Bentley v. Dennison

• Decision Date: 10 February 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. 11 Civ. 1056(SAS), 11 Civ. 3200(SAS).,s. 11 Civ. 1056(SAS), 11 Civ. 3200(SAS).
• Citation: 852 F.Supp.2d 379
• Parties: Kevin Michael BENTLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Robert J. DENNISON, et al., Defendants. Paul Betances, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Brian Fischer, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

852 F.Supp.2d 379

Kevin Michael BENTLEY, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Robert J. DENNISON, et al., Defendants.

Paul Betances, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.Brian Fischer, et al., Defendants.

Nos. 11 Civ. 1056(SAS), 11 Civ. 3200(SAS).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Feb. 10, 2012.

Matthew D. Brinckerhoff, Esq., Adam R. Pulver, Esq., Emery, Celli, Brinckerhoff & Abady LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs in Betances.

Joel Berger, Esq., New York, NY, for Plaintiffs in Bentley.

Michael J. Keane, James B. Cooney, Assistant Attorneys General, State of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Beginning in 1998, New York mandated that certain violent felonies be punished by a determinate prison sentence followed by a mandatory term of parole, known as post-release supervision (“PRS”).¹ The governing statute did not require that the term of PRS be announced by the judge at sentencing. In thousands of cases where the judge did not impose a term of PRS at sentencing, the New York State Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”) imposed PRS on convicted felons either before or as they were released from prison and the Department of Parole (“DOP”) then enforced its terms upon them.

On June 9, 2006, in Earley v. Murray, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the administrative imposition of PRS by DOCS violates the federal constitutional right to Due Process.² The court explained that “[o]nly the judgment of a court, as expressed through the sentence imposed by a judge, has the power to constrain a person's liberty,” and that “[t]he additional provision for post-release supervision added by DOCS is a nullity.” ³

Plaintiffs in these two related actions—the three Betances plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and a putative class and the twenty-one Bentley plaintiffs—bring their actions pursuant to section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code against current and former high-ranking officials at DOCS and DOP. Plaintiffs claim that in the years following Earley, “[i]n flat defiance of clear constitutional commands,” ⁴ state officials subjected them to unlawful custody by continuing to impose the terms of PRS that had been declared unlawful, arresting and re-incarcerating them for technical violations of those terms of PRS, and in one case administratively imposing a new term of PRS.

Defendants now move to dismiss the complaints, principally on the grounds that because plaintiffs' constitutional rights were not “clearly established” at the time that those rights were allegedly violated, state officials are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. This argument rests principally on the claim that for at least two years following Earley, there was confusion in the state courts about whether the decision was binding on the State and what remedies it required.

On close analysis, however, this argument is not persuasive. Although some New York state courts were in disagreement over the reach of the Earley decision and although some state trial courts held that they were not bound by a decision of the Second Circuit, there was never any disagreement or confusion about the core constitutional holding announced by Earley (and reiterated by the court in a denial for rehearing): terms of PRS imposed by the executive branch were nullified and if the State wished to re-impose them, it could seek resentencing before a judge.

II. BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are drawn from the plaintiffs' complaints. They are not findings of fact, but are assumed to be true for the purpose of this motion to dismiss and are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.

A. The Betances Plaintiffs

On July 20, 2004, Paul Betances was sentenced to five years incarceration. He was not sentenced to PRS. On April 24, 2008, DOCS and DOP administratively-imposed a five-year term of PRS on him. On July 9, 2009 after Betances had completed his incarceration for robbery and his maximum judicially-imposed sentence had expired, DOCS and DOP imprisoned him for violating his administratively-imposed PRS. He was released after a New York court granted his writ of habeas corpus on July 24, 2009.⁵

On August 15, 2000, Lloyd Barnes was sentenced to six years of incarceration and no term of PRS. On October 19, 2005, DOCS and DOP administratively-imposed on him a five year term of PRS. In about June 2008, DOP sentenced Barnes to three months incarceration based on his violation of the terms of his PRS. Barnes was releasedaround September or October of 2008.⁶

