Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., CV 92-3314 JSL.

• Citation: 833 F. Supp. 1486
• Decision Date: 22 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. CV 92-3314 JSL.,CV 92-3314 JSL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Carol BENTZLIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY; GM Hughes Electronics; and Does 1 through 20, Inclusive, Defendants.

833 F. Supp. 1486

Carol BENTZLIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY; GM Hughes Electronics; and Does 1 through 20, Inclusive, Defendants.

No. CV 92-3314 JSL.

United States District Court, C.D. California.

September 22, 1993.

Joel W.H. Kleinberg, Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiffs.

Raymond B. Biagini, McKenna & Cuneo, Washington, DC, for defendants.

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

LETTS, District Judge.

By order, entered December 28, 1992, this court granted the motions of defendants Hughes Aircraft Company and GM Hughes Electronics and intervenor United States to dismiss plaintiffs' action. The court indicated that an opinion would follow, setting forth in detail the basis of its decision. That opinion is set forth below.

I. FACTS

This case arises out of the accidental deaths of six members of the United States Marines Corps ("USMC") on January 29, 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, in the course of the Persian Gulf War. At the United States' request, this court takes judicial notice of the following facts.

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi military forces invaded neighboring Kuwait. On January 14, 1991, the United States Congress authorized the use of military force to secure the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. On January 18, President Bush ordered the ready reserves of the armed forces to active duty, and on January 21, 1991, designated the land and airspace above Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other areas and adjacent waters as areas in which the armed forces would be engaged in combat.

Plaintiffs are family members of Marines who were killed in combat near the border of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. According to plaintiffs, the Marines were riding in a light armored vehicle toward enemy Iraqi land forces, when a Maverick AGM-65D missile, fired from a U.S. Air Force A-10 aircraft, struck the vehicle and killed the Marines. Plaintiffs claim that a manufacturing defect caused the missile to deviate from its intended target and strike the Marines.

On May 4, 1992, plaintiffs brought suit against defendants Hughes Aircraft Company and GM Hughes Electronics ("Hughes"), the manufacturers of the missile, on state tort law causes of action. The first count, negligence, alleges that defendants "negligently and carelessly manufactured, tested, inspected, stored, transported, distributed, and controlled the ... Maverick missile." (Complaint at 3.) The second count alleges that defendants should be held accountable under strict liability for the defective manufacture of the missile.

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds that the political question doctrine renders the case nonjusticiable, the state secrets privilege bars adjudication of the case, and federal common law preempts state law tort actions against government contractors that arise out of combat. The United States, as intervenor in this action, moved to dismiss the case under the political question and state secrets doctrines. Secretary of the United States Air Force Donald B. Rice and Acting Secretary of Defense Donald J. Atwood submitted separate declarations, in which they asserted the state secrets privilege, barring discovery, over classified information regarding, inter alia, the Maverick missile's capabilities, the tactics employed by the A-10 aircraft, and military orders executed during the Persian Gulf War.¹

II. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiffs' State Law Tort Action Against Hughes is Preempted by Federal Common Law Immunizing Government Contractors from Tort Claims

The first ground upon which the court dismisses the complaint is that it is preempted by a federal common law defense for government contractors.²

The leading case to apply the preemption doctrine to suits against military contractors is Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 2514, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988). In Boyle, the Supreme Court held that the district court was required to dismiss a tort suit brought by the survivors of a soldier killed in a helicopter crash in the course of training; the suit sought recovery against the helicopter's manufacturer on the grounds that the emergency escape system was defectively designed.

