Bennett v. Vanderbilt University

• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SWEPSTON
• Citation: Bennett v. Vanderbilt University, 198 Tenn. 1, 277 S.W.2d 386, 2 McCanless 1 (Tenn. 1955)
• Decision Date: 11 March 1955
• Parties: , 198 Tenn. 1 Mrs. Mildred K. BENNETT v. VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY.

Page 386

277 S.W.2d 386

2 McCanless 1, 198 Tenn. 1

Mrs. Mildred K. BENNETT v. VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 11, 1955.

Rehearing Denied April 7, 1955.

Goodpasture, Carpenter & Dale, Nashville, for plaintiff.

Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, for defendant.

SWEPSTON, Justice.

This is a Workmen's Compensation case in which Mrs. Bennett seeks to recover compensation from Vanderbilt University by reason of serious injuries suffered as a result of her falling on a parking lot belonging to the University and located across the street from the University Hospital building where she was employed.

The Trial Judge dismissed her petition and the case is here on her appeal.

The material facts are that plaintiff, appellant, had been employed for approximately five years as a division clerk on the fourth floor of Vanderbilt Hospital which is located on a part of the property of the University northwest of the intersection of Garland Street and 21st Avenue South, in Nashville. Garland Street runs approximately east and west and 21st Avenue approximately north and south. Thus the building in which she was employed lies to the north of Garland Street; across Garland Street on the south side of same there are several parking lots owned by the University. There are several ways of approach to this building and several entrances but the one customarily used by petitioner is at the end of a driveway on the University grounds leading from the north side of Garland Street to this particular entrance to the building.

At the time plaintiff was first employed by the University she told her employer that she had an automobile which she considered much more convenient to use than the public transportation to and from her work, as a result of which she was furnished with a sticker for her automobile which entitled her to park on the parking lots above mentioned.

An effort was made to show in behalf of petitioner that it was a part of the contract of employment that she was to have this free parking space but since the Trial Judge has found that fact against her and there is material evidence to support his finding, the said finding is binding on this Court.

The fact is there was no reservation of any particular parking space for any employee or student, as many more stickers have been issued than the available parking space would accommodate, and all those who chose to use their automobiles park wherever they chose either on some part of the parking areas or on the street, depending upon where available space may be found at the time. There is no requirement that any of the employees or students come to the campus in their automobiles and a large number of them come by public or other means of transportation. The purpose in registering the names of the holders of stickers obviously was to limit the permission to park on these parking areas to those to whom they should be issued and to eliminate the general public.

On the date plaintiff was injured she had finished her work for the day for the University, had emerged from the building at the entrance or exit she normally used, although she was not required to use any particular entrance or exit, had walked along the driveway which led from this entrance to Garland Street, and along the sidewalk on Garland Street, then across this Street into the parking lot toward her automobile.

The University had had placed on the parking lot lines of wooden timbers, placed end to end, in order to separate the lines of automobiles which might be parked there. Petitioner while attempting to step across one of these timbers, tripped and fell, suffering serious injury.

When she left the Hospital building her work for the day had ended until next morning and it does not appear that she was subject to call nor that the University had any control over her activities in the interim.

Several of her assignments of error are predicated in part on the insistence that the act of the University in permitting her to park on this parking area was a part of the contract of employment. We have already disposed of that contention above and that factor is no longer material in the consideration of the case.

The question, therefore, is whether or not an employee is entitled to compensation for injury on the premises of the employer when she has completed her day's work and left the part of the premises where she is required to be for her work, has crossed a public street following a route which she chose to but was not required to take, in going to her automobile which was parked on another part of the premises of the employer where she was permitted but not required to park her automobile, and when the use of her automobile in going to and from home to work was of no interest to her employer but done for her own convenience.

Stated broadly, the question is whether or not her injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment.

The Trial Judge was of opinion that this case is controlled by the principles announced in Smith v. Camel Mfg. Co., 192 Tenn. 670, 241 S.W.2d 771.

Although the fact was in that case that the accident did not occur on any premises or property belonging to the employer but on a public sidewalk, we think the Trial Judge was correct. In that case on page 678, of 192 Tenn., on page 774 of 241 S.W.2d, the Court said:

'It is apparent from the foregoing quotation that this Court has rejected the general statement that an accident suffered by an employee in going to and from work was compensable if it occurred on the employer's premises, or so near the place of employment as reasonably would be regarded as in effect at the place, unless there were some special considerations as the requirement of use of a special road or way, or...