Benson v. Crowell

• Decision Date: 24 February 1930
• Citation: 38 F.2d 306
• Parties: BENSON v. CROWELL, Deputy Commissioner, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

38 F.2d 306 (1930)

BENSON v. CROWELL, Deputy Commissioner, et al.

District Court, S. D. Alabama. S. D.

February 24, 1930.

Outlaw, Kilborn & Smith and Harry T. Smith & Caffey, all of Mobile, Ala., for complainant.

Pillans, Cowley & Gresham, of Mobile, Ala., for Knudson.

Alex C. Birch, U. S. Atty., of Mobile, Ala., for Crowell.

ERVIN, District Judge.

After much deliberation I have concluded to amplify the opinion formerly rendered in this case, 33 F.(2d) 137. I then contented myself with citing the two cases hereafter cited and now feel they should have been commented on.

In London, etc., Co. v. Industrial Commission of California, 279 U. S. 109, 49 S. Ct. 296, 300, 73 L. Ed. 632, the court speaking of the jurisdiction of the admiralty court says: "Its jurisdiction is not limited to transportation of goods and passengers from one state to another, or from the United States to a foreign country, but depends upon the jurisdiction conferred italics mine in article 3, § 2, extending the judicial power of the United States to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."

In concluding its opinion it was said: "We must hold therefor that it was a violation of the exclusive maritime jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution to apply in this case the California Compensation Act."

The Constitution nowhere empowered the Congress to confer admiralty jurisdiction upon the "Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress should from time to time ordain and establish." By its own terms it vested these courts with all admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

In Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S. 438, 49 S. Ct. 411, 412, 73 L. Ed. 789, where the question was whether the Court of Custom Appeals was a constitutional court, or a statutory or legislative court it was said: "While article 3 of the Constitution declares, in section 1, that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in `such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,' and prescribes, in section 2, that this power shall extend to cases and controversies of certain enumerated classes, it long has been settled that article 3 does not express the full authority of Congress to create courts, and that other articles invest Congress with powers in the exertion of which it may create inferior courts and clothe them with functions deemed essential or helpful in carrying those powers into execution. But there is a difference between the two classes of courts. Those established under the specific power given in section 2 of article 3 are called constitutional courts. They share in the exercise of the judicial power defined in that section, can be invested with no other jurisdiction, and have judges who hold office during good behavior, with no power in Congress to provide otherwise. On the other hand, those created by Congress in the exertion of other powers are called legislative courts. Their functions always are directed to the execution of one or more of such powers, and are prescribed by Congress independently of section 2 of article 3; and their judges hold for such term as Congress prescribes, whether it be a fixed period of years or during good behavior." (Italics mine.)

Also it was said: "Legislative courts also may be created as special tribunals to examine and determine various matters, arising between the government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it. The mode of determining matters of this class is completely within congressional control. Congress may reserve to itself the power to decide, may delegate that power to executive officers, or may commit it to judicial tribunals."

In the same case, answering the argument that there was no provision in the act limiting the term of office of the judges provided for, it is said: "But the argument is fallacious. It mistakenly assumes that whether a court is of one class or the other depends on the intention of Congress, whereas the true test lies in the power under which the court was created and in the jurisdiction conferred. * * * But, if there be constitutional obstacles to assigning judges of constitutional courts to legislative courts, the provision cited is for that reason invalid, and cannot be saved on the theory that Congress intended the court to be in one class when under the Constitution it belongs in another."

The opinion in this case serves a much needed and useful purpose in clearing up and defining the difference between the constitutional courts, those ordained and established to receive and exercise the jurisdiction vested in them by the...