Bergemann v. Backer

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HARLAN
• Citation: Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655, 15 S.Ct. 727, 39 L.Ed. 845 (1895)
• Decision Date: 01 April 1895
• Docket Number: No. 709,709
• Parties: BERGEMANN v. BACKER, Sheriff

157 U.S. 655

15 S.Ct. 727

39 L.Ed. 845

BERGEMANN

v BACKER, Sheriff.

No. 709.

April 1, 1895.

Wm. D. Daly, for appellant.

Joshua S. Salmon, for appellee.

Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellant, August Bergemann, was convicted in the court of oyer and terminer of Morris county, N. J., of the crime of murder in the first degree, under an indictment charging that, on a day and within the county named, he 'did willfully, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought kill and murder' one Julius Bergemann, 'contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the state, the government and dignity of the same.'

Being in custody of the sheriff, awaiting the time fixed for his execution under a sentence of death, he presented his petition to the circuit court of the United States for the district of New Jersey, representing that he had applied to all the courts of the state having power in the premises to stay his said execution, and for a writ of error to review the judgment of conviction, but his application had been denied; that the indictment against him charged the crime of murder of the second degree, and not murder of the first degree; that he was not informed of the crime of murder of the first degree by any indictment, 'as by the constitution and laws of the land he should have been so charged before he could have been convicted thereof'; that 'he ought not to have been sentenced to death, as the said court was without jurisdiction in the premises, and could not have imposed said judgment under said indictment according to the constitution and law of the land'; and that 'the said conviction and the judgment of said court thereon was in violation of the fourteenth amendmento f the constitution of the United States, in that he was denied the equal protection of the laws, as contemplated by said amendment, and the sixth amendment, which requires that the defendant shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation made against him.'

Upon these grounds be prayed that a writ of habeas corpus be issued. The application for the writ having been denied, he prayed, and was allowed, an appeal pursuant to the statute.

The application for the writ of habeas corpus was properly denied. The court of oyer and terminer had jurisdiction both of the offense charged and of the accused. Revision N. J. p. 272, § 30.

Whether the indictment sufficiently charged the crime of murder in the first degree was for that court to determine. Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, 698 11 Sup. Ct. 224.

Nor is there any ground for the contention that the laws of New Jersey prescribing the form of indictments in cases of murder or manslaughter are inconsistent with the due process of law, or the equal protection of the laws required by the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States. By the sixty-eighth section of the New Jersey crimes act it is provided: 'All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in perpetrating or attempting to prepetrate, any arson, rape, sodomy, robbery or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree; and the jury before whom any person indicted for murder shall be tried shall, if they find such person guilty thereof, designate by their verdict whether it be murder of the first or second degree.' Revision N. J. p. 239, § 68. And by the forty-fifth section of the criminal procedure act it is provided: 'In any indictment for murder or manslaughter it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner in which, or the means by which the death of the deceased was caused, but it shall be sufficient in every indictment for murder to charge that the defendant did willfully, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought kill and murder the deceased; and it shall be sufficient in every indictment for manslaughter to charge that the defendant did feloniously kill and slay the deceased.' Revision N. J. p. 275, § 45.

In Graves v. State, 45 N. J. Law, 203, it was held that an indictment...