Bentley v. Dynarski

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SHEA
• Citation: Bentley v. Dynarski, 150 Conn. 147, 186 A.2d 791 (Conn. 1962)
• Decision Date: 04 December 1962
• Parties: Barbara BENTLEY et al. v. Laurentina DYNARSKI. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 791

186 A.2d 791

150 Conn. 147

Barbara BENTLEY et al. v. Laurentina DYNARSKI.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 4, 1962.

William R. Davis, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Leon RisCassi, Hartford, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Bruce W. Manternach, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Colin C. Tait, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before KING, MURPHY, SHEA and ALCORN, JJ., and FITZ GERALD, Superior Court Judge.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff Barbara Bentley brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from a fall alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in failing to maintain a stairway in a reasonably safe condition. The other plaintiff, Barbara's husband, sued to obtain reimbursement for expenses paid or incurred by him for the care and treatment of his wife. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. The trial court, on motion of the defendant, set aside the verdict because there was no evidence to warrant the jury in finding that the defendant retained control of the stairway. The plaintiffs have appealed.

In reviewing the action of the court on the motion to set aside the verdict, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Bambus v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 148 Conn. 167, 168, 169 A.2d 265; Lurier v. Danbury Bus Corporation, 144 Conn. 544, 547, 135 A.2d 597. Under this rule, the jury could have found the following facts: The defendant is the owner of a two-family house in New London. In October, 1957, the plaintiffs rented the apartment on the second floor under an oral month-to-month lease. An attic on the third floor was used for storage purposes by the plaintiffs and the defendant. In the rear of the premises, an outside stairway extended from the ground to the second-floor apartment. The treads of the stairway were badly worn and contained hollow areas in which water settled after a storm. The stairs had not been in a reasonably safe condition for a long time, and the plaintiff Barbara knew that they were in a defective condition. On October 23, 1958, at about 3:30 p. m., Barbara, while descending the stairs, slipped on a wet step and fell, sustaining the injuries of which she complains. It had rained earlier that day, and there were puddles of water on the stairs. When the plaintiffs rented the apartment, the defendant told them that she would take care of anything that went wrong if they would let her know about it. The defendant, on request by the plaintiffs, had repaired the oil burner, the hot-water heater, a toilet and some water faucets. Barbara, herself cleaned and took care of the stairway in question but had not told the defendant that it was in need of repairs. About two years after the accident, the stairs were painted by the defendant's husband.

Ordinarily, under an oral lease of a tenement in a building housing more than one family, the lessor neither impliedly warrants that the demised premises are in a reasonably safe condition nor impliedly undertakes to keep in reasonable repair the portion of the premises leased to and placed in the exclusive possession and control of the lessee. Torre v. DeRenzo, 140 Conn. 302, 306, 122 A.2d 25; Masterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 306, 179 A.2d 592. In the absence of an express or implied agreement to the contrary, the lessee of a tenement such as the one involved in this case acquires an exclusive occupancy and control of the tenement and, as incidental thereto, the parts of the structure which form an integral part of the tenement. Torre v. DeRenzo, supra; Central Coat, Apron & Linen Service, Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 136 Conn. 234, 237, 70 A.2d 126; Aprile v. Colonial Trust Co., 118 Conn. 573, 579, 173 A. 237. Whether the stairway here was included in the plaintiffs' lease and thus was under their control as tenants or was reserved to the defendant and so was under her control is essentially a question of intention, to be determined, in the absence of an expression in the lease, in the light of all of the significant circumstances, such as the location of the stairway and the use actually made of it. Miller v. Mutual Mortgage Co., 112 Conn. 303, 305, 152 A. 154. Although the plaintiffs alleged that the stairway was used in common by all tenants, there is no evidence to support this assertion. So far as the evidence discloses, the stairway was used only as a means of access to or egress from the plaintiff's second-floor tenement. The right to use it was included in their lease as a matter of law. Martel v. Malone, 138 Conn. 385, 389, 85 A.2d 246. 'The appurtenances of ingress and egress, essential to use and reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the leasing, are as much a part of the room conveyed as the room itself.' 3 Thompson, Real Property (Perm. Ed.) p. 229; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1, 3, 51 P.2d 189. Under the circumstances, there can be no doubt that the stairway was a part of the premises included in the plaintiffs' lease.

The plaintiffs contend that, even though the stairway led only to their apartment, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the defendant retained control of it, and that therefore she was liable for any injuries resulting from a failure to maintain it in a reasonably safe condition. The plaintiffs claim that the defendant had reserved a right of access by way of the stairway to make repairs in the plaintiffs' second-floor apartment. There is no evidence to show...