Berman v. United States 8212

• Decision Date: 01 October 1963
• Docket Number: No. 245,245
• Citation: 378 U.S. 530,84 S.Ct. 1895,12 L.Ed.2d 1012
• Parties: Milton BERMAN, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America. &#8212
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

378 U.S. 530

84 S.Ct. 1895

12 L.Ed.2d 1012

Milton BERMAN, petitioner,

v UNITED STATES of America.

No. 245.—.

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1963.

June 22, 1964

Rehearing Denied Oct. 12, 1964.

See 85 S.Ct. 14.

This case seems to me to be decided on the premise that it is more important that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be slavishly followed than that justibe be done. I cannot agree to any such principle and therefore dissent.

Bernard B. Polak, New York City, for petitioner.

Theodore G. Gilinsky, Washington, D. C., for respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

PER CURIAM.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is affirmed. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259.

Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, as Mr. Justice GOLDBERG join, dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on two counts—one of possessing counterfeit currency and one of receiving stolen securities. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of two years on each count and a total fine of $2,000. He decided to appeal. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(a)(2) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 10 days. Here the tenth d y fell on Saturday. On the preceding Friday an associate to whom petitioner's attorney had given the notice of appeal for filing left the office with a fever and went home to bed, where he stayed until late Sunday. Because of the associate's illness, the notice was not filed on Saturday; instead, it was filed Monday morning. The Court of Appeals, on motion of the Government, dismissed the appeal on the ground that under Rule 37(a)(2) and Rule 45(a) the notice for appeal had been filed one day late. Two days after this dismissal, petitioner, as authorized by Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 35, moved in the District Court for reduction of the sentence. This motion, with supporting affidavits, pointed out to the District Court that petitioner's appeal had been dismissed because it was one day late. Indeed, a principal ground urged upon the court for acting on the motion was that granting the motion would enable petitioner to appeal from the amended sentence and challenge the validity of the original conviction. The prosecuting attorney objected, saying 'I think he has had his one shot, and it's all over. He has no further right to appeal if the sentence is reduced.' The District Judge, stating that his understanding was 'contrary' to that of the prosecutor, granted petitioner's motion and, exercising his authority under Rule 35, reduced the sentence on each court from two years to one year and eight months and reduced the fine on each count. The following day, petitioner's counsel filed a second notice of appeal, but again the Court of Appeals granted the Government's motion to dismiss, rejecting the District Court's holding that the time for appeal began to run anew upon the partial rejection of the defendant's Rule 35 motion. This Court now affirms with the simple citation of United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259. Because I think that United States v. Robinson should be confined to its particular facts, and for a number of other reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

In this case petitioner, Berman, has contended since the time of his first appeal that evidence introduced at his trial had been obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure and that a statement by way of a confession made by him was involuntary and therefore should have been excluded as a violation of the Fifth Amendment. The most perfunctory review of this record shows that neither of those two questions is frivolous.^* In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837, this Court, after an exhaustive discussion of the question and the citation of many prior decisions of this Court, held that a defendant who had been convicted by use of a coerced confession in a state court could obtain relief in a federal habeas corpus proceeding notwithstanding the fact of a procedural default in the state courts which barred any challenge to the conviction in those courts. It is unthinkable that the same rule should not be applied in federal courts so as to grant relief to a defendant who has been denied a federally guaranteed right because of his failure to comply with the rule which requires the notice of appeal to be filed within 10 days. It is particularly abhorrent to think that such a rule can be enforced in the federal court where, as here, the sole reason for cutting off the defendant's right of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the fact that, after the defendant has decided to appeal, the lawyer to whom he entrusts the duty of physically transporting his notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals fails to get it there because he is taken ill.

Moreover, the Court in the Robinson case, which the Court now holds is controlling here, expressly stated, 361 U.S., at 230 n. 14, 80 S.Ct. at 288, that the allowance of an appeal after expiration of the prescribed time.

'seems unnecessary for the accomplishment of substantial justice, for there are a number of collateral remedies available to redress denial of basic rights. Examples are: The power of a District Court under Rule 35 to correct an illegal sentence at any time * * *; the power of a District Court to entertain a collateral attack upon a judgment of conviction and to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. * * *'

It is not strange that the Court in Robinson directed its attention to § 2255 proceedings since that section expressly provides that 'A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution * * * may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.'

My belief is that, even if Rule 37(a)(2) is held to require dismissal of this appeal, and I do not think it should be, this Court should remand the case to the Court of Appeals with directions to treat the appeal as an application for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Such a course was followed in similar circumstances by the Tenth Circuit in Hixon v. United States, 268 F.2d 667, where, as here, the appeal was late under Rule 37(a)(2). And we said in Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 54, 84 S.Ct. 21, 22, 11 L.Ed.2d 11:

'Where state procedural snarls of obstacles preclude an effective state remedy against unconstitutional convictions, federal courts have no other choice but to grant relief in the collateral proceeding. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837. But the situation is dif- ferent in federal proceedings, over which both the Courts of Appeals and this Court (McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed.2d 819) have broad powers of supervision. It is more appropriate, whenever possible, to correct errors reachable by the appeal rather than remit the parties to a new collateral proceeding.'

This is precisely what I think should be done in this case but the Court insists on affirming the harsh action of the Court of Appeals in dismissing the appeal. For a number of reasons, however, I would not affirm that dismissal.

I believe that petitioner's original appeal was timely under Rule 37(a)(2) if that rule is given a liberal, but permissible, construction more consonant with the ends of justice. The rule says that appeals must be taken 'within 10 days' after the entry of the order appealed from. Rule 45(a) says that the last day of the 10-day period is not to be counted if 'it is a Sunday or legal holiday'; in such case, the period runs 'until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday nor a holiday.' Neither of these rules says what is to happen if the tenth day is a Saturday, and neither defines what is a 'legal holiday.' Rule 56, however, sheds some light, for it states that federal courts shall be open for the filing of papers during business hours 'on all days except Sundays and legal holidays,' and the notes of the Advisory Committee responsible for the language of the Criminal Rules state that 'legal holidays' include not only federal holidays but also 'holidays prescribed by the laws of the State where the clerk's office is located.' (Emphasis supplied.) On this point, New York law is specific. In New York City, where the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sits, the offices of clerks of courts are closed on Saturdays by a state statute which provides: 'Whenever the last day on which any paper shall be filed or act done or performed in any such office expires on aturday, the time therefor is hereby extended to and including the next business day.' N.Y. Judiciary Law, § 282 (1963 Cum.Pocket Part). The practice is the same in other public offices in New York; for example, Saturday is not a business day in the offices of the county clerk in New York City, N.Y.County Law, § 902, or in county offices in other counties, id., § 206-a (196...