Bernero v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.

• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DAVID E. BLAIR, J.
• Citation: Bernero v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 230 S.W. 620, 287 Mo. 602 (Mo. 1921)
• Decision Date: 30 April 1921
• Parties: LOUIS BERNERO, an infant, by Lorraine T. Bernero, Curatrix of his Estate, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS UNION TRUST COMPANY et al

230 S.W. 620

287 Mo. 602

LOUIS BERNERO, an infant, by Lorraine T. Bernero, Curatrix of his Estate, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS UNION TRUST COMPANY et al

Supreme Court of Missouri

April 30, 1921

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. William T. Jones Judge.

Affirmed.

Thomas D. Cannon, David Goldsmith, M. N. Sale, E. P. McCarty and John Burke for appellant.

(1) The will of Louis Bernero should be construed so as to confer testamentary power of disposition upon Theresa Bernero only in case Manuello died before her and left no issue; and in order that the manifest and true intention of the testator may be effectuated the court will supply the words omitted so that the part of said will granting the power of appointment to Theresa Bernero shall read: "If, however, my said wife shall survive said Manuello, and he leave no issue, then she, said Theresa Bernero, is hereby empowered to devise said realty as she shall see fit." . . . (a) That construction is commanded by the statute. R. S. 1909, sec 583; Bryant v. Garrison, 150 Mo. 667. (b) That construction is sustained by the following direct authorities: 2 Jarman on Wills (5 Am. Ed. from 4 Eng. Ed.) pp. 536-538; Spalding v. Spalding, 3 Crs. Car. 385; Abbott v. Middleton, 21 Beav. 143; Dulaney v. Dulaney, 79 S.W. 195, 25 Ky. L. R. 1659; Selden v. King, 2 Call, 72; Liston v. Jenkins, 2 W.Va. 62; Young v. Harklrood, 166 Ill. 318; Wheable v. Whithers, 16 Simons, 505; Holmes v. Williams, 1 Root, 332; Den v. Combs, 18 N. J. L. 37; Robards v. Brown, 167 Mo. 457, 460; Nichols v. Boswell, 103 Mo. 160; Gardner on Wills, ch. 13, p. 376; Hellerman's Appeal, 115 Pa. St. 120; Penn. v. Folger, 77 Ill.App. 365; Glover v. Condell, 163 Ill. 566; Dew v. Barnes, 1 Jones Eq. 151; Eatherly v. Eatherly, 1 Caldwell, 461; Wells v. Wells, 279 Mo. 64; Sidney v. Shelly, 19 Ves. 352; Bacon v. Nichols, 105 P. 1082; Kellog v. Mix, 37 Conn. 243; Aulick v. Wallace, 12 Bush. 531; Geiger v. Brown, 4 McCord, 418; Sessoms v. Sessoms, Dev. & B. 453; Lynch v. Hill, 6 Munf. 114; Ball v. Phelan, 94 Miss. 293; In re Donges Estate, 103 Wis. 497; Cleland v. Waters, 16 Ga. 496; Baker v. Estate of McLeod, 79 Wis. 534. (2) The construction of the will of Louis Bernero contended for in appellant's first point is required, because the provision of Clause Five of said will giving Theresa Bernero testamentary power of disposition follows a clear, plain and unambiguous devise of the property in question to the issue of Manuello Bernero, and because a devise of that character cannot be cut down or lessened by a subsequent provision not equally as clear, plain and unambiguous. Elsea v. Smith, 273 Mo. 414; Settle v. Schaffer, 229 Mo. 570; Hornbrough v. Craven, 225 S.W. 448; Wells v. Fuchs, 226 Mo. 108; Sevier v. Woodson, 205 Mo. 216; Gannon v. Pauk, 200 Mo. 94; Gannon v. Albright, 183 Mo. 252; Yocum v. Siler, 160 Mo. 289; Chew v. Keller, 100 Mo. 369; Byrnes v. Stillwell, 103 N.Y. 453; Freeman v. Coit, 96 N.Y. 68; Damrell v. Hart, 137 Mass. 220; Mickley's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 