Berberian v. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n

• Citation: 424 A.2d 1072
• Decision Date: 30 January 1981
• Docket Number: No. 77-260-A,77-260-A
• Parties: Aram K. BERBERIAN v. RHODE ISLAND BAR ASSOCIATION. ppeal.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Page 1072

424 A.2d 1072

Aram K. BERBERIAN v. RHODE ISLAND BAR ASSOCIATION.

No. 77-260-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 30, 1981.

Aram K. Berberian, pro se.

Letts, Quinn & Licht, Richard A. Licht, Robert N. Huseby, Sr., Providence, for Rhode Island Bar Association.

OPINION

MURRAY, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order and judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the plaintiff's suit for mootness on a motion for summary judgment by the defendant bar association. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court, but for reasons other than those of the trial justice. ¹

The facts may be stated briefly. The plaintiff filed a complaint for mandamus in the Superior Court on April 27, 1977, to compel defendant to enroll him in its medical insurance program, to mail him copies of defendant's publication, and to print therein his "editorial comments." The clerk of the court entered a default against defendant approximately one month later. The defendant immediately filed motions to vacate the default and for entry of summary judgment in its favor on grounds that plaintiff was not a member of the bar association ² because of his failure to pay membership fees for fiscal years 1975-76 and 1976-77 and was thus not entitled to relief. A justice of the Superior Court granted the motion to vacate the default and denied the motion for summary judgment because there was an issue of fact concerning whether defendant could suspend plaintiff from membership without some action by the Supreme Court.

This court subsequently did act on petitions before it requesting plaintiff's suspension. In Petition of the Rhode Island Bar Association, 118 R.I. 489, 374 A.2d 802 (1977), we ordered plaintiff's suspension from membership in defendant bar association and from the practice of law unless he paid the arrearages. The plaintiff timely complied, and defendant reinstated plaintiff, conferring the full benefits of membership upon him. The defendant also renewed its motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had received his requested relief and that the matter was thus moot. A second trial justice granted the motion on mootness grounds, despite plaintiff's testimony at the hearing that he was now in arrears for fiscal year 1977-78 and that he had no intention of paying those dues. The trial justice concluded that plaintiff was free to sue once more.

The issue we confront is that which the first trial justice articulated. We conceive it, however, to be an issue of law, rather than of fact. Can defendant, without the express approval of this court, suspend an attorney from membership and deny him the benefits of membership on the basis of his refusal to pay dues? The answer is clearly no. In Petition of the Rhode Island Bar Association, 111 R.I. 936, 306 A.2d 199 (1973), we conditioned the unification of defendant association upon the expressed reservation of our right to approve or disapprove in advance any suspension or removal from membership of any attorney proposed by defendant.

The defendant did indeed supersede its authority by suspending plaintiff from membership, although not from practice, when it did. However, in Petition of the Rhode Island Bar Association, 118 R.I. 489, 374 A.2d 802 (1977), we essentially ratified defendant's action. ³ There, we ordered plaintiff to pay his dues within fifteen days or thereafter face suspension. We framed our order prospectively for, although the petitions of defendant nominally dealt with an earlier period,...