Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated

• Decision Date: 23 November 1966
• Docket Number: No. 15156.,15156.
• Citation: 369 F.2d 874
• Parties: Marion J. BERGUIDO, Individually, Marion J. Berguido, Robert G. Rowe and Warren H. Woodring, Executors of the Estate of Carlos Berguido, Jr., and June Berguido, Joy Berguido, Jill Berguido and Carlos Berguido, 3d, by Their Guardian Marion J. Berguido, Appellants, v. EASTERN AIR LINES, INCORPORATED.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

369 F.2d 874 (1966)

Marion J. BERGUIDO, Individually, Marion J. Berguido, Robert G. Rowe and Warren H. Woodring, Executors of the Estate of Carlos Berguido, Jr., and June Berguido, Joy Berguido, Jill Berguido and Carlos Berguido, 3d, by Their Guardian Marion J. Berguido, Appellants, v. EASTERN AIR LINES, INCORPORATED.

No. 15156.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued September 16, 1965.

Decided November 23, 1966.

Seymour I. Toll, and Charles A. Lord, Philadelphia, Pa. (B. Nathaniel Richter, Arthur G. Raynes, Richter, Lord, Toll & Cavanaugh, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellants. Truscott, Kline, O'Neill & Howson, Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel.

F. Hastings Griffin, Philadelphia, Pa. (Owen B. Rhoads, Dechert Price & Rhoads, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief) for appellee. Daniel L. Stonebridge, John J. Martin, New York City, of counsel.

Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and KALODNER and FORMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FORMAN, Circuit Judge.

This is the second appeal to reach us in the wrongful death action brought by appellants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, individually, as guardian and as executors of the estate of the deceased, Carlos Berguido, Jr. hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, plaintiff-appellant, and appellant, against Eastern Air Lines hereinafter referred to as defendant, defendant-appellee, and appellee. Decedent was a passenger for hire on a constellation that crashed near Imeson Airport, Jacksonville, Florida in the early morning of December 21, 1955.

Following two mistrials, a third trial, before a jury, resulted in a verdict for plaintiff. The jury found that the crash was the result of one or more acts of wilful misconduct on the part of the defendant. Defendant's attempt to limit its liability to $8300 under the Warsaw Convention¹ governing international airplane flights was thus defeated.² We reversed on evidentiary grounds.³

A fourth trial, before a jury, produced a verdict for plaintiff, but only for the limited Warsaw Convention liability of $8300, this jury resolving the issue of wilful misconduct adversely to the plaintiff. However, upon plaintiff's motion, the District Court vacated its judgment and granted a new trial.⁴ Defendant applied to this court for a writ of mandamus and prohibition, arguing that the District Court had exceeded its power in granting the new trial. We denied the writ⁵ as well as a petition for reargument.⁶

The case was then scheduled for its fifth trial. The posture of the case was as it was at the previous trials. Defendant, having pleaded the Warsaw Convention, was attempting to limit its liability to $8300,⁷ while plaintiff's main efforts were directed at proving either that the decedent's flight was not international, or that defendant was guilty of wilful misconduct so as to otherwise eliminate the Warsaw Convention defense. The plaintiff had presented alternate theories of defendant's wilful misconduct. It was urged by plaintiff that the pilot of the Eastern constellation had attempted a "sneak-in" landing — dropping down through a low cloud ceiling into a position below the authorized Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach minimum elevation. This theory was developed by plaintiff through the presentation of hypothetical questions to experts, Glickstein, Kepner and Cann. Plaintiff's alternative theory was that both the pilot and the co-pilot operating the aircraft had submarginal heart conditions. Medical records were introduced in support of this theory.

Plaintiff alleges that it also urged that defendant had not met its obligations under Article 3(1) of the Convention⁸ and, thus, the Convention did not apply. Plaintiff appears to indicate that the District Court was thus urged in the alternative to try the case on the theory of simple negligence.

The parties waived trial by jury. They also agreed that the District Court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) in non-jury cases. The parties further specified that the District Court might limit its decision to a general finding either for or against liability and in a single total sum fixing damages, just as a jury would do. Despite the acquiescence by the parties to a short form of disposition, not authorized by the Federal Rules, the District Court did file an opinion⁹ in which it set forth findings of fact on certain aspects of its ruling.

