Bepple v. Reiman, No. 34220

• Decision Date: 17 October 1957
• Docket Number: No. 34220
• Citation: 51 Wn.2d 144,316 P.2d 452
• Parties: Jacob N. BEPPLE, Appellant, v. Sigmund G. REIMAN and Jane Doe Reiman, husband and wife; W. H. Turnbull and Katherine Turnbull, husband and wife, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 144

51 Wn.2d 144

316 P.2d 452

Jacob N. BEPPLE, Appellant, v. Sigmund G. REIMAN and Jane Doe Reiman, husband and wife; W H. Turnbull and Katherine Turnbull, husband and wife, Respondents.

No. 34220.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

Oct. 17, 1957.

Kern, Dano & Cone, Ellensburg, for appellant.

William H. Mullen, Seattle, for respondents.

DONWORTH, Justice.

This action was commenced by appellant for the purpose of establishing ownership of certain land which he claimed by reason of adverse possession. The cause was tried to the court, which entered judgment dismissing appellant's complaint.

The facts may be summarized as follows:

For several years prior to 1928, Sigmund Reiman (hereinafter referred to as if he were the sole respondent) owned a tract of land in Grant county. This tract was intersected by the west boundary of the city of Quincy. The easterly portion, located within the corporate limits, was platted property, whereas the remaining (westerly) portion was unplatted farm land located outside the corporate limits. For convenience, we shall hereinafter refer to the platted property as tract I and to the adjoining portion of the unplatted property as tract II. The remaining unplatted property, abutting tract II on the west, consisted of approximately one hundred acres of farm land.

Prior to 1928, tracts I and II were surrounded by a common fence, forming a single, quadrangular enclosure of pasture land. A house, situated on tract I, was occupied by appellant as a tenant of respondent for over two years prior to January, 1928. During the period of his tenancy, appellant occupied only the house, making no use of the surrounding pasture land. The farm land to the west of tract II was not cultivated during that period. A dilapidated barn was at that time situated on tract II.

In January, 1928, appellant agreed to buy, and respondent agreed to sell, certain land under the terms of an executory contract. The land described therein encompassed all of tract I except a contiguous strip of land, ten feet in width (platted as an alley), extending from the north to the south boundaries thereof. This transaction was consummated by mail, as respondent was then residing in Seattle. Pursuant to that contract, a warranty deed was executed and delivered by respondent to appellant in 1943, the deed containing the same legal description of the land as that described in the 1928 contract. In 1946, a warranty deed, making a correction in the legal description of the land intended to have been conveyed by the first deed (immaterial for the purpose of this opinion), was executed by respondent and delivered to appellant.

Appellant mistakenly believed that he had purchased all land within the fenced enclosure. However, his purchase contract and the deeds executed thereunder described only tract I, exclusive of the ten-foot alley. The land here in dispute consists of tract II (which is wholly within the fenced enclosure) and the alley.

Early in 1928, respondent orally leased to appellant the remainder of his land on a share-crop basis. Respondent could not recall whether the lease was agreed upon simultaneous with, or subsequent to, the purchase agreement. With reference to this sequence of events, appellant testified, on direct examination, in part, as follows:

'Q. When would you say it actually was, when you actually rented the farm land? A. Well, that deal was partly made during,--right after I bought this house; this ground, and the house.'

On cross-examination, appellant responded in the affirmative when asked, 'The deals were made more or less simultaneously?'

Appellant commenced raising wheat on the land west of tract II in the spring of 1928, using the barn within the enclosure (tract II) for the maintenance of horses and storage of agricultural implements. Every second year thereafter appellant, through his grain depositary, paid to respondent, as rental, one fourth of the value of the wheat crop raised on the farm land.

Between 1928 and 1952, appellant constructed various improvements on tract II. Each of these improvements was used in conjunction with his cultivation of the leased farm land or incidental to his general farming operations. His aggregate investment in these improvements was estimated at about twelve hundred dollars, exclusive of his labor. The evidence fails to disclose whether or not appellant ever paid any taxes whatever on the land in dispute or the improvements thereon. During this period, respondent resided in Seattle but visited Quincy annually on Memorial Day. He seldom went to the farm site. He testified that he ignored it, but had noticed several of appellant's improvements from time to time and thought that they were constructed for appellant's own benefit.

In 1952, appellant first learned that, according to his deed, he was not the owner of the tract in dispute. Shortly thereafter, respondent advised him to remove his buildings therefrom. Appellant sought to purchase the disputed land, but the parties were unable to reach an agreement. In 1953, appellant ceased cultivating the farm land. In 1954, he removed the improvements which he had constructed on tract II. This action followed.

In substance, the trial court found that the purchase contract and the oral lease of the remaining land were executed simultaneously, and that appellant's occupancy of the land in dispute was as a tenant of respondent and not as one holding adversely to him.

Appell...