Berg v. Mengore
Decision Date | 01 April 1975 |
Citation | 533 P.2d 801,271 Or. 530 |
Parties | Michael BERG, Appellant, v. Joseph MENGORE, Respondent. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Raul Soto-Seelig, Rask & Soto-Seelig, Portland, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant.
James C. Tait, Oregon City, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Frederic D. Canning, and Hibbard, Caldwell, Canning, Bowerman & Schultz, Oregon City.
This is an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff in an automobile accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant and plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff lived in Oregon City and defendant lived in Sweet Home, Oregon. They had been good friends for some nine years and remained so at the time of trial. They planned to go to a circus performance in Portland, and defendant was driving to Oregon City to meet plaintiff. Defendant's car ran out of gasoline some four miles south of Oregon City on Highway 99E. Plaintiff picked defendant up and they went to the circus. About midnight, March 6, 1971, they returned to Oregon City, obtained some gasoline, drove to defendant's car and started the motor.
Plaintiff drove north toward Oregon City and defendant followed, driving his car. Highway 99E is a four-lane highway with two lanes for northbound traffic and two lanes for southbound traffic. Plaintiff was proceeding in the right, outside lane at 45 to 50 miles per hour and defendant was proceeding in the left, or inside, lane at 60 to 65 miles per hour. The posted speed limit was 55 miles per hour. 1
At this point a 'phantom' car heading south appeared in front of plaintiff's and defendant's automobiles in their northbound traffic lanes. On direct examination plaintiff testified:
'Q * * * At a point then you noticed another vehicle. Is that right?
'A Yes. As I rounded the curve I seen a car, reflection of the head-lights coming on the pavement. As I rounded the curve this car was coming towards me cutting the corner and I immediately started to slow down.
'* * *.
'A * * * I braked fairly hard but not enough to make it skid.
'* * *.
'A I veered off to the right as far as I could and they had a concrete wall, retaining wall on the right-hand side of the road approximately one foot from the solid line.
'* * *.
Both parties testified that defendant's car was 100 to 150 feet behind plaintiff's car, but in the left lane for northbound traffic. Plaintiff testified:
'Q Okay. Did the Defendant stop or turn or swerve to avoid hitting you?
The plaintiff and the defendant were the only witnesses called regarding the facts pertaining to the accident, and both parties testified that defendant's car collided with the rear of plaintiff's car when the 'phantom' car was opposite the plaintiff's car.
Defendant testified that as he saw the 'phantom' car coming toward him in his lane of traffic he pulled to the right and slammed on his brakes. He testified:
'Q And he was coming towards you?
'A Yes.
'Q When you saw this, what did you do?
'A I just for an instant thought of the only thing I could do. Things flashed through my mind on what aternatives I had. And just more on instinct than anything else I pulled my wheel to the right and slammed on my brakes to avoid hitting this other vehicle.
'* * *.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in failing to maintain a proper lookout, in failing to have his vehicle under proper control, and in driving at an excessive speed. Defendant generally denied plaintiff's allegations and affirmatively alleged that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to maintain a proper lookout and to keep his vehicle under proper control and 'in suddenly slowing or bringing his vehicle to a stop in the outside northbound lane of travel, when said movement could not be done with safety.' Defendant also affirmatively alleged that he was operating his vehicle in a northerly direction 'in the inside lane for northbound travel * * * a short distance behind the vehicle of the plaintiff, * * * a third vehicle operated by a person unknown, while traveling southbound on Highway 99E swerved into both lanes designated for northbound travel and plaintiff suddenly brought his vehicle to a stop in the outside lane for northbound travel at a time when defendant was swerving from the inside northbound lane into the outside northbound lane in order to avoid the unknown vehicle.'
Plaintiff first assigns as error the trial court's denail of plaintiff's motion to strike all of defendant's allegations of contributory negligence in the affirmative answer of defendant. The motion was, in effect, a request that the court hold as a matter of law that plaintiff was not guilty of any of the negligence alleged in the answer. See Rough v. Lamb, 240 Or. 240, 243, 401 P.2d 10 (1965). Since Miller v. Harder, 240 Or. 418, 421, 402 P.2d 84 (1965), wherein we overruled in part our decision in Lehr v. Gresham Berry Growers et al., 231 Or. 202, 372 P.2d 488 (1962), we have generally held that these and similar issues of negligence and proximate cause are questions for the jury. In Miller we stated:
240 Or. at 421, 402 P.2d at 85.
In the Lehr dissent we stated:
231 Or. at 215, 372 P.2d at 494.
In Hess v. Larson, 259 Or. 282, 286, 486 P.2d 533, 535 (1971), the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, contended 'that there was no evidence at all as to her speed, lookout, or control, and that it was error to submit these allegations of contributory negligence to the jury.' We held, in Hess:
* * *.' (Emphasis added.) 259 Or. at 286--87, 486 P.2d at 535.
Stevenson v. Hole, 269 Or. 530, 525 P.2d 1015 (1974), wherein we upheld the trial court in granting a directed verdict in favor of plaintiff although defendant alleged contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff, was such an 'exceptional accident case.' In Stevenson the defendant last noticed the plaintiff's vehicle when it was 150 to 200 feet from the intersection where plaintiff was making a left turn. Defendant next looked at plaintiff's vehicle when he was 30 to 50 feet away. We stated,
In the case at bar plaintiff knew that defendant's vehicle was 100 to 150 feet behind him. He also knew, according to the testimony, that the 'phantom vehicle' was proceeding diagnoally in the direction of defendant's automobile, in the inside lane. Notwithstanding these facts, plaintiff suddenly slowed his vehicle to approximately five miles per hour when he knew defendant, because of the 'phantom vehicle,' was turning to the outside lane 'to avoid hitting' the 'phantom vehicle.' From these facts the jury could have found that plaintiff was negligent in failing to properly control his car and in suddenly slowing his vehicle in the path of defendant's vehicle when such movement could not be done with safety. Under the facts of this case, the court did not err in submitting the question of both plaintiff's and defendant's negligence to the jury under proper instructions.
Plaintiff next assigns as error the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict in favor of plaintiff as a matter of law because 'defendant admitted negligence.' Plaintiff...
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