Summarily determining the international nature of the flight, a finding which the plaintiff does not now contest, the bulk of the District Court's opinion is devoted to a discussion of whether the defendant was guilty of wilful misconduct. A discussion of whether defendant complied with Article 3(1) of the Warsaw Convention is absent, although the Convention was determined to be applicable. The District Court observed that this was a case where the evidence of wilful misconduct was meager and incomplete, making the search for truth a most difficult task. It stated that a considerable number and variety of causes of the accident were within the realm of possibility. The District Court observed further that in a case such as this, where the search is for the cause of the accident, the judgment of a court must be determined upon the probabilities insofar as they can be determined from the evidence, and not on a mere possibility, even if such possibility be disclosed by the evidence.

The above preliminary observations were followed by a statement of "firm findings" which the District Court apparently considered facts found "specially" conforming to the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). The District Court found that there was not a preponderance of credible evidence that a health condition constituted wilful misconduct causing or contributing to the crash of the constellation. As to the "sneak-in" theory, the District Court stated that it could not find as proven by the preponderance of the evidence all of the assumed facts stated in the hypothetical questions put to plaintiff's experts. But, even if all the assumed facts were taken to be proven, said the District Court, the conclusions reached by plaintiff's experts were not believable. Rather, the District Court chose to find that there was a substantial and reasonable probability that the presence of jet aircraft in or near the ILS glide slope for the Eastern constellation interfered with the aircraft, bringing about emergency conditions resulting in the accident, the theory of the defendant. The Court then concluded that defendant was guilty neither of wilful misconduct nor of negligence. Having previously found the Warsaw Convention applicable, judgment was entered against the defendant for $8300. Though finding against defendant's liability above $8300, the District Court indicated, albeit quite unnecessarily, that plaintiff had suffered $375,000 in damages.

— I —

Prior to examining plaintiff-appellant's position on this appeal, a question of some moment is whether the District Court complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). The agreement between the parties, that the District Court need not enter findings of fact, is not effective. The requirement of Rule 52(a) is mandatory, the findings in part serving as a necessary aid to the appellate courts.¹⁰ If a full understanding of the factual issues cannot be gleaned from the District Court's opinion, we would be obliged to remand for compliance with Rule 52(a).

Were the findings, as prepared, sufficient compliance with Rule 52(a)? Concerning plaintiff's theory of the submarginal heart conditions of the pilot and co-pilot, the single finding that there was no probable causal relationship shown between their heart conditions and the accident is ample to meet the requirement of Rule 52(a). The basis of the Court's ruling is clear and an examination of the record will reveal whether there is substantial support for it.

The District Court did not, however, comply with Rule 52(a) when it found, without further elaboration, that some of the assumed facts stated in the hypotheticals were not proven. But for the Court's further assuming the validity of all the facts in the hypotheticals for purposes of testing whether the defendant, even under those circumstances, was guilty of wilful misconduct, the failure to elaborate on the inadequacy of the hypotheticals would have been a fatal defect requiring a remand. The Court did find, however, that assuming the accuracy of the facts in the hypotheticals, plaintiff's expert witnesses, Glickstein, Kepner and Cann, drew a conclusion therefrom as to the probable cause of the accident that was not believable. Considerable effort was exercised by the Court in analyzing the basis for the refusal to accept their conclusion. Such elaboration qualifies the finding as sufficient under Rule 52(a), if indeed a specific finding by the trier of fact is needed when the issue is one of credibility.

As to the District Court's finding that jet aircraft in or near the ILS glide slope interfered with the Eastern constellation and, therefore, defendant was not guilty of wilful misconduct, this states a fact susceptible of examination by an appellate court and thus is in compliance with Rule 52(a).

As an initial matter we conclude, therefore, that the requirements of Rule 52(a) have been sufficiently met.¹¹ The findings of fact and conclusions of law may now be considered in the light of plaintiff-appellant's appeal contentions.

— II —

Appellant now concedes the international nature of the flight and to this extent the applicability of the Warsaw Convention. It is contended for the first time, however, that the litigants to this suit, as well as most courts which have previously dealt with the question of liability under the Warsaw Convention, have labored under a misconception concerning the scheme of the Convention. Appellant urges a theory of...