Bernat v. Allphin

• Decision Date: 07 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 20030567.,20030567.
• Citation: 106 P.3d 707,2005 UT 1
• Parties: Sean Bernat, Lesa Beuchert, Jeremy Kee, Brandon Kvenvold, Donald Lang, Darrin Mann, Matthew Phillips, Joseph Scovell, Dylan T. Serre, Mark Wahlstrom, and Henry T. Zahkarian, Plaintiffs and Petitioners, v. The Honorable Michael G. Allphin, The Honorable Ann Boyden, The Honorable Michael K. Burton, The Honorable Glen R. Dawson, The Honorable Donald J. Eyre, The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg, The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

2005 UT 1

106 P.3d 707

Sean Bernat, Lesa Beuchert, Jeremy Kee, Brandon Kvenvold, Donald Lang, Darrin Mann, Matthew Phillips, Joseph Scovell, Dylan T. Serre, Mark Wahlstrom, and Henry T. Zahkarian, Plaintiffs and Petitioners, v. The Honorable Michael G. Allphin, The Honorable Ann Boyden, The Honorable Michael K. Burton, The Honorable Glen R. Dawson, The Honorable Donald J. Eyre, The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg, The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 20030567.

Supreme Court of Utah.

FILED January 7, 2005.

This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter.

Benjamin A. Hamilton, Salt Lake City, for petitioners.

Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for respondents.

DURRANT, Justice:

¶1 Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Utah's two-tier justice court system, arguing that this system violates the prohibition against double jeopardy and denies defendants due process and equal protection under the law. They assert that, in light of these alleged violations, the court of appeals abused its discretion when it refused to issue writs of mandamus directing various district courts to dismiss the charges against Petitioners. We reject Petitioners' constitutional challenges and affirm the court of appeals.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Petitioners Sean Bernat, Lesa Beuchert, Jeremy Kee, Brandon Kvenvold, Donald Lang, Darrin Mann, Matthew Phillips, Joseph Scovell, Dylan T. Serre, Mark Wahlstrom, and Henry T. Zakharian (collectively "Petitioners") were convicted of various crimes in several justice courts throughout the state.¹ Each appealed his or her conviction to a district court and, once in district court, challenged the constitutionality of Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-608,² which governs trial de novo appeals from justice court proceedings in criminal cases. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-608. Specifically, Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of rule 4-608(4),³ which requires an individual who is convicted in justice court to obtain a certificate of probable cause in order to stay a justice court sentence pending a de novo trial in district court. Petitioners argued that this requirement violates constitutional double jeopardy prohibitions, as well as due process and equal protection guarantees.

¶3 When the district courts denied Petitioners' motions to dismiss the charges against them, Petitioners appealed to the court of appeals. Because Utah Code section 78-5-120(7) gives the court of appeals jurisdiction over justice court appeals only where the district court has ruled on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance and not a rule, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7) (Supp. 2002), the court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeals and dismissed them accordingly. Petitioners thereafter petitioned the court of appeals for writs of mandamus directing the district courts to grant Petitioners' motions to dismiss on double jeopardy, due process, and equal protection grounds. The court of appeals declined to grant Petitioners' requests, reasoning that Utah's two-tier justice court system was not constitutionally deficient and concluding that Petitioners had failed to demonstrate a "gross or flagrant abuse of discretion" or a "particularly egregious and momentous legal error" that would justify granting the petitions.

¶4 This court granted Petitioners' request for certiorari review of the court of appeals' decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5 "[T]he granting of [a] writ [of mandamus] is always a matter of discretion with th[e] court and never a matter of right on behalf of the applicant." State v. Ruggeri, 429 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah 1967); see also Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995) ("With respect to mandamus . . . , a court has discretion in granting requested relief."). Thus, whether the court of appeals properly refused to issue a writ providing the relief requested by Petitioners is a matter that we review for an abuse of discretion. Osborne v. Adoption Ctr. of Choice, 2003 UT 15, ¶ 22, 70 P.3d 58.

ANALYSIS

¶6 Before addressing whether the procedures set forth in Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-608 violate the prohibition against double jeopardy or deny defendants due process or equal protection as Petitioners allege, we first provide a brief overview of the operation of Utah's two-tier justice court system.

