Berg v. San Juan Marriott Hotel & Stellaris Casino
| Decision Date | 06 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 14–1746 (BJM) |
| Citation | 261 F.Supp.3d 213 |
| Parties | Jense BERG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SAN JUAN MARRIOTT HOTEL & STELLARIS CASINO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Rafael G. Martinez–Geigel, Martinez Geigel Law Office, Emilio E. Sole–De–La–Paz, Sole De La Paz Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Charles A. Demier–LeBlanc, De Corral & De Mier, LLP, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Jense Berg ("Berg"), Maria Torres Mercado ("Torres"), and Jose Lopez Mercado ("Lopez") brought this action against San Juan Marriott Hotel & Stellaris Casino and AIG Insurance Company–PR alleging that they were unlawfully detained by hotel employees while staying at the hotel in 2012. Docket No. 1 ("Complaint") On November 20, 2015, defendants moved both for summary judgment and for dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Docket No. 26. Plaintiffs opposed. Docket No. 31. The case is before me on consent of the parties. Docket No. 14. For the following reasons, the motions for summary judgment and dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are DENIED .
Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is "genuine" only if it "is one that could be resolved in favor of either party." Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). A fact is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions [of the record materials] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The court does not act as trier of fact when reviewing the parties' submissions and so cannot "superimpose [its] own ideas of probability and likelihood (no matter how reasonable those ideas may be) upon" conflicting evidence. Greenburg v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth. , 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 1987). Rather, it must "view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs–Ryan v. Smith , 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). The court may not grant summary judgment "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. But the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), and may not rest upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina–Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).
Except where otherwise noted, the following facts are drawn from the parties' Local Rule 561 submissions.2
Plaintiffs Berg, Torres, and Lopez were each staying at the Marriott Hotel in San Juan, Puerto Rico. SUMF ¶¶ 1–2. On the night of September 12, 2012, Berg visited the Marriott's casino, where he cashed a number of one hundred dollar bills brought with him to Puerto Rico from St. Croix. SUMF ¶¶ 4–5. The bills had been stored in a safe for four to five years. Def. Berg Dep. at 16. On the morning of September 13, the casino conducted a "soft count" procedure in which bills paid during the previous evening were fed into a counting machine. SUMF ¶ 9. During the soft count, the machine rejected sixteen one hundred dollar bills as counterfeit. SUMF ¶¶ 10–11. An investigation conducted by the Security Department revealed that the bills had been played at Black Jack table 9 the previous evening by Berg. SUMF ¶ 15. On the morning of September 13, various cashier associates of the Casino and Hotel were instructed to be on the lookout for $100 bills. SUMF ¶ 16. Shortly after the alert went out, Lobby Bar attendant Jennifer Castro notified security that a customer had paid a $70.62 tab using a $100 bill, and left the area without picking up the change. SUMF ¶¶ 17, 21. Marriott security identified the customer as Berg and ran the bill through the counting machine, which rejected it. SUMF ¶¶ 18, 20. Security then notified the Secret Service and the Puerto Rico Police Department ("PRPD") that they suspected counterfeit money was being used in the hotel and casino. SUMF ¶¶ 23–24. Shortly thereafter, security personnel approached Berg in a vehicle in the hotel parking lot. SUMF ¶¶ 25–26.
At this point, the accounts provided by the plaintiffs and defendants diverge significantly. Plaintiffs claim that the security approached Berg's car at around noon or before, see OSMF ¶ 26, while defendants claim that security approached the car at 2:57 p.m. See SUMF ¶ 26. Plaintiffs contend that security officer Pedro Rivera Gonzague ("Rivera") told Berg that he needed to remain at the hotel because he used counterfeit money, see OSMF ¶ 27, while defendants claim that Rivera simply informed Berg there was a problem with the $100 bill he had used to pay at the bar and then asked him to come inside the lobby. See SUMF ¶ 27. In either event, both parties agree that Berg was escorted into the hotel without use of physical force. SUMF ¶¶ 28–29; OSMF ¶¶ 28–29. Upon arriving in the lobby, Berg met almost immediately with two PRPD officers, SUMF ¶ 32, and at some point he was also interviewed in a separate room by the Secret Service. SUMF ¶ 35.