The Supreme Court, in reaching its decision, noted that "in a few areas, involving `uniquely federal interests,' ... state law is preempted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the court — so called `federal common law.'" Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504, 108 S.Ct. at 2514 (citations omitted). The Court then went on to undertake such a preemption analysis and fashioned a "government contractor defense" which immunizes contractors from state tort liability for activities that they are required to perform pursuant to federal contracts.³ Id. at 511, 108 S.Ct. at 2518. Boyle explicitly held that the "government contractor defense" applies to design defects; the Court did not directly address whether the defense might be extended to limit liability allegedly resulting from manufacturing defects or other defects unrelated to product design. Id., at 511, 108 S.Ct. at 2518.⁴

Plaintiffs have attempted to plead their complaint around the Boyle decision by alleging, on information and belief, but without supporting evidence, that their claims arose from a manufacturing defect rather than a design defect. Plaintiffs now wish to conduct discovery to establish the truth of their allegations. Plaintiffs' suit and discovery requests, however, demonstrate that the preemptive effect of the "government contractor defense" must also extend to certain claims pleaded as manufacturing defect suits.

Two grounds require preemption in the instant case. First, the "government contractor defense" necessarily extends to preclude manufacturing defect claims, such as plaintiffs', against the manufacturers of sophisticated high-technology military equipment ("high-tech preemption"). High-tech equipment is defined as that which only has use in combat and which has no civilian analog. Second, the "government contractor defense" necessarily extends to suits, such as plaintiffs', which arise from wartime activity ("combat preemption").

1. Boyle Preemption Analysis

The rationale upon which the Boyle Court fashioned a federal common law defense against design defect claims supports preemption of plaintiffs' tort suit on both hightech and combat preemption grounds.

The Boyle Court's preemption analysis involved a two step process. First, the court must determine whether a case involves an area of "uniquely federal interests." Id. at 504, 108 S.Ct. at 2514. Second, the court must decide whether "a `significant conflict' exists between an identifiable `federal policy or interest and the operation of state law.'" Id. at 507, 108 S.Ct. at 2516 (citations omitted). If both conditions exist, the state law claims will be preempted by federal common law. As a corollary, in analyzing whether there is a conflict between state law and federal policy, the court must determine the scope of displacement of state law.

In Boyle, the Supreme Court found the procurement of military equipment to be a uniquely federal interest. It then determined that this interest would be frustrated if contractors were subject to state tort suits for injuries resulting from product design defects. The Court noted that the government is intimately involved in the design of military products, and reasoned that state law would conflict sharply with federal policy if contractors were held liable for specifically carrying out government-approved specifications for equipment. Id. at 505-08, 108 S.Ct. at 2515-16. The Court limited the scope of displacement of state law to suits alleging defectively designed equipment for which the government has approved the design specifications, thereby fashioning the federal common law "government contractor defense" which immunizes contractors against such suits.⁵ The Court rooted this defense in the "discretionary function" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), which reserves the government's sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the government's discretionary policy-making decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).

The selection of the appropriate design for military equipment ... is assuredly a discretionary function within the meaning of the FTCA ... involving judgment as to the balancing of many technical, military, and even social considerations.... Permitting `second-guessing' of these judgments through state tort suits against contractors would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption.

Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511, 108 S.Ct. at 2518.

2. Application of Boyle Preemption to Plaintiffs' Case

(a) Government Contract Defense for Manufacturing Defect Suits Arising from the Use of Sophisticated "Combat Use Weaponry"

Analysis of this case begins, as in Boyle, with the given that procurement of military equipment involves a uniquely federal interest. Since Boyle involved the alleged design defect of a military helicopter in peacetime, and this case involves the alleged manufacturing defect of a missile in wartime combat, the precise analysis of the conflict between federal interest and state law, and the degree to which state law must be preempted differs from that in Boyle, although the general structure of reasoning is the same.

The federal interest is even stronger in plaintiffs' case than in Boyle; the court takes note that the product involved in this case — a Maverick missile — is a technically sophisticated weapon which has no civilian counterpart and is manufactured solely for use in combat.⁶ It is a single purpose, single use product which is designed to self-destruct, and by its nature, it cannot be field-tested. The military helicopter in Boyle certainly has special features unique to the military, but the overall product is one derived from a general commercial design. The missile, in contrast, by its very nature,...