Bergquist v. Fidelity Information Services, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 November 2005
• Docket Number: No. 3:04CV1240J99MCR.,3:04CV1240J99MCR.
• Citation: 399 F.Supp.2d 1320
• Parties: Paul BERGQUIST, Plaintiff, v. FIDELITY INFORMATION SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

399 F.Supp.2d 1320

Paul BERGQUIST, Plaintiff, v. FIDELITY INFORMATION SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant.

No. 3:04CV1240J99MCR.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division.

November 10, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Archibald J. Thomas, III, Archibald J. Thomas, III, P.A., Philip Daniel Williams, Magid & Williams, P.A., Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff.

S. Grier Wells, Benjamin D. Sharkey, Ryan R. Fuller, Akerman Senterfitt, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

JOHN H. MOORE, II, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions (Dkt. 16) with attached exhibits and a deposition transcript of the Plaintiff in support (Dkt. 17), to which Plaintiff filed a Response (Dkt. 21). Defendant subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 18) and Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition with an attached exhibit (Dkt. 22). Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with an affidavit in support (Dkt. 19) and Defendant filed a Response in Opposition attaching multiple exhibits (Dkt. 20). Plaintiff filed an Unopposed Request for Oral Argument (Dkt. 23) and Defendant filed a Request for Oral Argument or in the Alternative for Leave to File a Reply to or Strike Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 24), to which Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (Dkt. 26).

I. Factual Background

In August 1995, Plaintiff was employed as a "Computer Programmer" by Defendant's predecessor, Alltel Information Services, Inc. ("Alltel Information") (Dkt. 7, ¶ 5). In 2003, Defendant purchased Altell Information and Plaintiff continued his employ with Defendant until his termination in October 2004 (Dkt. 18 at 2). On or about January 10, 2005 Plaintiff filed his one count Amended Complaint (Dkt. 7) alleging that Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (Dkt. 7) specifically alleges that for at least three years prior to October 2004, Plaintiff was employed in a computer programmer position "that under certain circumstances may be subject to exemption under the provisions" of the FLSA (Dkt. 7, ¶ 7). Plaintiff contends, however, that Defendant failed to comply with the exemption provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17) by employing Plaintiff in a position that was not exempt from overtime compensation under the FLSA. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant violated Section 7 of the FLSA in failing to provide overtime compensation for hours worked by Plaintiff in excess of forty hours per workweek. Consequently, Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation allegedly owed by the Defendant.¹

Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case under the FLSA that he is entitled to unpaid overtime compensation. Defendant also moves for summary judgment contending Plaintiffs employment duties and salary meet the requirements of an exempt computer professional. Defendant additionally moves for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. 16). The Court will address the Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkts. 18-19) prior to analyzing the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions (Dkt. 16).

II. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment

The Court should grant a motion for summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact [such] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987); Edwards v. Acadia Realty Trust, Inc., 141 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1344-45 (M.D.Fla.2001). The Court will construe the record and all inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine material fact. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Samples on Behalf of Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir.1988). Once this burden is met, however, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The Eleventh Circuit explained in Samples that the opposing party need only present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in its favor in order to survive the moving party's motion for summary judgment. See Samples, 846 F.2d at 1330; see also Augusta Iron & Steel Works v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir.1988).

Notably, the Supreme Court pointed out in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), that the moving party's burden only extends to facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law, as "[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Summary judgment will only be granted if all facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party, such that a responsible jury could not find in favor of the opposing party. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). If there is conflicting evidence that will permit differing reasonable inferences, the case will be submitted to the jury. See Augusta Iron & Steel, 835 F.2d at 856.

III. Affirmative Defense

While the FLSA generally requires employees receive overtime compensation for time worked beyond forty hours per week, certain employees are exempt from this requirement. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a); 29 U.S.C. § 213. Plaintiff asserts, however, that Defendant has not alleged as an affirmative defense any valid exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 213 and that any such exemption has therefore been waived. See Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 666 (5th Cir.2001)(noting that "[e]mployees are entitled to overtime compensation according to the general rule unless their employer proves that one of the many exemptions applies."); Brennan v. Valley Towing Co., 515 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir.1975). See also FED. R. CIV. PROC. RULE 8(c).

Plaintiff contends that "exemptions from the FLSA [are construed] narrowly ... and the employer has the burden to prove that the employee is exempt from the FLSA general rule...." Vela, 276 F.3d at 666-67 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, that "the assertion of an exemption from the mandates of the FLSA is an affirmative defense that is waived if it is not specifically pleaded by a defendant." Rotondo v. City of Georgetown, 869 F.Supp. 369, 373 (D.S.C.1994)(citing Renfro v. City of Emporia, Kan., 741 F.Supp. 887, 888 (D.Kan.1990)), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1529, 1539 (10th Cir.1991). Plaintiff argues because the Defendant did raise four affirmative defenses in its Answer (Dkt. 11), none of which involved an exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 213, any exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 213 is irrelevant to the Court's summary judgment determination.

Plaintiff alternatively alleges that if Defendant attempted to amend its Answer (Dkt.11) to raise an exemption at this juncture, such an effort would be precluded by Sosa v. Airprint Systems, Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir.1998). Plaintiff contends that Sosa establishes that if a motion to amend is filed after the deadline in the court's scheduling order, the motion cannot be granted unless the good cause standard set forth in Rule 16(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is met. Id. at 1418 n. 2 ("As we explain below, when a motion to amend is filed after a scheduling order deadline, Rule 16 is the proper guide for determining whether a party's delay may be excused."). Plaintiff argues the liberal amendment standard set out in Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is inapplicable here as the Court must first address the good cause standard in Rule 16(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant "could not possibly meet the standard imposed by Rule 16(b)" and that although the more liberal standard of excusable neglect in Rule 6(b) is also inapplicable, "it is doubtful that defendant could even meet" that standard (Dkt. 22 at 10). Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff argues the exemptions in 29 U.S.C. § 213 have been waived and are not before the Court.

Conversely, Defendant argues it did raise the FLSA exemption defense in its Answer (Dkt. 11) to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. 7). Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. 7) goes beyond the requirements necessary for pleading a prima facie case in that it raises the issue of whether Plaintiff was an exempt computer programmer. Indeed, Defendant references Paragraph 7 of the Amended Complaint which states:

For at least a three year period prior to October 2004, Plaintiff has been employed by Defendant in a computer programmer position that under certain circumstances may be subject to exemption under the provisions of the Act. However, Defendant failed to comply with the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17) thereby employing Plaintiff in an [sic] position that was not exempt from overtime compensation under the Act.

(Dkt.7, ¶ 7). Defendant contends the language of this pleading placed the exemption at issue. Defendant also contends that in responding to paragraph 7 in its Answer (Dkt.11), Defendant agreed that Plaintiff was a computer programmer and denied that it failed to comply with the computer programmer exemption. By this denial, Defendant argues it "asserted that Plaintiff was an exempt computer programmer and that it complied with the provisions of the exemption. ...