Bennett v. Wood, 76552
Decision Date | 09 September 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 76552,76552 |
Citation | 188 Ga.App. 630,373 S.E.2d 645 |
Parties | BENNETT v. WOOD. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
M. Theodore Solomon II, William J. Edgar, Alma, for appellant.
Lucian Wood, Jr., pro se.
Lucian Lincoln Wood, Jr., filed a motion pursuant to OCGA § 19-9-3(b) in the Superior Court of DeKalb County seeking modification of visitation rights with his minor son. Wood's former wife, Holly Wood Bennett, filed a response to Wood's motion raising various objections to jurisdiction and venue in DeKalb County as well as challenging the propriety of using the motion as a vehicle for modification. The trial court granted Wood's motion to modify certain aspects of the visitation rights, and we granted Bennett's application for discretionary appeal.
The record reveals that the parties were divorced in the Superior Court of Cobb County in 1983, and a final order regarding custody, visitation and child support was entered by that court in September 1984 and modified at the request of appellant in regard to certain aspects of visitation in November 1984. One year later, appellant filed an action in Cobb County for contempt of the order regarding child support and seeking a change in visitation. Appellee raised defenses of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue to the modification action based on his residence in DeKalb County, and that action was dismissed. Appellant refiled the petition seeking modification of visitation in DeKalb County, and that action resulted in an order entered May 2, 1986, modifying certain visitation provisions. No appeal from that order was taken.
At the time the 1986 DeKalb County order was entered, appellant was living in Candler County. Subsequent to the entry of that order, appellant married a resident of Bacon County, and in December 1986 moved her residence to that county. On September 16, 1987, some fifteen months after the DeKalb County order had been entered, appellee filed his motion in DeKalb County which resulted in the order appealed here.
1. Appellant contends the trial court erred by entertaining this action because any action to modify visitation must be brought in Bacon County, her county of residence. We agree and reverse.
It is well established that the term "custody" includes visitation rights. OCGA § 19-9-22(1). OCGA § 19-9-23(a) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Code section, after a court has determined who is to be the legal custodian of a child, any complaint seeking to obtain a change of legal custody of the child shall be brought as a separate action in the county of residence of the legal custodian of the child." Thus, the plain meaning of OCGA § 19-9-23(a) is that an action by the noncustodial parent to modify visitation with a minor child must be brought in the county of residence of the custodial parent. The problem arises because of an apparent conflict between the language in OCGA § 19-9-23, and that found in the identical provisions of OCGA §§ 19-9-1(b) and 19-9-3(b). The two latter statutes provide that (Emphasis supplied.)
Appellee argues that the language in OCGA §§ 19-9-1(b) and 19-9-3(b) authorizes him to bring a motion in the court issuing the last judgment effecting custody or visitation rights between the parties (i.e. DeKalb County), thereby excusing him from initiating a new suit in the county of residence of the legal custodian (i.e. Bacon County). We agree with appellee that these statutes permit modification of visitation rights to be sought by motion as well as by bringing a new action. However, we cannot agree that both methods are always suitable. Rather, the suitability of either method must be tested against the...
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...harmonized wherever possible, so as to ascertain the legislative intendment and give effect thereto.' [Cit.]" Bennett v. Wood, 188 Ga.App. 630, 632(1), 373 S.E.2d 645 (1988). Indeed, "[i]t is a basic rule of construction that a statute or constitutional provision should be construed to make......
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......(Emphasis supplied.)2 It is also "well established that the term ‘custody’ includes visitation rights." Bennett v. Wood , 188 Ga. App. 630, 631 (1), 373 S.E.2d 645 (1988) ; see also OCGA § 19-9-22 (1). We understand " ‘[t]he plain meaning of OCGA § 19-9-23 [to be] that an action ... to m......
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...and harmonized wherever possible, so as to ascertain the legislative intendment and give effect thereto.'" Bennett v. Wood, 188 Ga.App. 630, 632(1), 373 S.E.2d 645 (1988). Finally, "[i]t is a basic rule of construction that a statute or constitutional provision should be construed to make a......