Berger v. Scroll Compressors, LLC

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, J.
• Citation: Berger v. Scroll Compressors, LLC, 473 S.W.3d 727 (Mo. App. 2015)
• Decision Date: 12 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. SD 33877,SD 33877
• Parties: Philip Berger, Claimant–Appellant, v. Scroll Compressors, LLC, Employer–Respondent, and Missouri Division of Employment Security, Respondent.

473 S.W.3d 727

Philip Berger, Claimant–Appellant,

v. Scroll Compressors, LLC, Employer–Respondent,andMissouri Division of Employment Security, Respondent.

No. SD 33877

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two .

Filed: November 12, 2015

Attorneys for Appellant—Gene P. Graham, Jr., Deborah J. Blakely of Independence, MO.

Attorney for Respondent Scroll Compressors, LLC—Jay M. Dade of Springfield, MO.

Attorney for Respondent Missouri Division of Employment Security—Bart A. Matanic of Jefferson City, MO.

Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, J.

Philip Berger ("Claimant") appeals from a decision by the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (the "Commission") concluding that he is disqualified for unemployment insurance benefits following his separation from employment with Scroll Compressors, LLC ("Employer"). In a single point, Claimant contends that the Commission erred in ruling that he "voluntarily" left his employment. Using our standard of review, we reject Claimant's point and affirm the Commission's decision.

Commission Findings

The Commission concluded Claimant was disqualified for unemployment insurance benefits "because [Claimant] left work voluntarily ... without good cause attributable to the work or employer." In so deciding, the Commission made findings of fact that included the following:

Claimant had been working as a maintenance technician for employer since October 1995. He performed general maintenance on employer's production line equipment. From approximately 2002 through 2005, claimant worked in the scroll maintenance area. In this area, coolant chemicals called "metal working fluids" were in use.

Because claimant's physician recommended that claimant be removed from exposure to such chemicals, employer moved claimant to the final process packaging area of its facility. This area is walled away from the scroll maintenance area. It is in the furthermost area away from the scroll maintenance area. After this transfer of areas, employer was not aware that claimant was experiencing any further health problems. His attendance was perfect, and he did not raise any further issues. At some point, however, employer became aware that claimant had filed a lawsuit against it.

In general terms, claimant had sued employer due to what he contended was its lack of care by exposing him to chemicals that caused respiratory problems. During the civil hearing connected with such suit, employer learned that at least some of claimant's doctors were recommending that claimant not return to work for employer. Claimant had last actually worked for employer on November 8, 2013. He then took a two-week vacation. The civil hearing took place during that vacation.

Claimant was scheduled to return to work on approximately November 25, 2013. On that date, claimant returned to work. Employer instructed him to attend a meeting with three of its management personnel. During this meeting, employer's representatives told claimant that it needed him to take a step before returning to work (his job was still immediately available to him).

Because of the concerns that claimant's doctors had expressed during the hearing about claimant's continued work at employer's facility, employer gave claimant three options. First, he could give it a note from a doctor indicating either his full release to return to his normal duties or a note indicating what limitations and/or accommodations claimant needed. Second, claimant could take time off by submitting paperwork under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Third, he could apply for short-term disability insurance through a third-party insurer. Claimant left the meeting and indicated he would discuss these options with his attorney.

The Commission then found that (1) Employer's Manager of Human Resources, George Svaranowic, sent Claimant a letter dated December 2, 2013, (2) Claimant received the letter, (3) Claimant did not respond to the letter by December 13, 2013, (4) Svaranowic called and spoke to Claimant on December 13, 2013, (5) Claimant did not respond to Employer by January 2, 2014, (6) Svaranowic sent Claimant a letter dated January 2, 2014, (7) Claimant received the letter, and (8) the content of the letters and telephone conversation were as indicated in the letters and Svaranowic's testimony at the telephone conference hearing. The Commission then found as follows:

Despite [Claimant's] receipt of [Svaranowic's January 2] letter, claimant never had further communication with employer. He did not provide any short-term disability papers. He did not submit any doctor note. He made no further attempt to return to work.

