before WARRINGTON, KNAPPEN and DENISON, Circuit Judges.

DENISON Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

It is clear that the power of Congress to pass this statute must be found in its power to regulate commerce. The arguments of counsel for plaintiff in error, as we understand them, are that commodities only, and not persons, can be the subject of commerce; that persons cannot be prohibited from traveling from one state to another because of some intention they may have; that the woman herself is not by this act forbidden to travel, and it cannot be a criminal act to aid an unforbidden act; and that the law is an invasion of the police powers of the states.

It cannot now be doubted that transportation, of persons as well as of property, is 'commerce,' and that Congress may regulate the interstate transportation of persons. Glouchester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196 203, 5 Sup.Ct. 826, 29 L.Ed. 158;

Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 217, 14 Sup.Ct. 1087, 38 L.Ed.

See, also, the cases involving passenger traffic under the 962. interstate commerce acts.

It is also settled that the constitutional power to regulate includes the power to prohibit, in cases where such prohibition is in aid of the lawful protection of the public. The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 354, 23 Sup.Ct. 321, 47 L.Ed. 492.

We think it a mistake to assume that this statute does not prohibit, and so impliedly permits, the primary act and yet punishes as a crime a merely incidental wrong. The act does not undertake to prohibit the woman from traveling from one state to another of her own volition, and in the supposed exercise of her inherent personal rights, no matter what her purpose as to her future conduct may be. This conclusion is emphasized by observing that the woman traveling may be perfectly innocent of any intended immorality, and that the act cannot be intended to interfere with liberty of travel by such person. The primary thing forbidden is the inducing of a person to come into the state, with unlawful purpose by the inducer and in aid of such unlawful purpose, but without direct regard to the innate character or purpose of the person induced. It is this primary thing, and the incidental transportation by the carrier, which are forbidden and penalized.

We do not find in the statute either the purpose or the effect to interfere with the police powers of the state. The law is directed only against the inducing or performing of interstate transportation; and this entire subject-matter is obviously not within the scope of the police power of any state; hence its exercise cannot be an invasion of such power. It may well be assumed that the laws of all states prohibit, as those of Ohio do, the various ultimate acts of immorality referred to in this statute, and it follows that the law in question is in aid of the complete and effective exercise by the states of their respective police powers, and is of the same class as many acts of Congress in recent years having the same general purpose. See enumeration of such acts in U.S. v. Hoke (D.C.) 187 F. 992, 1000, 1003.

We conclude that the act is not open to the constitutional objections presented.

Respondent urges that while she was indicted for...