Bentley v. Baker

• Decision Date: 18 June 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 7:12-CV-132 (HL)
• Parties: KATHERN BENTLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RODNEY BAKER and JEROD BAKER, individually, d/b/a J & R BAKER FARMS, LLC, and/or J & R FARMS PARTNERSHIP, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

KATHERN BENTLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RODNEY BAKER and JEROD BAKER, individually, d/b/a J & R BAKER FARMS, LLC, and/or J & R FARMS PARTNERSHIP, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 7:12-CV-132 (HL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA VALDOSTA DIVISION

SO ORDERED: June 18, 2013

ORDER

This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) and Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 16). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 4, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. They alleged that the Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs in their employment contracts based upon their race, national origin, and lack of alienage by imposing discriminatory conditions and terms of employment on them that were not applied to "foreign, Hispanic, Mexican" workers. Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants violated § 1981 by either discharging or constructively discharging Plaintiffs based upon their race, national origin, and lack of alienage in favor of the Mexican workers.

On February 15, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs did not allege sufficient facts to plausibly show a cause of action for race discrimination under § 1981; failed to allege sufficient facts related to their claims of discharge or constructive discharge; and that any claims of national origin and alien discrimination should be dismissed because § 1981's protections do not extend to claims for discrimination based on national origin or alienage.

In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Through their amended complaint, Plaintiffs seek to add further detail to their factual allegations and to withdraw any reference to national origin.

Procedurally the Court must consider the motion to amend first because if the motion is granted, the pending motion to dismiss would be moot. See, e.g., Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2007); Jones Creek Investors, LLC v. Columbia County, Ga., No. CV11-174, 2012 WL 694316, at *3 n. 5 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2012) (stating that a timely filed amended pleading supersedes the original pleading, and motions directed at superseded pleadings are to be denied as moot).

II. ANALYSIS

Rule 15 states, in relevant part, that "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave" and that the "court shouldfreely give leave when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). "[U]nless a substantial reason exists to deny leave to amend, the discretion of the District Court is not broad enough to permit denial." Shipner v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 401, 407 (11th Cir. 1989). Some reasons a court may deny a motion to amend include undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendant, and futility of the amendment. See Brewer-Giorgio v. Producers Video, Inc., 216 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2000). Defendants argue that the proposed amendment is futile.

Generally, a "district court may deny leave to amend a complaint if it concludes that the proposed amendment would be futile, meaning that the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss." Christman v. Walsh, 416 F.App'x 841, 844 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiffs' proposed amendments must be dismissed if they fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)). To decide whether a complaint states a claim for relief, the court must "accept[ ] the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[ ] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. (citation omitted). Any claim contained therein must "'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). "'A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). The complaint "need not include detailed factual allegations,but it must set forth 'more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Upon review of the proposed amended complaint, and construing the complaint liberally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have stated a claim as to their § 1981 claims with regard to their employment contracts but have not stated a claim as to their constructive discharge claims. The Court finds that the proposed amendments to the constructive discharge claims are futile. Because the Court ultimately dismisses the constructive discharge claims, it will address those claims in more detail below.

According to the proposed amended complaint, ten Plaintiffs were constructively discharged at various times during the 2010 and 2011 growing seasons. The Court will separately examine the constructive discharge claims asserted by the nine Plaintiffs who worked for Defendants during the Fall 2010 season and the constructive discharge claim asserted by the one Plaintiff who worked for Defendants during the Spring 2011 season.

The threshold for a constructive discharge claim is higher than that for a hostile work environment claim. Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1231 (11th Cir. 2001), modified on other grounds, Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff claiming constructive discharge must show "a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment" such that resignation is the only reasonable response. See Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1298 (11th Cir. 2009).

A constructive discharge claim involves only an objective standard. See Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1231. To sustain a constructive discharge claim, a plaintiff must sufficientlyallege and show that the defendant imposed working conditions so onerous that a reasonable person in his position would have been compelled to resign. Thomas v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 116 F.3d 1432, 1434 (11th Cir. 1997). The defendant must also be allowed sufficient time to correct the situation. Kilgore v. Thompson & Brock Mgmt., Inc., 93 F.3d 752, 754 (11th Cir. 1996) ("A constructive discharge will generally not be found if the employer is not given sufficient time to remedy the situation.") "Part of an employee's obligation to be reasonable is an obligation not to assume the worst, and not to jump to conclusions too fast." Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 807 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to establish constructive discharge if the allegedly onerous conditions lasted for only a short time. Hill v. Winn-Dixie, 934 F.2d 1518, 1527 (11th Cir. 1991).

A. Fall 2010 Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs Ryan Buie, Maleah Caldwell, Fiona Dawson, Eric Martin, Lathaca Wheeler, Linda Wheeler, Victor Williams, Jimmy Boatwright, and Tyree Sinclair (collectively the "Fall 2010 Plaintiffs") began work for Defendants on September 27, 2010. Plaintiffs contend all nine of the Fall 2010 Plaintiffs were constructively discharged approximately one week after their start date. The facts alleged in the proposed amended complaint to establish the constructive discharge claims as to the Fall 2010 Plaintiffs are as follows:

37. The first day for the 2010 Plaintiffs began Monday, September 27, at 7 am at the J&R Baker Farms office located some distance from any town and from any Plaintiffs' residence.

38. The first day consisted of an uncompensated, mandatory orientation. Plaintiffs were not given any hours of work on this day and were not paid for their time attending the orientation.

39. During the orientation, Plaintiffs were told to arrive at the farm at 7 am on Tuesday, September 28.

40. After arriving at 7 am on September 28, Plaintiffs were required to wait for more than thirty (30) minutes until Defendants sent a bus to transport them to the fields.

41. Plaintiffs could not ride to the field earlier because Defendants separated their workforce by citizenship and race, and sent the bus to the field with Mexican workers first, requiring the U.S. workers to wait and ride a bus only with other American workers.

42. On September 28, Plaintiffs were told that they would not be paid the hourly wage offered in the contract, but instead were falsely told they would be paid only $1 for every bucket of squash that they picked, even if a worker only picked one bucket per hour or per day.

43. Plaintiffs who complained about this new compensation structure were told it would not be changed.

44. On September 28, Plaintiffs were also told, for the first time, that they would be subject to a test of their speed in picking squash and would be terminated if they did not pass the test.

45. During the test period Defendants required Plaintiffs to pick nine buckets of squash in one hour, a production standard that was not a term of their employment contracts.

46. On information and belief, Defendants did not require their Mexican workers to meet the production standard described in Paragraph 45 and did not subject the Mexican workers to a week of extremely limited work while they were "tested" against the production standard.

47. While picking squash, Plaintiffs were required to pickup up [sic] an empty bucket from a tractor and return the bucket to the tractor full of squash. The tractor did not follow Plaintiffs and other American workers as they picked.

48. Mexican workers were followed by a tractor, shortening the time to return picked squash to the

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