Meanwhile, Torres and Lopez claim that after Berg left with security, they were told to remain in the car by security personnel who stayed near the car. Pl. Torres Dep.3 at 4:1–2; Pl. Lopez Dep. at 5:24–6:5. After a few minutes, Torres and Lopez say the security officers escorted them to the lobby, where they were told to remain in sight. Pl. Torres Dep. at 4:19–5:3; 8:5–9. At some point, Torres alleges that she went to the restroom and was followed by security officers who waited outside the stall. Pl. Torres Dep. at 8:11–9:19.
Plaintiffs were permitted to leave the lobby around or after 5 p.m., SUMF ¶ 36. That evening plaintiffs left the hotel for some time, though their accounts of where they went conflict slightly. See Def. Torres Dep. at 9:3–6 (); Def. Berg Dep. at 5:6–23 (plaintiffs went "walking around"). Plaintiffs concede that they were never put under arrest at any time during the incident. OSMF ¶ 42. Berg was asked to come into the police station the following day. OSMF ¶ 38. The next morning, however, he was informed that the visit would not be necessary. Pl. Berg Dep. at 8:23–9:4.
Lopez, who had checked out of the Marriott before the incident began, did not return to stay at the hotel. Pl. Lopez Dep. at 4:14–5:20. Berg and Torres, on the other hand, actually extended their stay at the Marriott for two more nights. SUMF ¶ 43. None of the plaintiffs received medical treatment or took medications in relation to the incident at the Marriott. SUMF ¶ 45. This action was filed on October 13, 2014. Complaint.
Defendants move for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' false imprisonment claims, or in the alternative, for dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. I will discuss both motions in turn.
Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted on plaintiffs' false imprisonment claims because (1) plaintiffs cannot establish that their movements were restricted and (2) the hotel's actions were reasonable. Docket No. 26–9 ("Def. Memo.") at 15. As discussed below, however, the record contains genuine disputes of material fact that prevent me from granting summary judgment on any of the claims.
Plaintiffs bring their claims under Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico. Docket No. 10 at 5–6. Article 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico imposes liability on any person who causes damages to another through fault or negligence. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141. Article 1803 extends liability to employers for damages caused by employees acting in service of the employer or on account of their duties. Id. § 5142. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico recognizes a cause of action for false imprisonment "every time that a ‘person, whether or not a law enforcement officer, may by himself or through another one unlawfully detain or cause the unlawful detention of another person.’ " Santana v. United States , 919 F.Supp. 558, 563 (D.P.R. 1996) ). The doctrine of false imprisonment under Puerto Rican civil law is comparable to the doctrine under Anglo–American common law. See Ayala , 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 1021–22 ().
The elements of a false imprisonment claim are: "(1) intentional restriction of a person's freedom of movement, (2) that the detained person be conscious of the detention and that he or she not have consented, and (3) that the detention cause damages." Segarra Jimenez v. Banco Popular, Inc. , 421 F.Supp.2d 452, 461 (D.P.R. 2006) (citing Castro Cotto v. Tiendas Pitusa , 159 D.P.R. 650, 656 (2003) ). False imprisonment may be established even when the victim was not confined by physical force or barriers. See McCann v. Wal–Mart Stores , 210 F.3d 51, 53 (1st Cir. 2000). Rather, confinement may result from threats of physical force, a false assertion of legal authority to confine, or a plaintiff's submission to other duress. Id. at 53 ; Resta...
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Rodríguez-Tirado v. Bonds
...at 11. This is an accurate recitation of cause of action for false imprisonment in Puerto Rico. See Berg v. San Juan Marriott Hotel & Stellaris Casino, 261 F. Supp. 3d 213, 218 (D.P.R. 2016) (citing Castro Cotto v. Tiendas Pitusa, 159 D.P.R. 650, 656 (2003)). Next, the jury instructions exp......