Berigan v. State

• Decision Date: 05 January 1968
• Docket Number: No. 18,18
• Citation: 2 Md.App. 666,236 A.2d 743
• Parties: Rolf BERIGAN v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 666

2 Md.App. 666

236 A.2d 743

Rolf BERIGAN v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 18.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 5, 1968.

Eugene J. Fitzpatrick, Wheaton, for appellant.

Anthony Carey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Edward L. Blanton, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, William A. Linthicum, Jr., State's Atty. for Montgomery County, James F. Tomes, Asst. State's Atty. for Montgomery County, Rockville, on brief, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and MORTON, ORTH, and THOMPSON, JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

The appellant was convicted of grand larceny on October 24, 1966, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County by Judge Kathryn J. Shook, sitting without a jury, and sentenced to a term of five years in the Maryland Penitentiary. His principal contention on this appeal is that his arrest was unlawful and that all tangible evidence seized from him as a result thereof was erroneously admitted into evidence over his timely objection.

The evidence adduced at the trial established that on July 13, 1966, the appellant encountered Mrs. Helen Doherty and her niece at lunch in a restaurant in Washington, D. C. A conversation ensued, as a result of which appellant was invited to a dinner party that evening at Mrs. Doherty's home in Montgomery County. Appellant arrived at the Doherty home at about 6:00 p.m. and spent some time in the house alone while Mrs. Doherty and the other guests congregated about the backyard swimming pool. When Mrs. Doherty came in to prepare dinner, the appellant excused himself, indicating that he had suddenly remembered a prior engagement downtown. Later that evening it was discovered that various items of personal property, including a camera and light meter, a wrist watch, a diamond ring, other jewelry, and $175.00 in cash, were missing.

Acting on information received, Detective Nelson Thayer of the Montgomery County Police obtained an arrest warrant for appellant, charging him with grand larceny. Thayer testified that with the Maryland warrant in his possession, he went to the Washington Hilton Hotel in the District of Columbia where, at 5:00 a.m. on the morning of July 14, he met with a District detective, showing him the warrant at that time; that the officers, together with the manager of the hotel, then proceeded to appellant's room where the manager knocked on the door 'in an effort to wake him (appellant) up'; and that thereafter the manager 'opened his room and demanded his money for the hotel room,' at which time the officers entered appellant's room and told him that he was under arrest 'as a fugitive from the State of Maryland.' The stolen camera and light meter were immediately observed by the officers in the room and seized, following which they ordered appellant to get dressed, took him to a District precinct station, searched his person, and seized therefrom the remainder of the articles stolen from Mrs. Doherty's home.

Appellant contends that his arrest was illegal for failure of the arresting officers to give notice of their purpose and authority before breaking into his hotel room, and that the search conducted incident to such unlawful arrest was likewise illegal. The State contends, on the other hand, that the arresting officers had an arrest warrant in their possession and were justified in using any means available to them in order to effect appellant's arrest pursuant to the terms of the warrant. On the record before us, we agree with appellant that his arrest was illegal and that the tangible fruits thereof should not have been received in evidence at his trial.

It is, of course, clear that the legality of appellant's arrest must be determined by applying the law of the District of Columbia, the jurisdiction in which it was made. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332; United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210; Stanley v. State, 230 Md. 188, 186 A.2d 478. It is equally plain that a warrant of arrest issued in Maryland may not lawfully be executed in the District of Columbia for the Maryland warrant has no validity beyond the boundaries of the State; and we perceive this to be the law of the District of Columbia. See 5 Am.Jur.2d Arrest, Sections 18-21. Since, however, peace officers in the District of Columbia may, under that jurisdiction's law, arrest without a warrant where they have probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed, Wrightson v. United States, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 222 F.2d 556, we think that the knowledge of the District officers that a Maryland felony warrant was outstanding for appellant provided them with probable cause to arrest appellant without a warrant. See St. Clair v. State, 1 Md.App. 605, 232 A.2d 565; People v. Webb, 56 Cal.Rptr. 902, 424 P.2d 342 (Cal.); United States v. Yant, 373 F.2d 543 (6th Cir.)

The law of the District of Columbia, like that of Maryland (see Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 204 A.2d 516) provides, in effect, that a peace officer lawfully seeking to arrest an individual in a house (or, as here, in his hotel room), either by authority of an arrest warrant or under circumstances making a warrant unnecessary, must give proper notice of his purpose and authority, and be denied admittance, before he can use force to break and enter to effectuate the arrest. See White v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 319, 346 F.2d 800; Accarino v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 394, 179 F.2d 456; Reid v. United States, 201 A.2d 867 (D.C.Mun.App.). ¹ This rule is not, however, without qualification or exception, so that as noted in Henson, an announcement and demand are not requisite where the facts make it evident that the officers' purpose is known or where such announcement and demand would likely frustrate the arrest, increase the peril of the arresting officer, or permit the destruction of evidence. See also Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726. We think the law of the District of Columbia is essentially the same as that delineated in Henson, and that similar exceptions to the general rule would be recognized in that jurisdiction. See Miller v. United States, supra, 357 U.S at page 309, 78 S.Ct. 1190; Accarino v. United States, supra, 179 F.2d at page 464, recognizing that an officer may break a door if 'the necessities of the moment require'; and Reid v. United States, supra, applying such an exception in a narcotics case where it was shown that the officers had reason to believe that the evidence would be destroyed if they gave prior notice of...