Based on these facts and for reasons further detailed below, we find that claimant voluntarily left his work for employer effective February 14, 2014 [the expiration of the FMLA leave Employer granted Claimant].

In its conclusions of law, the Commission then concluded:

Claimant clearly could and intended to return to work for employer as evidenced by his return to work on November 25, 2013. Since sometime in 2005, when employer transferred him into a different area of its facility where his exposure to the metal working fluids had been minimized, claimant had not made employer aware of any further problems in his work environment. After claimant sued it, employer had concerns about whether to return claimant to his former job or whether it needed to make further accommodations for him. Its request that he provide something current from the doctor of his choice to document his ability to return to his former job or his need for restrictions or other accommodations was reasonable. If he believed he needed more time for recuperation, he also had the options of FMLA leave and/or short-term disability.

Thus, we conclude that claimant had choices and alternatives and that he left his employment voluntarily by choosing not to pursue any of his alternatives through February 14, 2014 (the date through which employer had extended claimant a guaranteed leave under the FMLA).

The Commission then moved to the question whether Claimant's separation from work was without good cause attributable to Claimant's work or employer. The Commission concluded:

In the case before us, claimant did not testify to provide his reasons for quitting. We do not know whether he feared that continuing to work for employer might aggravate his respiratory problems, whether he could not afford to see a doctor, whether he felt that his working relationship with employer had been poisoned, or whether he simply did not want to make the effort of seeking and acquiring a letter from a doctor. Because it was claimant's burden to prove good cause for leaving his work for employer, we must conclude that he failed to meet this burden.

To prove good cause to quit, claimant had to prove not only the reason he quit, but that he exercised the type of good faith effort that a reasonable person who genuinely wanted to work would have exercised in trying to resolve any problems with employer. Even if for the sake of argument we assumed that claimant had good reasons for quitting, we have no evidence that employer was asking for something from claimant that was unreasonable or impossible to acquire. Nonetheless, without any explanation, claimant simply ceased communicating with employer. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that he acted reasonably.

Standard of Review

In Fendler v. Hudson Services, 370 S.W.3d 585, 588–89 (Mo. banc 2012), our Supreme Court described our standard of review as:

Article V, section 18 of the Missouri Constitution provides for judicial review of the commission's decisions to determine whether they "are supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record." Mo. Const. art. V, § 18. Under section 288.210:

The findings of the commission as to the facts, if supported by competent and substantial evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the appellate court shall be confined to questions of law. The court, on appeal, may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the decision of the commission on the following grounds and no other:

(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers;

(2) That the decision was procured by fraud;

(3) That the facts found by the commission do not support the award; or

(4) That there was no sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award. An appeal shall not act as a supersedeas or stay unless the commission shall so order.

§ 288.210. "Whether the award is supported by competent and substantial evidence is judged by examining the evidence in the context of the whole record." Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Mo. banc 2003). "This Court defers to the Commission on issues involving the credibility of witnesses and the weight given to testimony," Johnson v. Denton Const. Co., 911 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Mo. banc 1995), but in so doing it does not view "the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the award." Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 223.

Additionally, whether an employee left work voluntarily or involuntarily is a question of fact for the Commission. Miller v. Great Southern Bank, 367 S.W.3d 111, 117 (Mo.App.S.D.2012) ; Dearborn v. Great Southern Financial Corp., 422 S.W.3d 487, 494 (Mo.App.S.D.2014). The employee "generally has the burden of showing that he is eligible for benefits" with the result that the employee has the "burden of showing" that the employee left work involuntarily or, if the employee left voluntarily, that the employee did so with good cause attributable to the employee's work or employer. Harris v. Division of Employment Security, 350 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Mo.App.W.D.2011).

Law

Under section 288.050.1(1), RSMo Cum. Supp. 2011, a claimant is disqualified for unemployment insurance benefits if the claimant "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work or to the claimant's employer."...