Bernier v. Burris

• Decision Date: 20 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 62876,62876
• Citation: 113 Ill.2d 219,497 N.E.2d 763,100 Ill.Dec. 585
• Parties: , 100 Ill.Dec. 585, 55 USLW 2031 Bernice BERNIER, Appellee, v. Roland W. BURRIS, State Comptroller et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 763

497 N.E.2d 763

113 Ill.2d 219, 100 Ill.Dec. 585, 55

USLW 2031

Bernice BERNIER, Appellee, v. Roland W. BURRIS, State Comptroller et al., Appellants.

No. 62876.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 20, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 26, 1986.

Robert A. Clifford & Associates, Chicago, for amicus curiae Consumer Health Resource Center in support of appellee; Robert A. Clifford, Robert P. Sheridan, of counsel.

John C. Wunsch, Law Offices of John C. Wunsch, Chicago, for amicus curiae Ill. State Council of Sr. Citizens in support of appellee; Patrick G. Reardon, Stephen M. Connolly, Attys. for Ill. State Council of Sr. Citizens Chicago, of counsel.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Roma J. Stewart, Sol. Gen., Chicago, for appellants; Michael J. Hayes, Michael V. Casey, Thomas A. Ioppolo, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, of counsel.

The Chicago Bar Ass'n, Chicago, for amicus curiae the Chicago Bar Ass'n; Philip H. Corboy, of counsel.

Richard S. Fleisher, David A. Novoselsky, Todd A. Smith, Chicago, for People's Medical Soc.

Carl F. Schroeder, Ralph R. Hruby, Carl F. Schroeder, Ltd., Wheaton, for amicus curiae, Illinois Public Action Council.

Ill. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Chicago, for amicus curiae Ill. Trial Lawyers Ass'n; Robert J. Glenn, David A. Novoselsky, of counsel.

Susan W. McGrath, William D. McGrath, McGrath & McGrath, Champaign, for Champaign County Health Care Consumers, amicus curiae.

Asher, Pavalon, Gittler and Greenfield, Ltd., Anesi, Ozmon, Lewin & Associates, Ltd., Chicago, for amicus curiae for the Illinois State Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus. Organizations, Chicago Federation of Labor--Indus. Union Council, Chicago and Cook County Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, Ironworkers Dist. Council of Greater Chicago and Tri-City Bldg. Trades Council; Nat P. Ozmon, Lester Asher, Eugene I. Pavalon, Paul J. Bargiel, William A. Geiser, Richard A. Kimnach, of counsel.

John D. Hayes, Hayes & Power, Chicago, Thomas F. Londrigan, Londrigan, Potter & Randle, P.C. Springfield, James L. Gilbert, James L. Gilbert & Associates, P.C., Arvada, Colo., for amicus curiae Trial Lawyers for Public Justice.

Leonard M. Ring and Associates, Chicago, for appellee, Bernice Bernier; Leonard M. Ring, Leslie J. Rosen, of counsel.

John M. Cannon, Susan W. Wanat, Ann Plunkett Sheldon, Mid-America Legal Foundation, Chicago, for amicus curiae of Mid-America Legal Foundation supporting appellants.

Peter M. Sfikas, Larry R. Eaton, Peterson, Ross, Schloerb & Seidel, Chicago, of counsel, for amici curiae American Dental Ass'n and Ill. State Dental Soc.

Max E. Wildman, Douglas R. Carlson, Martin J. Hatlie, Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago, for amicus curiae of the American Medical Ass'n in support of appellants; Kirk B. Johnson, B.J. Anderson, Susan M. Schmidt, American Medical Ass'n, Chicago, of counsel.

Saul J. Morse & Associates, Ltd., Winston & Strawn, Friedman & Koven, for Ill. State Medical Society, amicus curiae; Saul J. Morse, Springfield, Calvin Sawyier, Clive Topol, Mark Van Cura, John B. Simon, Russ M. Strobel, Chicago, of counsel.

Mark D. Deaton, Daniel J. Mulvanny, Ill. Hosp. Ass'n, Naperville, for the Illinois Hosp. Ass'n.

D. Kendall Griffith, Dennis J. Horan, Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, Chicago, for the Metropolitan Chicago Healthcare Council.

Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Bernice Bernier, brought this action in the circuit court of Cook County challenging the constitutionality of various provisions of Public Act 84-7. Approved June 25, 1985, and effective August 15, 1985, Public Act 84-7 made a number of significant changes to the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, pars. 1-101 through 19c-101) concerning medical malpractice actions. The circuit judge found that the particular provisions challenged by the plaintiff were unconstitutional, and the defendants have appealed that decision directly to this court (103 Ill.2d R. 302(a)). Numerous amici curiae have submitted briefs in this court in behalf of the parties.

