Bergeson v. Pesch

Decision Date16 October 1962
Docket NumberNo. 50691,50691
Citation254 Iowa 223,117 N.W.2d 431
PartiesMearl Hittle BERGESON, Appellee, v. Carl PESCH, Commissioner of Public Safety of the State of Iowa, and the Motor Vehicle Department, Appellants.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Evan Hultman, Atty. Gen., and Bruce M. Snell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Gill & Dunkle, Sioux City, for appellee.

GARFIELD, Chief, Justice.

The question presented is one of statutory construction--whether the Iowa motor vehicle department (herein called 'the department') may legally revoke an operator's license because of his conviction upon three charges of violating speed restrictions fixed by city ordinance committed within a period of 12 months.

In this certiorari action instituted by the operator under rules 306-319, Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 I.C.A., the trial court held the department was without such power to revoke and sustained the writ. The department has appealed. We affirm the decision.

A sufficient statement of the facts, which are undisputed, is that plaintiff-appellee was convicted upon three charges of speed restrictions fixed by city ordinance committed within a period of 12 months and the department revoked his operator's license because of such convictions.

We set out the pertinent state statutes. Section 321.209, Code 1958, I.C.A., provides: 'Mandatory Revocation. The department shall forthwith revoke the license of any operator or chauffeur * * * upon receiving a record of such operator's or chauffeur's conviction of any of the following offenses: * * *

'7. Conviction * * * upon three charges of any speed restriction violation under the provisions of sections 321.285 to 321.287, inclusive, committed within a period of twelve months.'

Code section 321.285, I.C.A. states: 'Speed restrictions. Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper, * * * and no person shall drive * * * at a speed greater than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead, * * *.'

'The following shall be the lawful speed except as hereinbefore or hereinafter modified, and any speed in excess thereof shall be unlawful:

'1. Twenty miles per hour in any business district.

'2. Twenty-five miles per hour in any residence or school district.' (Emphasis added.)

Subsections 3 to 8 of 321.285 fix maximum speeds in other districts or under other circumstances or conditions. Section 321.286, included in the statutes refered to in 321.209, supra, fixes speed limits for trucks. Section 321.287, also referred to in 321.209, fixes speed limits for buses. Neither 321.286 nor 321.287 has any direct application to this controversy.

I. The department and its head, the commissioner of public safety, have only such powers as are expressly, or by necessary and fair implication, conferred upon them by the legislature. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 252 Iowa 318, 321, 105 N.W.2d 633, 635, and citations; 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure §§ 48-50; 42 Am.Jur. Public Administrative Law § 26, pages 316-17, § 68, page 379. See also Code section 321.2, 321.3 and 321.4, I.C.A.; Springville Community School Dist. v. Iowa Department of Public Instruction, 252 Iowa 907, 914, 109 N.W.2d 213, 217, and citations.

II. The department's principal contention is that municipal speed restriction ordinances are incorporated by reference into section 321.285, supra, by the language thereof we have italicized and are thereby included within the terms of section 321.209, subd. 7, also supra, which require revocation of an operator's license.

It is argued sections 321.235 and 321.293 are included by reference in the exception to 321.285. 321.235 provides, 'Local authorities may, however, adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter.' And 321.293 provides local authorities may authorize by ordinance higher speeds than those stated in 321.285 upon through highways or highways where stop signs have been erected at the entrances thereto.

We may assume, without so deciding, that the language in 321.285, 'except as hereinbefore or hereinafter modified,' includes a reference to these provisions of 321.235 and 321.293. The effect of such a reference is merely a recognition by the legislature of the power of local authorities to adopt certain speed restrictions.

We think the quoted language of 321.285 falls considerably short of incorporating therein by reference any speed restriction ordinance which may be passed by a city or town pursuant to the authority of 321.235 or 321.293. Nor may it fairly be held that convictions under such an ordinance are convictions of 'violation under the provisions of section(s) 321.285' within the terms of 321.209, subd. 7, supra. They are convictions under an ordinance, not under 321.285. And 321.209, subd. 7, confers no authority upon the department to revoke a license for violations of an ordinance.

If the legislature intended to direct the department to revoke an operator's license for violations of speed restrictions contained in a city ordinance we must presume it would have so stated. Courts may not, under the guise of construction, extend, enlarge or otherwise change the terms of a statute. Wall v. County Board of Education, 249 Iowa 209, 218, 86 N.W.2d 231, 237; Tucker v. Nason, 249 Iowa 496, 501-502, 87 N.W.2d 547, 549-550, and citations; Mallory v. Jurgena, 250 Iowa 16, 21-22, 92 N.W.2d 387, 390, and citations.

Rule 344(f), par. 13, Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted September 17, 1962, is applicable here: 'In construing statutes the courts search for the legislative intent as shown by what the legislature said, rather than what it should or might have said.'

We observe the ground for mandatory revocation of an operator's license which immediately precedes subsection 7, supra, is: '6. Conviction * * * upon two charges of reckless driving.' It is to be noticed subsection 6 does not add 'under section 321.283,' the state statute which defines the offense of reckless driving. There appears to be a clear distinction between subsections 6 and 7 on the point at issue. The former is fairly open to the construction that two convictions of reckless driving, whether under 321.283 or a valid city ordinance, afford cause for revocation. But subsection 7 limits the cause for revocation there set out to convictions of speed violations 'under the provisions of sections 321.285 to 321.287.' In effect the department would have us read out of 321.209, subd. 7, the language just quoted.

III. The department argues that the statutory provisions quoted at the outset hereof are remedial and should be liberally construed. If this be conceded for present purposes it does not aid the department in this controversy. There are bounds beyond which the doctrine of liberal construction of statutes may not lead us. It is subject to the principle that all rules of statutory construction are merely for the purpose of ascertaining legislative intent. It does not authorize us to change the reasonable meaning of the language of the statute. Iowa Employment Security Comm. v. Marshall County, 242 Iowa 1254, 1257, 49 N.W.2d 829, 831, and citation; Kyte v. Iowa Employment Security Comm., 244 Iowa 1119, 1124, 60 N.W.2d 225, 227; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 387, page 917 ('* * * liberal construction * * * does not mean an enlargement of the plain provisions of the law, since the rule of liberal construction...

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  • Graham v. Worthington
    • United States
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    ...extend, enlarge or otherwise change the terms or plain intent and meaning of the statute. Rule 344(f)(13), R.C.P., and Bergeson v. Pesch, 254 Iowa 223, 227, 117 N.W.2d 431. When considered in its entirety the Act discloses no intent on the part of the legislature to waive existing governmen......
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    ...under the guise of construction, may extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the terms and meaning of a statute. Bergeson v. Pesch, 254 Iowa 223, 227--228, 117 N.W.2d 431. Conversely we must, if reasonably possible, give meaning and effect to every part, and all words used in a legislative ena......
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