517; Clavering v. Ellison, 3 Drewry, 470; Burton v. Gagnon, 180 Ill. 349; Yocum v. Parker, 134 F. 205; Yocum v. Parker, 130 F. 722; Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall. 458; Thornhill v. Hall, 2 Clark & Fin. 22; 3 Jarman on Wills (5 Ed.), 704. (a) Indeed, this is declared to be a settled rule of property in this State. Cornet v. Cornet, 248 Mo. 223. (3) The contingent remainder limited by the will of Louis Bernero, deceased, to the children of Manuello Bernero, became a vested remainder in fee, in plaintiff, Louis Bernero, at his birth, and when the prior life estate of Theresa Bernero and the prior life estate of Manuello Bernero were out of the way, plaintiff's vested remainder in fee vested in possession. Collins v. Whitman, 222 S.W. 842; Barkhoefer v. Barkhoefer, 204 S.W. 909; Deacon v. Trust Co., 271 Mo. 687, 689; Tindall v. Tindall, 167 Mo. 218; Gates v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254; Waddell v. Waddell, 99 Mo. 338; Jones v. Waters, 17 Mo. 587; Tiedeman on Real Property (2 Ed.), secs. 412, 413; 2 Washburn on Real Property (4 Ed.), 555, 556, 561; Fearne on Remainders, p. 217; 10 U. S. Encyc. of Cases, pp. 646, 647; Manhattan R. E. Co. v. Cudlipps, 80 A.D. 532; Moore v. Lyons, 25 Wend. 119; Savings Bank v. Lees, 176 Pa. St. 402; R. S. 1909, sec. 578. (4) Upon the death of Louis Bernero, deceased, a remainder for his own life vested in Manuello Bernero, subject to the preceding particular (life) estate of Theresa Bernero. Manuello Bernero's vested remainder for life was subject to defeat by his death before Theresa; while the remainder for his own life vested in Manuello Bernero upon the death of the testator, Louis Bernero, it did not vest in possession and was defeated by his death. The words "if he shall survive her" by the clear tenets of construction, after words giving Manuello Bernero a vested life estate, have reference only to his enjoyment of the estate -- or vesting of possession -- and not to the vesting of his title. Gray on Perpetuities (2 Ed.), secs. 100, 102, 103, 108; Johnson v. Loan & Tr. Co., 224 U.S. 238; Williams on Real Prop. (17 Int. Ed.) 397, 415, 416; 2 Washburn, Real Prop. (4 Ed.) pp. 545, 568, 575; 10 U. S. Encyc. of Cases, p. 647; 6 Albany Law Journal, 361; Collins v. Whitman, 222 S.W. 842; Warne v. Sorge, 258 Mo. 171; Collier v. Archer, 258 Mo. 389, 390; Barkhoefer v. Barkhoefer, 204 S.W. 906; Deacon v. Trust Co., 271 Mo. 687, 689; Tindall v. Tindall, 167 Mo. 218; Byrne v. France, 131 Mo. 639; Chew v. Keller, 100 Mo. 362; Byrnes v. Stillwell, 103 N.Y. 453; Temple v. Sammis, 97 N.Y. 526; Embury v. Sheldon, 68 N.Y. 227; Livingston v. Green, 52 N.Y. 118; Johnstone v. Valentine, 4 Sandf. 36; Chew's Appeal, 37 Pa. St. 23; Munderson v. Lukens, 23 Pa. St. 31; Parker v. Ross, 69 N.H. 213; Crosby v. Crosby, 64 N.H. 77; Kennard v. Kennard, 63 N.H. 303; Pue v. Pue, 1 Md. Ch. 382; Gibbons v. Gibbons, 140 Mass. 102; Darling v. Blanchard, 109 Mass. 176; Blanchard v. Blanchard, 1 Allen, 223; Neilson v. Brett, 99 Va. 673; Brockelbank v. Johnson, 20 Beav. 205; More v. Lyons, 25 Wend. 119. (5) The death of Manuello Bernero before Theresa Bernero had no other effect upon the title of plaintiff, Louis Bernero, than to remove one preceding life estate, and thus bring his vested remainder in fee one step nearer possession. 