Berg v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 10 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 13-cv-11844 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
| Parties | NANCY LOUISE BERG, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
In light of the entire record in this case, I suggest that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's determination that Plaintiff is not disabled. Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED, and that the findings of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(b)(3), and by Notice of Reference, this case was referred to this magistrate judge for the purpose of reviewing the Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff's claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB). The matter is currently before this Court on cross-motions for summary judgment.2 (Docs. 13, 14.)
Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and DIB with a protective filing date of June 16, 2010, alleging that she became unable to work on March 20, 2010. (Transcript, Doc. 10-2 at 67.) The claim was denied at the initial administrative stage. (Id.)
On September 15, 2011, Plaintiff appeared before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Kathleen H. Eiler, who considered the application for benefits de novo. (Tr. at 87-115.) In a decision dated December 2, 2011, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from March 20, 2010, through the date of the ALJ's decision. (Tr. at 80.) Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of this decision. (Tr. at 57-60.)
The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, see Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 543-44 (6th Cir. 2004), on March 27, 2013, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Tr. at 32-35.) On April 24, 2013,Plaintiff filed the instant suit seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's unfavorable decision. (Doc. 1.)
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decisions. Judicial review of the Commissioner's decisions is limited to determining whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he employed the proper legal standards. See Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla . . . but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)(quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y Health and Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Walters, 127 F.3d at 528. It is not the function of this Court to try cases de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence or decide questions of credibility. See Brainard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).
In determining the existence of substantial evidence, the court must examine the administrative record as a whole. See Kirk v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 536 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court woulddecide the matter differently, Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if substantial evidence also supports another conclusion. See Her v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999). "The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a 'zone of choice' within which the Commissioner may proceed without interference from the courts." Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994)(citing Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)(en banc)(citations omitted)).
"Both the court of appeals and the district court may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the Appeals Council." Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). There is no requirement, however, that either the ALJ or the reviewing court discuss every piece of evidence in the administrative record. See Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 Fed. Appx. 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006)("[a]n ALJ can consider all the evidence without directly addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party")(citations omitted); Van Der Maas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 198 Fed. Appx. 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2006).
Disability for purposes of DIB is defined as the:
[I]nability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a) (DIB), 416.905(a) (SSI). Plaintiff's Social Security disability determination is to be made through theapplication of a five-step sequential analysis:
Step Three: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the severe impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled regardless of age, education or work experience.
Step Four: If the claimant is able to perform his or her past relevant work, benefits are denied without further analysis.
Step Five: Even if the claimant is unable to perform his or her past relevant work, if other work exists in the national economy that plaintiff can perform, in view of his or her age, education, and work experience, benefits are denied.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. See also Heston, 245 F.3d at 534. "If the Commissioner makes a dispositive finding at any point in the five-step process, the review terminates." Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007).
"Through step four, the claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by [his] impairments and the fact that [he] is precluded from performing [his] past relevant work." Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003)(cited Cruse, 502 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also Boyes v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 46 F.3d 510, 512 (6th Cir. 1994)("[c]laimant bears the burden of proving his entitlement to benefits."). If the analysis reaches the fifth step withouta finding that the claimant is not disabled, the burden transfers to the Commissioner. See Combs v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006). At the fifth step, the Commissioner is required to show that "other jobs in significant numbers exist in the national economy that [claimant] could perform given [his] RFC [residual functional capacity] and considering relevant vocational factors." Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g).
The ALJ applied the Commissioner's five-step disability analysis to Plaintiff's claim and found at step one that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2014, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 20, 2010. (Tr. at 69.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's degenerative disc disease, arthritis, hypertension, headaches and bipolar disorder were "severe" within the meaning of the second sequential step. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found no evidence that Plainiff's combination of impairments met or equaled one of the listings in the regulations. (Tr. at 70-73.) The ALJ found that the Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform
light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) except that she can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can frequently climb ramps and stairs. She can never crawl, but can frequently balance, stoop, crouch and kneel. The claimant can occasionally reach with her left upper extremity. She retains the mental capacity to perform simple, routine one or two-step tasks. The claimant can occasionally interact with supervisors and coworkers, but should never interact with the general public. She would work best in relative isolation or in a small familiar group (Tr. at 73.)
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work. (Tr.at 79.) The ALJ also found that as of the alleged disability onset date, Plaintiff was 52 years old, which put her in the "individual closely approaching advanced age" category. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563 and 416.963. At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform the requirements of light exertional level and unskilled occupations. (Tr. at 80.) Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id.)
A review of the relevant medical evidence contained in the administrative record indicates that Plaintiff has a history of bipolar disorder.3 (Tr. at 273-347.) Plaintiff began psychiatric treatment in 1996. (Tr. at 344.) In September 2006, Plaintiff received in-patient treatment for mood disorder with suicidal ideation. (Tr. at 273...
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