Benuska v. Dahl
Decision Date | 22 August 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 79-185,79-185 |
Citation | 410 N.E.2d 249,87 Ill.App.3d 911,43 Ill.Dec. 249 |
Parties | , 43 Ill.Dec. 249 Barbara BENUSKA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy L. DAHL and Janice Carol Jones, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Frederick W. Temple, Evanston, Hubbard, Hubbard, O'Brien & Hall, Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, Stephen R. Swofford and Thomas A. Brabec, Chicago, for defendants-appellants.
Rathje, Woodward, Dyer & Burt, Wheaton, for plaintiff-appellee.
Plaintiff, Barbara Benuska, filed suit in the Circuit Court of DuPage County to recover money damages for personal injuries she sustained when the automobile driven by defendant Timothy L. Dahl collided with the auto operated by defendant Janice Carol Jones, in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger. A trial was thereafter held, with the jury rendering a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against both defendants in the amount of $100,000. The Circuit Court thereupon entered judgment upon the verdict, and defendants have appealed.
For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the judgment entered below and remand for a new trial.
The facts pertinent to the issues decided on this appeal are as follows. On the evening of March 25, 1977, Janice Carol Jones was driving her girlfriend, Barbara Benuska, to the home of a relative to spend the remainder of the holiday weekend. They had spent the earlier part of the evening at the home of Christy Glantz, a friend of Jones, where they had dinner and visited from about 7:00 p. m. to about 11:15 p. m. At about 11:30 p. m., Jones was driving westbound on Illinois street, approaching the intersection of Illinois and Lake streets, in Aurora, Illinois. As she proceeded through the intersection, her car was struck on the left front side by an auto driven by defendant Timothy L. Dahl. Plaintiff was riding in the front seat on the passenger side and sustained various injuries to the neck and vertebrae in the collision.
Plaintiff filed suit against Jones and Dahl, alleging negligence in the operation of their respective motor vehicles. In addition, plaintiff alleged in her complaint that Jones was intoxicated at the time of the occurrence. Defendant filed a motion in limine prior to trial, to preclude plaintiff from introducing any evidence of drinking or intoxication in the course of trial. The motion was heard and granted by the trial court, which ruled that there was not sufficient evidence of intoxication to present to the jury. The cause then proceeded to trial.
After plaintiff and at least one of the defendants had presented its case-in-chief, the trial court announced that, on its own motion, it had reconsidered its ruling on the motion in limine and had concluded that there was sufficient evidence of intoxication to present to the jury. Over the objection of all parties and over defendant Jones' motion for mistrial in particular, the trial court permitted the plaintiff to reopen her case to present evidence of Jones' intoxication. Plaintiff then offered her opinion that Jones was intoxicated at the time of the accident, and other opinion evidence pertinent to the issue was presented. The issues thus joined were submitted to the jury for its consideration, which rendered a verdict against both defendants and assessed damages in the amount of $100,000. Each defendant has appealed, raising different issues, which we will consider separately.
Defendant Jones argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying her motion for mistrial upon the reversal of its prior ruling on the motion in limine. It is settled law that a decision whether or not to grant a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court based upon the particular circumstances of the case (Sesemann v. Ellington (1977), 51 Ill.App.3d 790, 9 Ill.Dec. 785, 367 N.E.2d 219). A mistrial should be declared only as the result of some occurrence of such character and magnitude that a party is deprived of its right to a fair trial. (Needy v. Sparks (1977), 51 Ill.App.3d 350, 9 Ill.Dec. 70, 366 N.E.2d 327.) The moving party must demonstrate actual prejudice as a result of the ruling or occurrence. (Williams v. Board of Education of Clinton Community Unit School Dist. No. 15 of DeWitt Co. (1977), 52 Ill.App.3d 328, 10 Ill.Dec. 161, 367 N.E.2d 549.) Finally, the trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial will not be disturbed upon appellate review absent a clear abuse of discretion. Stuart v. Rahn (1974), 16 Ill.App.3d 315, 306 N.E.2d 66.
Guided by the strict standards of review noted above, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendant Jones' motion for mistrial. It is apparent that the re-opening of the plaintiff's case in mid-trial to present evidence of intoxication deprived Jones of a fair opportunity to contest the charge of intoxication. First, Jones did not have the opportunity to question prosecutive jurors on voir dire examination about their attitudes on the issue of intoxication. Litigants are granted the right to examine prospective jurors on voir dire to enable them to select a jury composed of men and women who are qualified and...
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