Bernardo Sampeyreac Joseph Stewart v. United States

Decision Date01 January 1833
Citation8 L.Ed. 665,32 U.S. 222,7 Pet. 222
PartiesBERNARDO SAMPEYREAC and JOSEPH STEWART, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES, Appellees
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Arkansas. The appellant, Sampeyreac, under the act of congress of the 26th of May 1824, entitled 'an act enabling the claimants to lands within the limits of the state of Missouri, and territory of Arkansas, to institute proceedings to try the validity of their claims,' exhibited the bill against the United States, which was filed in the clerk's office of the superior court in the territory of Arkansas, in chancery sitting, on the 21st day of November 1827, stating that, being an inhabitant of Louisiana, he did, on the 6th day of October 1789, address a letter to the governor of the then Spanish province of Louisiana, asking for ten arpens of land in front, with the usual depth, on Strawberry river, within the district of Arkansas, to be granted to him in full property; and that the said governor did, on the 11th day of October 1789, make an order of survey upon said petition, which the appellant alleged, was such a claim as might have been perfected into a complete title, under and in conformity to the laws, usages and customs of the government of Spain, under which the same originated, had not the sovereignty of the country been transferred to the United States; and was, therefore, provided for by the treaty between the United States and the French republic, made the 30th April 1803. The bill prayed that this claim might be confirmed, according to the provisions of the act of congress before mentioned.

Upon this petition, the clerk of the court issued a subpoena against the district-attorney of the United States, which was executed on the 24th of November 1827. To this bill, the district-attorney of the United States filed an answer, at the December term of said court 1827, denying, generally, the facts and allegations in said bill, and alleging that Sampeyreac was a fictitious person, or was a foreigner, and then dead. On the 19th day of December 1827, the district-attorney of the United States moved to postpone the final adjudication of the case until the following term, for the following reasons: 1. The petition and subpoena in this case were served on the United States, within one month of the present term of this court, but more than fifteen days allowed by law; and in consequence of this short notice, the United States attorney has not answered this bill until the present term. 2. Has not had a sufficient length of time to take counter-depositions, if counter-evidence does exist. 3. There are many more cases pending in this court on the same principles, and similarly situated in all respects; and the attorney for the United States asks this continuance, for the purpose of procuring such evidence as may exist on the part of the government.

The court proceeded to hear the cause; and upon the deposition of one John Heberard, entered, on that day, a decree against the United States, in favor of said Sampeyreac, for four hundred arpens of land.

On the 14th day of February 1828, a deed, purporting to be a deed executed by Sampeyreac, transferring his claim to the clerk's certificate of the existence of this decree, and of all his right, title and interest in said decree, to John J. Bowie, was proved, and admitted to record on the 22d day of October 1828, in the office of the circuit court of Hempstead county, in the territory of Arkansas, and which title was transferred by Bowie to Joseph Stewart, in December 1828; by virtue of which transfer, the said Stewart filed with the register of the land-office at Little Rock, an application for the N. E. 17, 11 S, 26 W; and E. 1/2, S. E. 17, 11 S, 26 W; and W. 1/2 N. E. 13, 11 S. 27 W. which application was admitted by the register, on the 13th of December 1828.

At the April term 1830 of the court, the United States attorney, upon leave granted, filed a bill charging that the decree entered by the court, at the December term 1827, in the case of Sampeyreac, was obtained by fraud and surprise, and alleging that the court erred in proceeding to the trial of said cause, at the said December term, without having set said cause for hearing, and without affording the United States time to prove the injustice of the claim. The bill charged that the original petition to Governor Mero, and the order of survey, were forgeries; which fact had come to the knowledge of the attorney, since the decree was made; that Sampeyreac was a fictitious person; or, if he ever did exist, was dead; that Heberard and the other witnesses committed perjury in this case; and that the petition and order of survey were made since 1789; and that record evidence had been discovered, since the decree, which would be produced upon the hearing to prove the forgery.