I. UTAH'S TWO-TIER JUSTICE COURT SYSTEM

¶7 Justice courts are courts "not of record,"⁴ authorized by article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution and governed by the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-5-101 to -140 (2002). Justice courts are created by municipalities or counties, id. § 78-5-101.5, and have jurisdiction over certain small claims cases, "class B and C misdemeanors, violation of ordinances, and infractions committed within [the justice courts'] territorial jurisdiction, except those offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction," id. § 78-5-104.

¶8 Because justice courts are courts not of record, the appeals process from a justice court decision is unique. A defendant who has pleaded guilty or been convicted in justice court is entitled to a trial de novo in a district court, provided that he or she files a notice of appeal within thirty days of the sentence or guilty plea. Id. § 78-5-120(1). If a defendant desires to have an adverse judgment stayed pending a trial de novo before the district court, the defendant must also obtain a certificate of probable cause. Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-608(4). The justice court makes the determination in the first instance of whether to grant an application for a certificate of probable cause. Id. 4-608(5). If a justice court denies the application, a defendant may apply to the district court for a stay.⁵ Id. Like justice courts, a district court will only stay a sentence if it issues a certificate of probable cause. Utah R. Crim. P. 27(a)(2). A defendant's application for a certificate of probable cause must be in writing and

accompanied by a memorandum of law identifying the issues to be presented on appeal and supporting the defendant's position that those issues raise a substantial question of law or fact reasonably likely to result in reversal, an order for a new trial[,] or a sentence that does not include a term of incarceration in jail or prison.

Id. 27(d)(2). A district court may issue a certificate of probable cause only if the court finds that the appeal "is not being taken for the purpose of delay" and "raises substantial issues of law or fact reasonably likely to result in reversal, an order for a new trial[,] or a sentence that does not include a term of incarceration in jail or prison." Id. 27(f).

¶9 Petitioners argue that the process outlined above violates double jeopardy, due process, and equal protection, and that, as a result of these violations, the court of appeals abused its discretion in refusing to issue writs of mandamus ordering the district courts to dismiss the charges against Petitioners. We examine each of these alleged constitutional violations in turn.

II. UTAH'S TWO-TIER JUSTICE COURT SYSTEM DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

¶10 Both the United States and Utah Constitutions prohibit the state from placing an individual twice in jeopardy for the same offense.⁶ U.S. Const. amend. V; Utah Const. art. I, § 12. In jury trials, jeopardy attaches after a jury has been selected and sworn. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 466 (1973); State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, ¶ 8, 46 P.3d 230. In bench trials, jeopardy attaches after the first witness is sworn and the court begins to hear evidence. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37 n.15 (1978); State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Utah 1983). Because Petitioners have not provided a separate analysis of the double jeopardy protections afforded under our state constitution, we limit our review to examining the constitutionality of Utah's justice court system under federal law. See State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 873 n.6 (Utah 1993).

¶11 The Double Jeopardy Clause embodies three separate protections: (1) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1984). "The primary purpose of foreclosing a second prosecution after conviction . . . is to prevent a defendant from being subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense." Id. at 307.

¶12 Petitioners do not argue that Utah's justice court system subjects them to the possibility of multiple punishments, nor do they contend that recourse from a justice court conviction in the form of a trial de novo violates double jeopardy per se. Rather, Petitioners argue that Utah's justice court scheme impermissibly places a defendant twice in jeopardy because the system does not automatically "wipe the slate clean" and void the judgment against a justice court defendant while his or her trial de novo is pending before the district court. Petitioners maintain that "[o]ur system of justice cannot allow an accused to exercise his right to appeal by de novo trial in district court while standing before that court convicted of the exact offense he will be tried for a second time." In support of this assertion, Petitioners cite the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Colten v. Kentucky, Ludwig v. Massachusetts, and Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, arguing that under these cases, the Constitution requires justice court sentences to be vacated on appeal. We review each of these decisions before addressing Petitioners' contention.

A. The Supreme Court's Examination of Two-Tier Justice Court Systems in Colten, Ludwig, and Lydon

¶13 The Supreme Court...