Berger v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | 16 CV 1835 (MKB) (CLP) |
| Parties | SARA BERGER, Plaintiff, v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On November 24, 2015, plaintiff Sara Berger ("plaintiff" or "Berger") commenced this personal injury action against Mazda Motor of America, Inc., d/b/a Mazda North American Operations ("defendant" or "Mazda"), in New York State Supreme Court, Kings1 County. Plaintiff, the owner of a 2015 Mazda CX-5 Grand Touring SUV (the "Vehicle"), alleges that she injured her thumb on the "under-seat protrusions of sharp metal pieces" when she reached under the passenger side seat of the Vehicle. She also alleges various other defects in the Vehicle that she contends were in breach of both the Vehicle's express warranty and the implied warranty of merchantability.
The case was removed to this Court on April 14, 2016. Following the completion of discovery, defendant now moves for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion was referred to the undersigned on August 8, 2018 to prepare a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, it is respectfully recommended that defendant's motion be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff alleges that she resides in Brooklyn, New York and is a citizen of New York. (Compl.2 ¶ 2). She further alleges that defendant Mazda is a domestic LLC transacting business in and deriving substantial revenue from goods consumed and services rendered in the State of New York. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 4). Defendant alleges in its Notice of Removal that it is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of California with a principal place of business in California and that plaintiff alleges $85,000 in damages, bringing the case within the diversity jurisdiction of this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 3, 6).
Plaintiff purchased her 2015 Mazda CX5 Grand Touring SUV (the "Vehicle") in August 2014 from an authorized Mazda dealership, paying approximately $35,000, of which she financed $22,000. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9; see also Def.'s 56.1 Stmnt3 ¶ 1; Pl.'s 56.1 Stmnt4 ¶ 1). Plaintiff testified during her deposition that she "settled" on the Vehicle even though she liked other vehicles better, but they were not within her budget. (Def.'s 56.1 Stmnt ¶ 2 (citing Ex. D5 at 24-26)). Plaintiff alleges that the Vehicle came with multiple express manufacturer's warranties, which she claims defendant violated. (Compl. ¶ 11; see also Def.'s 56.1 Stmnt ¶ 3; Ex. M6 at 12). Although plaintiff did not provide the Court with a copy of these warranties, defendant has provided a copy of the New Vehicle Limited Warranty, which came with the Vehicle and whichwarranted that the Vehicle "'was free from defects in material or workmanship,'" subject to certain conditions. (Def.'s 56.1 Stmnt ¶ 3 (citing Ex. M at 12)). It further warranted that "'a Mazda Dealer will make necessary repairs, using new or remanufactured parts, to correct any problem covered by this warranty without charge to you.'" (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that on March 11, 2015, while she was sitting in her Vehicle, she reached under the passenger's side seat and "severely lacerated her left thumb" on sharp metal pieces protruding from under the seat. (Compl. ¶ 14). Plaintiff allegedly required six stitches to her thumb, leaving a permanent scar. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 16; Pl.'s 56.1 Stmnt ¶ 21). As a result of the injury, plaintiff was forced to wear a splint and could not type; her work involves her typing constantly at a computer. (Compl. ¶¶ 17,18). Plaintiff alleges that she brought the dangerous condition, which is under both the driver's and passenger's front seats, to Mazda's attention, but Mazda "has not resolved" the issue, creating a risk of future harm. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20).
Plaintiff raises a number of other complaints and problems that she has had with the Vehicle, including: 1) she receives a message, "'key not found on the dashboard,'" after which she cannot get back into her car using the keyless entry; 2) there was an issue with the inner left tie rod; when turning the wheel all the way to the left, "the car made a metal-on-metal grinding noise;" 3) there is a paint defect in the middle of the ledge near the trunk of the Vehicle; 4) there is a delay in the heating of the Vehicle's seats; and 5) the Vehicle made a "squeaking noise" as it traveled across safety bumps, which the dealer allegedly attributed to a defect in the rear passenger side strut. (Id. ¶¶ 22-32). Plaintiff alleges that each of these problems, some of which cause a potential hazard, were brought to Mazda's attention. (Id.) Although plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that the issues have not been resolved (id.), Mazda disagrees. (Def.'s 56.1 Stmnt ¶¶ 4, 5 (citing Ex. D at 79-87)).
In her Complaint, plaintiff brings claims of negligence and strict liability for the manufacturing defects, and breach of express and implied warranties. (Id. ¶¶ 33-62). Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's tort product liability claims, arguing that she cannot sustain her burden of showing a manufacturing defect; the seat was reasonably safe and did not present any design defects; and there were no defects in workmanship or material. Defendant also moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's other breach of warranty claims on the grounds that there was no breach of these warranties.
It is well-settled that a party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Thompson v. Gjivoje, 896 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1990). Since summary judgment is an extreme remedy, cutting off the rights of the non-moving party to present a case to the jury, see Egelston v. State Univ. College at Geneseo, 535 F.2d 752, 754 (2d Cir. 1976); Gibralter v. City of New York, 612 F. Supp. 125, 133-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), the court should not grant summary judgment unless it is clear that all of the elements have been satisfied. See Auletta v. Tully, 576 F. Supp. 191, 194-95 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984). In addition, "'the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
Once the moving party discharges its burden of proof under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment "has the burden of coming forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 782 F. Supp. 854, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Rule 56(e) "provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256. A party opposing summary judgment may not "merely. . . assert a conclusion without supplying supporting arguments or facts." BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir. l996) (internal quotations omitted). The party must set forth "concrete particulars" showing that a trial is necessary. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Deloach, 708 F. Supp. 1371, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Indeed, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties" alone will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).
In reversing a grant of summary judgment, the Second Circuit noted that the "'[t]rial court's task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them.'" Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiff has alleged that Mazda should be held strictly liable for her thumb injury based on both the theory that there was a manufacturing defect and the theory of a defect in the design of the underside of the front passenger seat that caused the injury.
A manufacturer may be liable if it places a defective product on the market that then causes the plaintiff's injuries. Arbaiza v. Delta Int'l Machinery Corp., No. 96 CV 1224, 1998 WL 846773, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1998) (citing Liraino v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 700 N.E.2d 303, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1998)). A plaintiff must establish that the product suffered from a defective design, defective manufacture, or inadequate warnings. June v. Lift-A-Loft Equip., Inc., No. 88 CV 1205, 1992 WL 168181, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 13, 1992) (citing Robinson v. Reed Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 479, 403 N.E.2d 440, 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (1980)).
"Under New York law, [i]t is well settled that, whether [an] action is pleaded in strict products liability, breach of warranty or negligence, it is a consumer's burden to show that a defect in the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury." Vicusi v. P&G - Clairol, Inc., 346 Fed. Appx. 715, 716 (2d Cir. 2009); Porrazzo v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, 822 F. Supp. 2d 406, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Although plaintiff has alleged both negligence and strict liability, this court in DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., noted: "[n]egligence and strict liability for design defects are, in New York, almost functionally equivalent." 509 F. Supp. 762, 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 53, 82 (S.D.N.Y....
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