Bentz v. Twp. of Little Egg Harbor

• Decision Date: 11 July 2019
• Docket Number: DOCKET NO. A-5878-17T1
• Parties: RONALD BENTZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWNSHIP OF LITTLE EGG HARBOR, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division

RONALD BENTZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWNSHIP OF LITTLE EGG HARBOR, Defendant-Respondent.

DOCKET NO. A-5878-17T1

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

Submitted June 6, 2019

July 11, 2019

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

Before Judges Simonelli and Whipple.

On appeal from the Tax Court of New Jersey, Docket No. 009763-2017, whose opinion is reported at 30 N.J. Tax 530 (Tax 2018).

Ronald Bentz, appellant pro se.

Gilmore & Monahan, PA, attorneys for respondent (Robin La Bue, on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for amicus curiae New Jersey Division of Taxation (Jamie M. Zug, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Ronald Bentz owns property in the Township of Little Egg Harbor. He is a veteran who served in the Navy from September 6, 1983 to September 5, 1986. In 1986, he was stationed on a ship during the conflict between the United States and Libya (the Libya conflict). He was honorably discharged in September 1986, and his discharge certificate indicates he was in "sea service." Effective September 6, 2016, the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) declared plaintiff 100% permanently disabled due to a "wartime service-connected disability."

Plaintiff filed a claim for a disabled veteran's property tax exemption for the 2017 tax year pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.30(a). He stated, in part, he was an honorably discharged disabled veteran with active wartime service during the Grenada peacekeeping mission and the Lebanon peacekeeping mission.

N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) provides as follows, in pertinent part:

"Active service in time of war" means active service by a person, while in the United States Armed Forces, at some time during one of the following periods:

. . . .

The Grenada peacekeeping mission, on or after October 23, 1983, who has served in Grenada or on board any ship actively engaged in patrolling the territorial waters of that nation for a period, continuous or in the aggregate, of at least [fourteen] days commencing on or before November 21, 1983 or the date of termination of that mission as proclaimed by the President of the United States or Congress, whichever date of termination is the latest, in such active service; . . .

The Lebanon peacekeeping mission, on or after September 26, 1982, who has served in Lebanon or on board any ship actively engaged in patrolling the territorial waters of that nation for a period, continuous or in the aggregate, of at least [fourteen] days commencing on or before December 1, 1987 or the date of termination of that mission, as proclaimed by the President of the United States or Congress, whichever date of termination is the latest, in such active service[.]

Plaintiff did not serve in the Grenada peacekeeping mission or Lebanon peacekeeping mission, but his service during the Libya conflict occurred during the same time as those missions. The Libya conflict is not included in N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a).

The Township disallowed plaintiff's claim because he failed to meet two statutory requirements: (1) "Active Duty in a qualified branch of the Armed Forces of the United States 'in time of war'"[;] and (2) "Peacekeeping Missions require a minimum of [fourteen] days service in the actual combat zone[.]" The Ocean County Board of Taxation (Board) affirmed the disallowance.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Tax Court, challenging the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) under the Equal Protection Clause and Supremacy Clause. On July 25, 2018, Judge Mala Sundar issued a comprehensive written decision, finding the statute was constitutional. Bentz v. Twp. of Little Egg Harbor, 30 N.J. Tax 530 (Tax 2018). The judge conducted a broad historical review of the veteran's property tax exemption statutes and determined the separation of powers doctrine bars judicial interference in legislative functions. The judge found the New Jersey Constitution delegated the Legislature with the sole discretion to define an event in time of war or other emergency, and concluded the court lacked authority to graft the Libya conflict into N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a).

Judge Sundar acknowledged that "the court can examine if in the performance of the constitutionally delegated powers, the Legislature violated the Constitution[,]" but found no such infirmity. Id. at 542. For one, the judge found our Legislature has not abdicated its constitutionally delegated powers, as is evident in N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) and its amendments. Id. at 543 (citing Fisher v. City of Millville, 450 N.J. Super. 610, 616-17 (App. Div. 2017) (recognizing that the Legislature has actively amended N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) "keeping step with the Constitution's amendment to authorize Legislation covering events 'in time of war or other emergency.'"), aff'g 29 N.J. Tax 91 (Tax 2016)).