1 Fearne, Contg. Rem. 510-517; Scatterwood v. Edge, 1 Salk. 229; Pennington v. Pennington, 70 Md. 418; Ege v. Herring, 108 Md. 391; Johnson v. Harrelson, 6 S.C. 336; Mowatt v. Carrow, 7 Paige, 328; Trust Co. v. Hagencamp, 191 N.Y. 281; Williams v. Jones, 166 N.Y. 522; Matter of Miller, 161 N.Y. 71; Crozier v. Bray, 120 N.Y. 366; Wager v. Wager, 96 N.Y. 164; McLean v. Freeman, 70 N.Y. 81; Dunnings v. Marshall, 23 N.Y. 366; Moris v. Beyea, 13 N.Y. 273; Robinson v. Orphan Asylum, 123 U.S. 702; Mathis v. Hammond, 6 Rich. Eq. 121; Smith v. Hance, 11 N. J. L. 255; Prescott v. Prescott, 7 Metc. 141; 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. (2 Ed.) 411, 453; Statham v. Bell, 1 Cowp. 40; Gibbon v. Gibbon, 40 Ga. 562; Horton v. Barrett, 22 Me. 257; Mebane v. Womac, 2 Jones Eq. 293; Simmons v. Gooding, 5 Ired. Eq. 382; Jones v. Westcomb, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 245, par. 10. (6) The provisions of the will of Theresa Bernero are invalid and void because in conflict with the Rule Against Perpetuities: Said provisions of said will of Theresa Bernero violate the rule prohibiting what has been termed a double possibility, and they are therefore invalid, and defendants took no interest in the land described in plaintiff's second amended petition by virtue of said will. (a) The remoteness of an appointment depends upon its distance from the creation and not from the exercise of the power. Cox v. Dickson, 256 Pa. St. 510; Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, 473. (b) It is settled law that a devise or conveyance of land, which entitles the unborn child of an unborn child to take, is invalid. Whitby v. Mitchell, L. R. 42 Ch. Div. 494; Whitby v. Mitchell, L. R. 44 Ch. Div. 85; Frost v. Frost, 43 Ch. Div. 246; In re Nash, L. R. Ch. Div. 1910, vol. 1, p. 1; Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 166; Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208; Buxton v. Kroeger, 219 Mo. 271, 275; Bradford v. Blossom, 207 Mo. 233. (c) And this rule applies to equitable estates. In re Nash, L. R. Ch. Div. 1910, vol. 1, p. 1; Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3 Ed.), sec. 69, 245c, 323; Buxton v. Kroeger, 219 Mo. 273; Bradford v. Blossom, 207 Mo. 233. (d) The fact that no child has been born to Clotilda Longinotti since the death of Theresa Bernero is immaterial. Buxton v. Kroeger, 219 Mo. 275; Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 239; Rozier v. Graham, 146 Mo. 360; Sears v. Russell, 8 Gray, 98. (7) The court erred in admitting evidence tending to show that Clotilda Longinotti had passed the age when she would no longer bear children. Rozier v. Graham, 146 Mo. 360. (8) For the purpose of the rule against perpetuities, a woman is considered capable of child-bearing so long as she lives. Rozier v. Graham, 146 Mo. 360; Flora v. Anderson, 67 F. 182; In re Dawson, 39 Ch. Div. 155; List v. Rodney, 83 Pa. St. 483.

Albert Arnstein, Jourdan, Rassieur & Pierce, Bryan, Williams & Cave, John J. O'Brien, and John M. Goodwin for respondents.

(1) Plaintiff, the child of Manuello, takes no interest in the realty in question, because Manuello, his father, did not survive Theresa, the wife of Louis. (a) The law is: That where an estate for life is made to depend on the contingency of the object of it being alive at the period when the preceding estate determines, limitations or interests consecutive on that estate are contingent on the same event. 2 Jarman on Wills (6 Ed.), p. 1390; Oetjen v Diemmer, 115 Ga. 1005; Simmons v. Gooding, 40 N.C. 382; Clarke v. Johnson, 8 Wall. 493; Bouknight v. Brown, 16 S.C. 155; Brinkerhoff v. Green, 122 N.Y.S. 481; Smith v. Harbinson, 228 Pa. St....