Bernard v. Keisling
Decision Date | 07 October 1993 |
Parties | Rhonda BERNARD, Petitioner, v. Phil KEISLING, Secretary of State, Respondent. SC S40549. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
John R. Faust, Jr., of Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, Portland, argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner.
Robert B. Rocklin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the answering memorandum were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
In this original proceeding, petitioner challenges a ballot title certified by the Attorney General to the Secretary of State. See ORS 250.085(2) (providing procedure). Pursuant to ORS 250.067(1), petitioner had submitted to the Secretary of State timely written comments on the earlier, proposed ballot title and, therefore, is entitled to bring this challenge to the certified ballot title. ORS 250.085(2). On review, we approve the ballot title certified by the Attorney General.
The Attorney General certified the following ballot title to the Secretary of State for that proposed initiative measure:
Under ORS 250.085(4), we review ballot titles for substantial compliance with the requirements of ORS 250.035 and 250.039. 1 Petitioner argues that the Caption does not reasonably identify the subject of the measure and that the Question does not plainly phrase the measure's chief purpose, in that both refer to "fees" rather than to "taxes." Petitioner asserts that, because the measure imposes a revenue requirement designed to raise money for public purposes and not for the costs of regulation, the measure would impose a tax on extractions, not a fee. Petitioner asks this court to modify the Caption and Question by substituting the word "taxes" for the word "fees" in the Caption and Question of the ballot title. Petitioner does not challenge the Attorney General's proposed Summary.
The Attorney General argues that the words of the measure consistently refer to the imposition of a license "fee" and that this court has held that, generally, and in the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, the Attorney General should use the words of the measure. See Sampson v. Roberts, 309 Or. 335, 340, 788 P.2d 421 (1990) (so holding). Petitioner responds that this court's holding in Sampson does not apply to the Caption and Question of a ballot title, but only to the Summary. Having made that response, however, petitioner advances no argument as to why the rule should be different for different parts of the ballot title, and we can think of none.
The Attorney General further argues that the question whether the proposed measure imposes a "fee" or a "tax" calls for interpretation of the measure, and a ballot title challenge is not the appropriate forum for deciding legal issues requiring interpretation of a proposed measure. This court has held that, if a measure is enacted into law, the court may later be required to decide the meaning and significance of words used in the measure and, therefore, that it generally is inappropriate for the court to do so in a ballot title proceeding. Hand v. Roberts, 309 Or. 430, 438, 788 P.2d 446 (1990) (); Aughenbaugh v. Roberts, 309 Or. 510, 516, 789 P.2d 656 (1990) (same); Sampson v. Roberts, supra, 309 Or. at 339, 788 P.2d 421 (same).
Petitioner relies primarily on Automobile Club v. State of Oregon, 314 Or. 479, 489, 840 P.2d 674 (1992) (...
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...politically inflated terms or phrases in the text of the measure in order to advance its passage. Cf. Bernard v. Keisling, 317 Or. 591, 596-97, 858 P.2d 1309 (1993) (court will not hesitate to look beyond words of measure if those words obfuscate subject, chief purpose, summary, or major ef......
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