Bernier v. Skripek
| Decision Date | 07 August 1967 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 50014 |
| Parties | David BERNIER, Administrator of the Estate of Geraldine Bernier, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barbara SKRIPEK, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Murphy & Murphy, Chicago, Jerome T. Murphy, Chicago, of counsel, for plaintiff-appellant.
Kirklund, Ellis, Hodson, Chaffetz & Masters, Chicago, David Jacker, Francis B. Libbe, Alan H. Swanson, Chicago, of counsel, for defendant-appellee.
Action was brought by plaintiff, as Administrator of the Estate of Geraldine Bernier, his wife, who died as a result of injuries sustained when the automobile in which she was riding as a guest collided with a guard rail or bridge abutment situated adjacent to the street on which the vehicle was being driven by defendant. At the close of plaintiff's case, the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of defendant. Motions by plaintiff for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial were denied. The only point raised on appeal is that it was error for the court to have directed the verdict.
On the issue of liability there were only three witnesses: a service station attendant, a State Trooper, and defendant (called as a witness under Section 60 of the Civil Practice Act). There follows their testimony:
Defendant, Barbara Skripek
Deceased arrived at defendant's home in the late afternoon on September 21, 1957. At approximately 5:30 P.M., deceased, defendant, and defendant's brother, William, left the Skripek home in Roseland and rode with William in his 1956 Pontiac to the home of his friend located at 88th Street and Cottage Grove. At that point William left the car and defendant moved into the driver's seat. The girls planned to visit defendant's sister who lived at 4501 West 180th Street. They arrived there about 7:30 P.M., had coffee and cake, and stayed until 10:45 P.M. Defendant and deceased then left in the Pontiac for the long ride home, with defendant driving. Defendant was familiar with the car, having driven it two or three times a week during the six or eight months her brother had owned it.
The evening was dark, but clear. Defendant had driven home from her sister's house on six or seven prior occasions, and had been in the habit of taking Cicero Avenue north to 127th Street and then going east on 127th Street to State Street which ran close to her residence in Roseland. On the evening of the occurrence, however, defendant changed her route and proceeded east on 180th Street until she came to a dead end. She then turned right and proceeded south to 187th Street where she again turned right and headed west. By this time defendant had completely lost her bearings. She had never driven in the area into which her new route took her, and to add further to her confusion the streets in the neighborhood turned and wound around. All prior visits to her sister's home had been in the daytime and she had never driven home from there at night. Another right turn headed defendant in a northerly direction until she arrived at an intersection where there was a gas station. Defendant drove into the gas station and asked the attendant for directions back to Roseland. He informed her that she was then on the southeast corner of 127th Street and Harlem, a substantial distance west of her home.
When defendant pulled out of the gas station, she turned east on 127th Street, accelerating the car gradually. She did not try to get speed quickly. The two girls were conversing and the car radio was turned on. The headlights were functioning normally at low beam and defendant could see a distance of fifty to seventy-five feet ahead. The highway was unlighted. Defendant drove in the center lane of the two eastbound lanes after leaving the gas station, with her left wheels either on or 'very slightly over' the center line of the road. Being unfamiliar with the road, she felt safer in that lane. There was no traffic in front of or behind defendant's car and nothing obstructed her view of the road, which was made of concrete. Defendant was not confused after learning the way at the gas station, although she had been confused prior to that time. She had been driving with the headlights on high beam but lowered them on entering the gas station and did not raise them again. She was not late for anything, and was in no hurry to get home. She had her hands on the wheel at all times after leaving the gas station until hitting the guard rail. At no time did she lose control of the vehicle. She was looking straight ahead after leaving the gas station and never took her eyes off the road. She was not distracted by anything. She could see the right-hand edge of the pavement, but did not observe that the highway narrowed. She saw no traffic signs.
Deceased asked defendant to move from the center lane 'over closer to the right-hand side of the road, because she would feel safer and more comfortable' if she did so. To satisfy deceased, defendant moved the car to the right, but she did not swerve the wheel very quickly or suddenly. The impact with the guard rail occurred a split second thereafter. At the time of impact, defendant's car was proceeding at a speed between 25 and 35 miles per hour. Defendant had her foot on the accelerator continuously, and never applied the brake after leaving the gas station, although she could not recall whether her foot was on the accelerator at the time of the impact. She never saw the guard rail.
He arrived at the accident scene shortly after the occurrence. Both girls were still in the Pontiac and both were injured. The car was a few feet from a guard rail protecting a culvert about a block east of Harlem on 127th Street. The right front fender of the car had collided with the guard rail. The car was facing in a southeasterly direction. He did not see any skid marks. As 127th Street moves east from Harlem, it narrows down at this culvert or guard rail. West of the culvert it is four lanes wide. East of the culvert it is two lanes wide. There was no obstruction to the center lane.
There were no street lights. There were no signs from Harlem to the culvert, such as 'Pavement Narrows,' 'Road Merges,' or the like. There was a center line down the middle of the road. Photographs in evidence (defendant's exhibits 1 and 2, admitted by stipulation), show a series of four posts with metal diagonally-striped warning-type signs along the south side of the road west of the guard rail. Those signs were not there on the night of the accident. The concrete base of the guard rail is off the edge of the pavement, maybe two feet.
Testifying as to a conversation with the defendant shortly after and at the scene of the occurrence, this witness said that she was obviously injured and 'disoriented'; and that with regard to the occurrence she told him she was confused and didn't know what happened. An ambulance came within five minutes, taking defendant and deceased to the hospital. On cross-examination Grosskurth said that defendant 'admittedly was confused,' although he did not recall 'if she specifically used 'confused' or whether she substituted another word.' He also did not recall if she said 'whether she was confused at the time of the accident or confused earlier, such as being lost.'
On the night of the accident, he was helping his son operate a gas station on the southeast corner of 127th Street and Harlem Avenue. The first he knew of the accident was when he heard a big noise and crash. He then saw that a car had crashed the railing of the bridge. The distance from the gas station driveway to the guard rail was approximately 300 feet-not a full block-and the lights from the station shone out almost to the bridge railing. 127th Street is four lanes wide east of Harlem. The wide pavement stops 'just to the west of the bridge, right near the bridge.' It is a two-lane road all the way through, only at the intersection of Harlem it is four lanes. The car had moved from a brightly lighted area into the darkness of night.
A cause of action against an automobile driver accrues to a guest occupant only if the guest sustains injuries caused by the wilful and wanton misconduct of the driver. Ill.Rev.Stat., 1965, ch. 95 1/2, § 9-201. The statute, however, does not define the term 'wilful and wanton misconduct.' Most opinions dealing with this subject contain a statement similar to the one found in Hearing v. Hilton, 12 Ill.2d 559, 562, 147 N.E.2d 311, 313, where the court said, 'Wilful and wanton misconduct has been...
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