Bennion v. Stolrow
| Decision Date | 29 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20210061-CA |
| Citation | 2022 UT App 93 |
| Parties | Weston Bennion, Appellant, v. Dale Stolrow, Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Second District Court, Ogden Department The Honorable Joseph M. Bean No. 180902051
Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, Lindy W. Hamilton, and Robert W Gibbons, Attorneys for Appellant
Troy L. Booher, Beth E. Kennedy, Taylor P. Webb, Trystan B. Smith Todd A. Turnblom, and Tajha L. Ferrara, Attorneys for Appellee
[1]
¶1 Weston Bennion appeals the district court's decision on his motion to enforce a settlement agreement. He argues that the court incorrectly interpreted the agreement when it determined that a portion of the payment under the agreement could include a subrogation claimant as a joint payee. We affirm.
¶2 On July 11, 2015, Bennion was significantly injured in a fall when floorboards of Dale Stolrow's deck broke. Bennion subsequently filed suit against Stolrow. Stolrow was insured by State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (State Farm), and attorneys from its in-house counsel's office represented Stolrow in the litigation.
¶3 After two years of litigation, with a trial date approaching the parties reached a settlement agreement. The agreement set forth the following release:
Additionally, the settlement agreement contained a provision specifying that Bennion would "indemnify, defend, and hold harmless" Stolrow and State Farm in the event that future claims or other legal actions relating to the deck accident were brought against them.
¶4 Stolrow's attorneys prepared the settlement agreement and sent it to Bennion for his signature. Along with the transmission of the agreement for signature, the attorneys informed Bennion that they had notice of a lien from Rawlings Company (Rawlings), which was working on behalf of Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Bennion's insurer, in the amount of $9,103.09 and that they intended to issue a separate check for the lien. The communication also told Bennion that if he would first like to negotiate with Rawlings for a lower payment amount, State Farm was willing to issue the checks according to the results of such negotiations.
¶5 Bennion signed the agreement but responded that no check that included a lienholder would be acceptable. State Farm was not willing to make payment without addressing the Rawlings lien; but it offered several alternatives to address the lien: (1) issuing one $150,000 check that included Rawlings as a joint payee; (2) issuing a check for the undisputed amount to Bennion and his attorney, and a separate check for the lien amount that would include Rawlings as a joint payee; or (3) waiting to issue the check until the matter was negotiated and resolved between Bennion and Rawlings. Bennion refused all options and continued to insist on payment that did not account for the Rawlings lien.
¶6 Bennion thereafter filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that the agreement was breached by the refusal to write one check for the full settlement amount to Bennion and that Stolrow was trying to change the terms of the agreement. In response, Stolrow argued that there was no attempt to alter the settlement agreement's terms but that where the agreement specified that the consideration paid was subject to subrogation claims and health care liens, the issuance of the two checks that took the lien into account would be consistent with the agreement.
¶7 Under these facts, the district court agreed that Stolrow and State Farm's proposed issuance of two checks was appropriate, particularly where to do otherwise could leave Stolrow and State Farm vulnerable to a cause of action by Rawlings. State Farm then promptly issued the checks as it had proposed-one to Bennion, his attorney, and Rawlings for $9,103.09 and one to Bennion and his attorney for $140,896.91.
¶8 Bennion thereafter submitted a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. Bennion now appeals.
¶9 Bennion argues that the district court erred in interpreting the unambiguous settlement agreement to allow a portion of the consideration to be paid via a check issued to him and Rawlings as joint payees. Pioneer Builders Co. of Nevada v. K D A Corp., 2018 UT App 206, ¶ 10, 437 P.3d 539 (quotation simplified); see also Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, ¶ 16, 216 P.3d 352 ("When, as in this case, a contract is unambiguous and can be interpreted as a matter of law, we review the district court's interpretation for correctness, according no deference to the district court.").
¶10 Bennion also takes issue with the district court's denial of his motion to reconsider, arguing that the court's incorrect interpretation of the settlement agreement also "permeated" this ruling. Nakkina v. Mahanthi, 2021 UT App 111, ¶ 18, 496 P.3d 1173 (quotation simplified).
¶11 The parties agree that the settlement agreement is valid and unambiguous. Bennion argues only that the district court erred in its interpretation of this unambiguous settlement agreement. Brady v. Park, 2019 UT 16 ¶ 53, 445 P.3d 395 (quotation simplified). Bennion argues that the plain language of the settlement agreement required $150,000 be paid to him as consideration and did not allow Stolrow "to make a direct payment to any claimant, lienholder, or other third party."
¶12 As an initial matter, we note that Bennion's references to having received only a "partial payment" or to a "direct payment" being made to Rawlings are inaccurate. This misapprehends what the district court determined was allowed by the settlement agreement. The court approved the issuance of "one check to [Bennion] in the undisputed amount and one check to both [Bennion] and Rawlings in the disputed subrogation amount." Thus, both checks, together totaling $150,000, listed Bennion as a payee and were delivered to him. The full settlement amount was paid to Bennion, although joint payees were included on the checks.[2] The question is simply whether issuing part of the payment to both Bennion and Rawlings was permitted under the plain language of the settlement agreement.
¶13 The paragraph setting forth the consideration amount provides, "In consideration of [$150,000] . . . Weston Bennion hereby releases and forever discharges Dale Stolrow and . . . State Farm . . . ." And while we agree with Bennion that this provision does not specifically permit payment to a claimant or lienholder, we cannot say the same for paragraph 7 of the settlement agreement, which, according to its title, is intended to specifically address subrogation claims or liens.
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