Benno v. Shasta Cnty.
| Decision Date | 29 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:16-cv-01110-TLN-DMC,2:16-cv-01110-TLN-DMC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | JAMES MICHAEL BENNO; JESSICA ELAINE BENNO; JACOB DANIEL BENNO; LOGAN WAYNE BENNO; MARCIA JONES; DENNIS PERON; BRIAN MONTERROZO; RICHARD YOUNG; CHARLES B. McINTOSH; JESSICA CONCHA SOLANO; NICHOLAS NEAL BOLTON; WALTER CARNEY; JERILYN CARNEY; and JOSH HANCOCK, Plaintiffs, v. SHASTA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA; SHASTA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; THOMAS BOSENKO, in his capacity as Sheriff of Shasta County; DALE FLETCHER; TOM BARNER; SHASTA COUNTY CODE ENFORCEMENT; SHASTA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; LESTER BAUGH; and DOES 1 to 10, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants County of Shasta ("County"), Shasta County Board of Supervisors ("Board"), Shasta County Code Enforcement Office ("Code Enforcement"), and Shasta County Sheriff's Department's ("Sheriff's Dept.") (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss.1 (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiffs James Benno, Jessica Benno, Jacob Benno, Logan Benno, Marcia Jones, Dennis Peron, Brian Monterrozo, Richard Young, Charles McIntosh, Jessica Solano ("Solano"), Nicholas Bolton ("Bolton"), Walter Carney, Jerilyn Carney,2 and Josh Hancock ("Hancock") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") opposed the motion. (ECF No. 23.) Defendants replied. (ECF No. 24.) For the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
This action is proceeding on Plaintiffs' original Complaint, which asserts Defendants violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights when they enacted a county ordinance banning the outdoor cultivation of marijuana and enforced the ordinance by conducting raids on Plaintiffs' property. (See ECF Nos. 1, 9.)
James Benno, Solano, Bolton, Walter Carney, and Jerilyn Carney began "collectively cultivating" medical marijuana on their respective real properties in Shasta County at various times between 1997 and 2009. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiffs do not indicate whether they cultivated the marijuana indoors or outdoors on their properties but contend they cultivated medical marijuana in compliance with California's Compassionate Use Act ("CUA") (Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 11362.5 et seq.) and California's Medical Marijuana Program Act ("MMPA") (Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 11362.7 et seq.). (Id. at 4-5, 7.) The Complaint additionally indicates James Benno cultivated the marijuana for himself and a group of patients. (Id. at 4.)
On December 13, 2011, the County enacted an ordinance which permitted the indoor and outdoor cultivation of marijuana, subject to certain restrictions ("2011 Ordinance"). (ECF No. 9 at 4-14.) On January 28, 2014, the County enacted a subsequent ordinance banning the outdoor cultivation of marijuana ("2014 Ordinance").3 (Id. at 16-28.)
Meanwhile, Plaintiffs identify four discrete raids which they contend were performed without valid warrants:
During the aforementioned raids, Plaintiffs allege officers in "military-style uniforms some of whom had automatic machine gun type weapons" physically attacked and pointed their weapons at Plaintiffs. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiffs further allege they were unarmed, "did not pose any danger to [the] officers," and did not "attempt[] to escape or evade [the] officers." (Id.) Rather, Plaintiffs allege they "responded to [the officers'] requests." (Id.) As a result of these encounters, Plaintiffs allege they sustained physical injuries "to limbs and other body parts as well as mental injuries including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, anxiety and other mental disorders." (Id.) The Complaint does not identify any of the individual officers who participated in the aforementioned raids, attribute specific conduct to any individual officer, or specify which Plaintiffs were injured during the raids or what particular injuries they each sustained. (See id.) Plaintiffs additionally contend that, "if warrants were obtained [for any of the raids], they were deficient."4 (Id. at 13.)
On May 20, 2016, Plaintiffs initiated this action, asserting five causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for: (1) warrantless search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, against the County and the Sheriff's Dept.; (2) improper taking in violation of the Fifth andFourteenth Amendments, against the County and the Sheriff's Dept.; (3) excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, against the County and the Sheriff's Dept.; (4) inverse condemnation in violation of Article I, § 19(a) of the California Constitution, against all Defendants; and (5) violations of Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, against all Defendants.5 (Id. at 12-18.) Plaintiffs seek monetary damages, fees and costs, and injunctive relief. (Id. at 18-20.)
On November 28, 2017, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiffs filed an Opposition, and Defendants replied. (ECF Nos. 23-24.)
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Iqbal), 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (Twombly), 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). "This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn (Retail Clerks), 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege "'specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility whenthe plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Nevertheless, a court "need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff "can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff has failed to "nudge[] [his or her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible," is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.
If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, "[a] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (qu...
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