Benoit v. Capitol Mfg. Co., a Div. of Harsco Corp.

• Decision Date: 06 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-388,91-388
• Citation: 606 So.2d 58
• Parties: John R. BENOIT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAPITOL MANUFACTURING COMPANY, A DIVISION OF HARSCO CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 58

606 So.2d 58

John R. BENOIT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAPITOL MANUFACTURING COMPANY, A DIVISION OF HARSCO CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 91-388.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Third Circuit.

Oct. 6, 1992.

Writ Granted Dec. 21, 1992.

Aaron J. Allen, Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellant.

Jeansonne and Briney, Carl W. Robicheaux, Lafayette, for defendant-appellee, Capitol.

Milton Bennett, in pro per.

Before DOMENGEAUX, C.J., and COREIL ^* and PATIN ^*, JJ.

PATIN, Judge, Pro Tem.

John R. Benoit filed suit for personal injuries against his co-employee, Milton Bennett and his employer, Capitol Manufacturing Company. After a bench trial the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Benoit and against Bennett in the sum of $61,011.00 plus interest and costs. Benoit was found to be twenty-five percent at fault and Bennett seventy-five percent. The claim against Capitol was dismissed with prejudice. From this judgment Benoit appeals.

Appellant claimed he sustained damages in a fight intentionally started by his co-employee while at work. He sued both Bennett and Capitol under the intentional exception to the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act. La.R.S. 23:1032.

Appellant asserts the following errors:

(1) the trial court erred in not finding Capitol vicariously liable for the intentional injury by Bennett;

(2) the trial court erred in not awarding appellant damages for loss of future earnings or loss of earning capacity; and

(3) the trial court erred in assigning twenty-five percent fault to plaintiff for his own injury.

On January 23, 1989 appellant and Bennett were working the "graveyard" or night shift at Capitol's facility in Crowley, Louisiana. Both were machine operators with work stations very near one another. Appellant's work station was immediately adjacent to two large sliding doors which opened to the outside. Bennett's work station was somewhat farther away.

The night of the incident was cold and the doors were open. Bennett was experiencing discomfort from the cold and made numerous requests of his supervisor, George Signorelli, to have the doors closed. His requests were denied.

Around 4:30 a.m. both Bennett and appellant went on break. Bennett closed the doors, appellant confronted him about it, an argument ensued and erupted into a fight.

During the fight appellant sustained a broken hand. He claims his hand was struck when he raised it to deflect a blow from a stick that Bennett was wielding. Bennett claims that he never had a stick. The whole confrontation lasted approximately ten minutes. Both men were fired for fighting.

Appellant filed suit on June 1, 1989 alleging the acts of Bennett in causing injury were intentional and in the course and scope of employment.

The trial court heard evidence on October 30 and 31 of 1990. The matter was taken under advisement and judgment rendered on December 12, 1990. The trial court found that appellant met the burden of proof regarding the intentional acts of Bennett. It further found that appellant failed to meet the burden of proof concerning Capitol's vicarious liability for Bennett's actions.

Appellant asserts the trial court erred in finding Capitol not liable for the intentional act of its employee, Bennett. He contends the acts of Bennett came within the exception to the normal remedy of worker's compensation and that Capitol is vicariously liable.

La.R.S. 23:1032, as it existed at the time of the incident, set out the exclusiveness of worker's compensation as a remedy, and the following exception:

Nothing in this Chapter shall affect the liability of the employer ... or employee of such employer or principal to a fine or penalty under any other statute or the liability, civil or criminal, resulting from an intentional act.

La.Civ.C. art. 2320 provides:

Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.

In dismissing the claim against Capitol the trial court applied LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So.2d 216 (La.1974). LeBrane set out the standard to be used when determining whether to hold an employer responsible for the intentional tort of an employee. The trial court stated the requirements of LeBrane as follows:

[T]he intentional conduct of the co-employee must be so closely connected in time, place, and causation to his employment-duties as to be regarded as a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer's business, as distinguished from conduct motivated by purely personal considerations entirely extemporaneous to the employer's interest.

The trial court found, as fact, the cause of the incident was a disagreement between Bennett and appellant about the open door. It further found that Bennett's conduct resulted from the fact that he was cold and wished the door closed. It considered this conduct to be purely personal in nature.

The court below also found that Capitol did not benefit in any way from the incident. The court stated that the status of the doors had no bearing on the operation of the machines, as they were not temperature sensitive. Thus, the act of closing the doors by Bennett was not in furtherance of any employment duty. Furthermore, the trial court found Capitol suffered a detriment in having to fire two valued employees.

In correctly applying the test set forth in LeBrane, the trial court had to make several findings of fact. In doing so, it is afforded much discretion and the factual findings must be upheld absent a showing of manifest error. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989).

Our review of the record reveals no error in the fact findings of the trial court. There is ample testimony and evidence showing the catalyst for the incident was Bennett's desire to have the door closed. We cannot say that his desire was in any way intentional conduct "primarily employment...