Berkman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 November 1962
• Parties: Melvin C. BERKMAN, Jae Manufacturing Jewelers, Inc. and A. & I. Kaplan Co., Inc., Plaintiffs, v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

209 F. Supp. 851

Melvin C. BERKMAN, Jae Manufacturing Jewelers, Inc. and A. & I. Kaplan Co., Inc., Plaintiffs, v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

November 2, 1962.

Kelly, Donovan, Robinson & Maloof, New York City, for plaintiffs; Henry J. Robinson, Jr., New York City, of counsel.

Bigham, Englar, Jones & Houston, New York City, for defendant; John L. Conners, New York City, of counsel.

TYLER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs move under Rule 12(f), F.R. Civ.P., to strike certain matter from defendant's ("TWA") answer; defendant cross-moves for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56.

Plaintiffs seek to recover for the value of certain jewelry which they allege that they, as owners, delivered into the custody of defendant airlines and which has not been returned to them.

Neither the moving papers nor the remarks of counsel upon oral argument indicated any dispute as to the controlling facts, which follow:

On August 3, 1961 plaintiff Berkman purchased at New York City an air ticket from United Air Lines, Inc. This ticket gave passage from New York, N. Y., to Portland, Oregon, via St. Louis, Missouri, Kansas City, Missouri, and Denver, Colorado. There was specified on the ticket a departure time, flight number, and carrying airline for each leg of the journey.

The trip was scheduled to commence in New York City on September 5 and terminate in Portland, Oregon, on September 7, 1961.

Plaintiff Berkman flew the route, as scheduled, except for a substitution of airline and flight number on the St. Louis to Kansas City leg. (This substitution was due to a revision of schedule effective subsequent to the issuance by United of the original ticket on August 3.)

In the course of this trip, on September 6 in St. Louis, Missouri, plaintiff Berkman deposited with TWA two pieces of baggage some fifteen minutes prior to boarding defendant's flight #209 from St. Louis to Kansas City. Concededly, he did not indicate or declare a special or higher value for his luggage or its contents. The baggage was checked through, as the claim checks indicate, to Kansas City, where it was to be claimed by Berkman. One of the bags, asserted to contain a substantial quantity of jewelry, was not returned to him when he sought to claim it upon his arrival in Kansas City; it has never been returned to him or the other plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs claim damages of $57,089.40, the alleged true value of the missing jewelry.

TWA contends that its liability, if any, is controlled by the terms of its local and joint passenger rules under Tariff No. PR 4, filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board pursuant to § 1373 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 1301 et seq. In particular, TWA asserts as controlling either an exclusionary rule (Rule 70(c))¹ or, in the alternative, a rule limiting its liability (Rule 71)².

Plaintiffs, not attacking the general validity and effect of these rules in any respect, argue that they are inapplicable to the case at bar in that the flight on which the lost baggage had been checked was purely intra-state and that, therefore, the tariff filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board has no application.

It is established that Congress may employ its authority under the Constitution to control, in the national interest, activities which may appear at first blush to be purely intra-state and as such without the domain of federal power. Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 46 S.Ct. 452, 70 L.Ed. 878 (1926). The essential question raised by the parties here is whether the Congress has so exercised its authority in the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act and in the rules and regulations thereby authorized.

In urging the intra-state character of TWA's undertaking to transport the lost jewelry, plaintiffs point out that the baggage was given into the custody of defendant at St. Louis, Missouri, just prior to the departure of intra-state flight #209; that, pursuant to the terms of the bailment, the baggage was sought to be reclaimed at the terminus of flight #209, Kansas City, Missouri; and that the excess baggage rate charged by TWA for this luggage was based on only the mileage between St. Louis and Kansas City.

In essence, then, plaintiffs argue that the engagement of the parties with respect to the bailment of luggage on the St. Louis to Kansas City flight constituted a contract separate and distinct from that contract for inter-state passage entered into between United Air Lines, Inc. and plaintiff Berkman on August 3.

It would be an interesting exercise to analyze the series of transactions involved in this case from the point of view of the common law of contracts. But this would be irrelevant to the real issue, which is the effect, upon the facts of this case, of the Federal Aviation Act and the tariff rules filed thereunder.

The Act is intended to be a comprehensive scheme for regulating interstate air travel in this country. The Act declares that one of its aims is to "foster sound economic conditions in * * * inter-state air transportation and to improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers". 49 U.S.C....