On February 20, 2001, Gabriel Velez was sentenced to five years incarceration. He was not sentenced to PRS. On July 2, 2004, he was released from prison and subjected to administratively-imposed PRS. In July 2008, he was arrested and charged with violating that PRS. He was incarcerated on that ground until October 6, 2008. He was released from the terms of the PRS on October 15, 2008 by writ of habeas corpus.⁷ Betances, Barnes, and Velez bring their claims on behalf of a putative class of others who were subjected to administratively-imposed PRS and/or incarcerated for violations of such PRS.⁸

B. The Bentley Plaintiffs

There are twenty-one plaintiffs in Bentley and a recitation of the facts common to all of them is sufficient: each Bentley plaintiff alleges that he was convicted of a crime, sentenced to a determinate term of incarceration, and not sentenced to any term of PRS.⁹ Each Bentley plaintiff was later subjected to administratively-imposed PRS. Then, after the Second Circuit issued its Earley decision, each Bentley plaintiff was incarcerated for technical violations of his PRS. With one exception, these incarcerations began on dates after Earley and before April 29, 2008 ¹⁰ and continued until various dates between February 23, 2008 and November 24, 2008.¹¹

In their complaint, the Bentley plaintiffs describe their experiences during their terms of unlawful custody—both under PRS and during incarceration. Many of these unlawful terms of PRS lasted for years, as did some of the periods of unlawful incarceration.¹² The plaintiffs' alleged experiences include being attacked by corrections officers and placed in solitary confinement,¹³ missing the births of their children, ¹⁴ and being denied medical care.¹⁵

C. The Defendants

The named defendants are current and former high ranking officials at DOP and DOCS. They are sued in their individual and official capacities.¹⁶ Plaintiffs allege that defendants were responsible for setting and enforcing the policies at DOP and DOCS that directly caused the deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Plaintiffs allege that in the immediate aftermath of the Second Circuit's decision in Earley, defendants, including defendant [Anthony Annucci, Deputy Commissioner and Counsel for DOCS] undertook an analysis of DOCS records in order to identify all inmates, or former inmates, who were administratively sentenced to PRS by DOCS notwithstanding any indication that a court had actually sentenced that person to PRS, whether in their sentencing and commitment paperwork or the minutes of their sentencing. That analysis identified 8,100 inmates that could not be subjected to PRS under Earley, including 1,600 that had already been released and subjected to PRS. We know this happened because defendant Annucci swore to the truth of these facts under penalty of perjury.... Defendants, however, did nothing with the information that was gathered.¹⁷

Plaintiffs allege that despite knowing which inmates and parolees were in custody due to administratively-imposed PRS that had been declared a “nullity” by Earley, defendants continued to arrest people for alleged violations of the terms of their parole ( e.g., failure to report or to adhere to curfew restrictions), re-incarcerate people after administrative hearings for those violations, impose PRS on individuals who had not been sentenced to PRS, and fully enforce the terms of PRS.¹⁸

Plaintiffs incorporate into their Complaint a letter written by defendant Annucci to an inmate who had invoked his rights under Earley.¹⁹ In the letter, Annucci wrote that the 2006 Earley decision “is contrary to state appellate case law” from 2002 through 2005 and that “[w]hen state and federal courts reach different results regarding state law, the state case law takes precedence over federal case law in state court until the specific issue is addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court.” ²⁰ Annucci wrote that “this Department would be required to set aside your period of post-release supervision if specifically ordered to do so by a state or federal court .... In the absence of such order, your determinate term is deemed to include a period of post-release supervision pursuant to the statutes and state case law set forth above.” ²¹

This letter, plaintiffs claim, supports their allegation that defendants “deliberately engaged in a planned campaign of massive resistence to and defiance of Earley.” ²² Plaintiffs allege that the defendants were especially aware of Earley because numerous persons incarcerated for technical violations of administratively-imposed PRS after Earley filed habeas corpus petitions in the state courts. Although defendants prevailed in some of these cases because some state trial judges accepted defendants' assertions that they were not technically “bound” to follow Earley, defendants were obviously aware that even if the state courts defied Earley as non-binding, the federal district courts—which were bound by Earley—would have to grant habeas corpus relief. Regardless of whether the lower state courts or the Appellate Divisions or even the New York State Court of Appeals ultimately disagreed with Earley, individuals who had been placed on PRS administratively and sent to prison for PRS violations administratively were entitled to relief in federal...