The plaintiff, a resident and taxpayer of Cook County, instituted her action as a taxpayer's suit on July 3, 1985. Named as defendants in the action were various State officials, and the complaint sought to enjoin the disbursement and expenditure of public funds for carrying out the various provisions in Public Act 84-7. By her amended complaint the plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of five parts of the legislation--those establishing a system of review panels, providing for the periodic payment of future damages, modifying the collateral-source rule, prohibiting awards of punitive damages, and limiting the amounts of contingent fees. Following an extensive evidentiary hearing, in which both the plaintiff and the defendants presented testimony on the nature and extent of the medical malpractice crisis and the effect that the provisions here may have on litigants, the trial judge found that all five parts challenged by the plaintiff violated a number of State and Federal constitutional guarantees.

Public Act 84-7 amended sections 2-1109, 2-1205, 8-2001, and 8-2003 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, pars. 2-1109, 2-1205, 8-2001, 8-2003) and added to the Code sections 2-114, 2-611.1, 2-622, 2-1010, 2-1012 through 2-1020, 2-1114, 2-1115, 2-1701 through 2-1719, and 8-2501 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, pars. 2-114, 2-611.1, 2-622, 2-1010, 2-1012 through 2-1020, 2-1114, 2-1115, 2-1701 through 2-1719, 8-2501). These provisions in general are applicable to actions for what is termed "healing art" malpractice, a broad category that is not confined to actions against physicians and hospitals but rather, as some of the provisions indicate, may also include actions against other health professionals such as dentists or psychologists. See, e.g., Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 2-622.

We note at the outset that "[t]here is, as this court has frequently emphasized, a strong presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional (People v. Greene (1983), 96 Ill.2d 334, 338 [70 Ill.Dec. 856, 450 N.E.2d 329]; Cronin v. Lindberg (1976), 66 Ill.2d 47, 58 [4 Ill.Dec. 424, 360 N.E.2d 360] ), and one who asserts otherwise has the burden of clearly establishing the constitutional violation (Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius (1979), 77 Ill.2d 287, 303 [32 Ill.Dec. 872, 395 N.E.2d 1376]; People v. Dale (1950), 406 Ill. 238, 244 .)." (Sayles v. Thompson (1983), 99 Ill.2d 122, 124-25, 75 Ill.Dec. 446, 457 N.E.2d 440). Because many of the provisions challenged here are attacked on the same grounds, as violating the due process and equal protection guarantees of both the State and Federal constitutions (see U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, sec. 2) and the State prohibition of special legislation (see Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, sec. 13), it may be useful to set out, in a preliminary way, the standards under which those arguments would properly be addressed.

The rational-basis test generally has been applied in testing the constitutionality of medical malpractice legislation under guarantees of due process and equal protection. (See Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on Medical Malpractice Laws, 38 Okla.L.Rev. 195, 202-12 (1985).) Two notable exceptions, however, are found in Carson v. Maurer (1980), 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825, and Arneson v. Olson (N.D.1978), 270 N.W.2d 125. In Carson the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held, as a matter of State constitutional law, that the appropriate standard to use in assessing the equal-protection challenges there was "whether the challenged classifications are reasonable and have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." (120 N.H. 925, 932-33, 424 A.2d 825, 831.) Applying that intermediate test, the court invalidated a broad range of provisions, including ones that modified the collateral-source rule, provided for the periodic payment of future damages, and set a scale for determining contingent fees. Similarly, in Arneson the Supreme Court of North Dakota used an intermediate standard of review--one that required "a 'close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals' " (270 N.W.2d 125, 133)--in finding that various medical malpractice provisions violated State constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process.

We decline to follow Carson and Arneson in applying to medical malpractice legislation a standard stricter than rationality review. We do not believe that the provisions in question implicate a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, and accordingly the appropriate standard for determining the plaintiff's equal protection challenges under the Illinois and Federal constitutions is whether the legislation bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. (McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners (1969), 394 U.S. 802, 809, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1408, 22 L.Ed.2d 739, 745; Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter (1980), 82 Ill.2d 116, 119-20, 45 Ill.Dec. 18, 412 N.E.2d 151.) This standard applies as well to the additional argument that the provisions violate the State constitutional prohibition against special legislation (Jenkins v. Wu (1984), 102 Ill.2d 468, 477-78, 82 Ill.Dec. 382, 468 N.E.2d 1162; Anderson v. Wagner (1979), 79 Ill.2d 295, 315, 37 Ill.Dec. 558, 402 N.E.2d 560), for although the guarantee of equal protection and the prohibition against special legislation are not identical, they are "generally judged by the same standard" (Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson (1985), 108 Ill.2d 357, 368, 91 Ill.Dec. 610, 483 N.E.2d 1245). Similarly, we do not believe that the provisions here burden a fundamental right, and for our purposes here the appropriate inquiry under due process is whether the legislation bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Williamson v. Lee Optical...