Sampeyreac was proceeded against as an absent defendant, after the return of the subpoena, that 'he was not to be found in the territory of Arkansas;' and a decree pro confesso was entered, as to him, on the 28th day of October 1830. Before this decree was entered, Joseph Stewart was permitted to file his answer, and was made a defendant in this case, which was excepted to on the part of the United States, and a bill of exceptions was signed by the court on the 28th October 1830.

It was not charged or contended, that Stewart purchased with a knowledge of the forgery, either of the original grant, or of the transfer from Sampeyreac to Bowie.

The final decree, reversing and annulling the decree entered in favor of Sampeyreac, at December term, 1827, was delivered by the court, February 7th, 1831. From this decree, this appeal was taken by Joseph Stewart, for himself and Sampeyreac.

The case was argued by Prentiss and White, for the appellants; and by Fulton and Taney, the Attorney-General, for the United States.

For the appellants, the following points were stated for the consideration of the court.

1. That, by the provisions of the act of 1824, and of the act continuing it, the decree of confirmation, rendered in December term 1827, became final, after the lapse of one whole year from its date, without an appeal being taken therefrom.

2. That a bill of review cannot be prosecuted, after the time for allowing an appeal has expired.

3. That if the foregoing proposition is not universally true, it is so as to a bill of review for errors apparent, and as to which the party could have availed himself by an appeal.

4. If a bill of review can be prosecuted for any cause, after the time for an appeal has expired, it cannot be for causes known to the party at the time of rendering the decree complained of.

5. The refusal of the court to continue the cause at December term 1827, was not an error re-examinable on appeal; or, if so, was an error apparent, which could have been corrected on an appeal, if taken within the year allowed for an appeal; and therefore, not by a bill of review, after the expiration of the time allowed for an appeal.

6. The substantial ground in difference between the United States and Sampeyreac, supposing there was such a person in being, was, that the order of survey was, or was not, a genuine one—was or was not, a forgery. This was the whole ground of difference; and both this fact, and the question whether Sampeyreac was a real inhabitant of Louisiana, capable of taking, or had assigned his claim, were all put directly in issue on the original trial.

7. After the decree rendered in the first case, a bill of review cannot be maintained, on after-discovered testimony, which could have been used, under the issue joined, unless such after-discovered evidence be evidence of record.

8. Although the bill of review suggests the discovery of such record evidence, none such is produced on the bill of review; the only evidence being that of witnesses, and the title-papers in the other cases then depending, all of which were known, and, if proper evidence, could have been used on the first trial.

9. All that is alleged in the bill of review, concerning the appearance of the papers themselves, and other facts to show they were post-dated, appeared on the first trial.

10. The time of discovery of the new evidence is not stated, nor does it appear; and it is contended, that, if such be evidence, discovered after trial, as will sustain a bill of review, the bill must, at least, appear to have been filed within one year from the time of such discovery.

11. If the refusal to continue the cause at December term, was a matter which could be alleged on a bill of review, or considered on an appeal, there was no error in that refusal, as the law only required fifteen days between the service and return of the subpoena, whereas twenty-eight days intervened, and required a trial to be had at first term, unless good cause should be shown for a continuance; and it is contended, that, as the cases were all treated a similar, and it was not alleged, that there had not been time to file answers; and as the United States attorney admitted the credibility of the claimant's witness, and stated, that he knew of no testimony which could impeach the genuineness of the claim, he showed no cause of continuance, unless he could show it in the improvident provisions of the act of congress under which he was acting.

12. The defendant Stewart is an innocent purchaser, and is entitled to protection, whether the original claim was a forged one or not. That Sampeyreac, after the decree confirming his claim, conveyed his right to Bowie, appears from his recorded deed, in evidence by consent; and, although they insisted, that that deed was a forgery, no evidence of any kind was taken to support that objection. That Stewart was an innocent purchaser, in November or December 1828, is admitted in the fullest terms. 'A purchaser by deed, and in good faith.'

13. It appears, that being such purchaser in good faith, Stewart made entry of the claim, on the 13th December 1828,...

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