Judge Sundar also rejected plaintiff's arguments that the non-inclusion of the Libya conflict in N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) violates the Supremacy Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff had argued that N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) violated the Supremacy Clause because the federal statutes pertaining to veterans are broader in scope as to a "time of war" designation. The judge found this argument unpersuasive because "[o]nly the State . . . imposes, or exempts from imposition, local property tax. . . . Therefore, definitions for purposes of local property tax are not controlled by, or overridden by, federal statutes relating to veteran's compensation or benefits." Id. at 547 (citing Twp. of Galloway v. Duncan, 29 N.J. Tax 520, 534 (Tax 2016)) (holding that the Exemption Statute need not "defer to a technical definition or term of art prescribed by military regulation or otherwise.").

As to the Equal Protection Clause, plaintiff argued he was entitled to the same treatment as a disabled veteran of the Lebanon peacekeeping mission. While Judge Sundar empathized with plaintiff's position, given that he actually witnessed war and war-like conditions, as compared to a veteran of the Lebanon peacekeeping mission, the judge rejected his argument for the simple reason that "veterans' preference laws do not involve a suspect class." Id. at 547-48 (quoting Darnell v. Twp. of Moorestown, 167 N.J. Super. 16, 21 (App. Div. 1979)). As the judge explained:

"[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that all persons be treated alike." As long as there is no "suspect" class, or classification which is affected by the legislation, "a legislative classification will be presumed valid, even if it has the effect of treating some differently from others."

A "classification involving veterans does not result in 'invidious or irrational' distinctions among a state's residents; does not affect a suspect or semi-suspect class; and does not regulate fundamental rights."

[Id. at 548 (alteration in original) (quoting Garma v. Twp. of Lakewood, 14 N.J. Tax. 1, 15, 12 (Tax 1994)).]

Thus, Judge Sundar found the court must examine the alleged unconstitutionality of N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a), as applied to plaintiff, under the rational basis scrutiny, under which the court must determine whether the allegedly offensive legislation is rationally related to a legitimate State interest. Ibid. (citing Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 681, 680 (2012)) (where the "subject matter [of a legislation] is local, economic, social, and commercial [and] . . . a tax classification," it only need to pass rational basis scrutiny); see also Hooper v. Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618 (1985) ("When a state distributes benefits unequally, the distinctions it makes are subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Generally, a law will survive that scrutiny if the distinction rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose.").

In addition to recognizing precedent has uniformly held that statutes which treat veterans differently for purposes of certain benefits, pass the rational basis muster, Bentz, 30 N.J. Tax at 549 (citing Ballou v. Dep't of Civ. Serv., 75 N.J. 365 (1978); Fischer v. West, 11 Vet. App. 121, 123-24 (Ct. Vet. App. 1998)), the judge provided numerous potential legislative motivations that would explain why the Legislature did not include the Libya conflict in N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a), which were "'reasonably conceivable state of facts' [providing] 'a rational basis for the classification.'" Ibid. (quoting Armour, 566 U.S. at 681). The judge noted, for example:

It may be that our Legislature did not consider the conflict with Libya for purposes of including it in the [N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a)] because it was not federally identified as a war or as an emergency due to the short term, the quantum of armed personnel, costs or damages involved, or because the 1986 [Executive Order] imposed purely economic sanction or embargoes, or because under federal law, it never elevated to the level of a war for purposes of providing veteran benefits.

[Ibid.]

Ultimately, Judge Sundar acknowledged that "[t]he 'burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.'" Id. at 550 (quoting Armour, 566 U.S. at 681). As plaintiff had not negatived the above conceivable bases, and had merely asserted the federal government treats veterans who served during the Libya conflict more generously, which the judge found was not evidenced by federal legislation governing veterans' benefits, plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to overcome the presumptive constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.30(a) and N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a). The judge, thus, dismissed plaintiff's complaint.

We recognize that "judges presiding in the Tax Court have special expertise; for that...