Berke v. Saul

• Decision Date: 20 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-CV-4042-MAR,19-CV-4042-MAR
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
• Parties: CARRIE AGNES BERKE, Claimant, v. ANDREW W. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

CARRIE AGNES BERKE, Claimant, v. ANDREW W. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 19-CV-4042-MAR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA WESTERN DIVISION

November 20, 2020

ORDER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. BACKGROUND ............................................................................. 3

II. DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF ......... 4

A. The ALJ'S Findings ................................................................ 7

B. The Substantial Evidence Standard ............................................. 8

III. DISCUSSION ............................................................................... 9

A. Whether the Record as a Whole Supports the ALJ's Finding that Claimant's Atrial Fibrillation, Headaches, and Asthma were Nonsevere Impairments ........................................................................ 10

1. Atrial Fibrillation .......................................................... 13

2. Headaches .................................................................. 16

3. Asthma ...................................................................... 17 4. Combination of Impairments ............................................ 18

B. Whether the ALJ Correctly Considered Claimant's Impairments Under Listing 12.05(B) .................................................................... 19

1. Claimant's GAF Score of 47 ............................................ 21

2. Claimant's Full-Scale I.Q. Score of 77 ............................... 24

3. Other Support for the ALJ's Contested Step Three Findings ..... 30

a. Limitations in Understanding, Remembering, or Applying Information ........................................................ 31

b. Limitations on Interacting with Others ....................... 32

c. Limitations on Concentrating, Persisting, or Maintaining Pace .................................................................. 33

4. Conclusion .................................................................. 33

C. Whether the ALJ Provided Good Reasons for the Weight Afforded Dr. Lukken's Opinion ................................................................. 34

1. Legal Standard for Evaluating Dr. Lukken's Opinion ............. 35

2. Analysis ..................................................................... 36

a. Length and Frequency of Treatment Relationship ......... 36

b. Nature and Extent of Treatment Relationship ............... 36

c. Supportability ...................................................... 37

d. Consistency ......................................................... 41

e. Specialization ...................................................... 47

f. Conclusion ......................................................... 48

D. Whether the ALJ Proffered a Hypothetical to the VE that was Supported by the Record ....................................................................... 48

1. Legal Standard for Evaluating the Hypothetical and Claimant's Arguments .................................................................. 49

2. Analysis ..................................................................... 49

a. Arguments Previously Addressed .............................. 49

b. Evaluation of Claimant's Testimony .......................... 51

c. Evaluation of Ms. Matheny's Testimony ..................... 59

d. Effect of ALJ's Decisions on Hypotheticals at Step Five .................................................................. 62

IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 62

Plaintiff Carrie Agnes Berke ("Claimant") seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Sections 401-34. Claimant contends that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in determining that she was not disabled. For the reasons that follow, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.

I. BACKGROUND

I adopt the facts set forth in the Parties' Joint Statement of Facts (Doc. 14) and only summarize the pertinent facts here. This is an appeal from a denial of DIB. Claimant was born November 2, 1971. (AR¹ at 218.) Claimant has a ninth-grade education and is able to communicate in English. (Id. at 24, 218.) She allegedly became disabled due toatrial fibrillation, morbid obesity, panic disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, behavioral (non-epileptic) spells, anxiety disorder, PTSD, a learning disability, asthma, and a thyroid disorder. (Id. at 231.) Claimant's original onset of disability date was July 1, 2014, but was later amended to September 25, 2014. (Id. at 39, 218.) Claimant filed an application for DIB on September 27, 2016. (Id.) Her claim was denied originally and on reconsideration. (Id. at 145-48, 156-64.) A video hearing was held on September 25, 2018, with Claimant and her attorney, Jay E. Denne, in Sioux City, Iowa and ALJ Matt Bring in Fargo, North Dakota.² (Id. at 33-72.) Vocational Expert ("VE") Tammie C. Donaldson and Claimant's daughter, Cheyanne Matheny also appeared. (Id. at 10.) Claimant, the VE, and Ms. Matheny all testified. (Id. at 39-72.) The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on January 10, 2019. (Id. at 7-34.)

Claimant requested review and the Appeals Council denied review on April 30, 2019. (Id. at 1-4.) Accordingly, the ALJ's decision stands as the final administrative ruling in the matter and became the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481.

On July 12, 2019, Claimant timely filed her complaint in this Court. (Doc. 3.) On September 23, 2019, the parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge and the Honorable Leonard T. Strand reassigned the case to me for final disposition. (Doc. 6.) All briefing was completed and the case was ready for decision on March 25, 2020. (Doc. 18.)

II. DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF

A disability is the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected toresult in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant has a disability when, due to physical or mental impairments, the claimant

is not only unable to do [the claimant's] previous work but cannot, considering [the claimant's] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists . . . in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). A claimant is not disabled if the claimant is able to do work that exists in the national economy but is unemployed due to an inability to find work, lack of options in the local area, technological changes in a particular industry, economic downturns, employer hiring practices, or other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(c).

To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner follows the five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the regulations. Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003). At steps one through four, the claimant has the burden to prove he or she is disabled; at step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove there are jobs available in the national economy. Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2009).

At step one, the ALJ will consider whether a claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." Id. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). "Substantial activity is significant physical or mental work that is done on a full- or part-time basis. Gainful activity is simply work that is done for compensation." Dukes v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Comstock v. Chater, 91 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a),(b)).

If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, at step two, the ALJ decides if the claimant's impairments are severe. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If theimpairments are not severe, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. An impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit a claimant's "physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." Id. § 416.920(c). The ability to do basic work activities means the ability and aptitude necessary to perform most jobs. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b)). These include

(1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting.

Id. (quotation omitted) (numbers added; internal brackets omitted).

If the claimant has a severe impairment, at step three, the ALJ will determine the medical severity of the impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations ("the listings"), then "the claimant is presumptively disabled without regard to age, education, and work experience." Tate v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 1191, 1196 (8th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).

If the claimant's impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal an impairment in the listings, at step four, the ALJ will assess the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and the demands of the claimant's past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). RFC is what the claimant can still do despite his or her limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a)). RFC is based on all...