Bernstein v. Centaur Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 28 November 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 83 Civ. 7989 (JMC).,83 Civ. 7989 (JMC). |
Citation | 606 F. Supp. 98 |
Parties | George BERNSTEIN, acting for and on Behalf of the COMMISSIONER OF BANKING AND INSURANCE OF The STATE OF VERMONT as Receiver for the purpose of rehabilitation of Ambassador Insurance Company and James P. Corcoran, Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York as Rehabilitator of Horizon Insurance Company, Plaintiffs, v. CENTAUR INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Kroll, Pomerantz & Cameron, New York City (Elliott M. Kroll, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff George Bernstein.
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, New York City (Thomas Farber, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff James P. Corcoran.
Cabell, Kennedy & French, New York City (T. Richard Kennedy, New York City, of counsel), for defendant.
Defendant's motion to dismiss the seventh cause of action is granted. Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Defendant's motion to stay this action pending arbitration is granted in part and denied in part pending submission of supplemental affidavits. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
This diversity action was brought by Ambassador Insurance Company "Ambassador" and Horizon Insurance Company "Horizon".1 On November 10, 1983, the Superior Court of the state of Vermont declared Ambassador insolvent and appointed the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance of Vermont as rehabilitator. On December 7, 1983, the Supreme Court of the State of New York declared Horizon insolvent and appointed the Superintendent of Insurance of New York as rehabilitator.2 On January 31, 1984, the current plaintiffs, acting on behalf of the rehabilitators of Ambassador and Horizon, were substituted as plaintiffs.3
Ambassador alleges seven causes of action based upon certain reinsurance agreements between defendant Centaur Insurance Co. "Centaur" as reinsurer and plaintiffs as reinsured. Horizon joins in only the sixth and seventh claims. The first six claims allege nonpayment of amounts due under the agreements and seek damages, an accounting and a declaration of rights. The seventh cause of action alleges that defendant's actions were "willful, deliberate, without reasonable or probable cause and in bad faith," for which plaintiffs demand ten million dollars in damages.
Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiffs' seventh cause of action on the grounds that it fails to state an independent cause of action and is in fact merely a request for punitive damages, which are not available in a contract action absent willful or malicious fraud.
Defendant also moves to stay the action pending arbitration. It is undisputed that all the reinsurance agreements at issue contain a clause providing: "Any difference of opinion between the Reinsurer and the Company with respect to the interpretation of this certificate or the performance of the obligations under the certificate shall be submitted to arbitration."4
Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. There is no independent cause of action for punitive damages in New York. See Weir Metro Ambu-Service v. Turner, 57 N.Y.2d 911, 456 N.Y.S.2d 757, 442 N.E.2d 1268 (1982); Bradshaw v. Silversmith, 122 Misc.2d 544, 546, 472 N.Y.S.2d 237, 239 (N.Y.App.Term 1983). Moreover, even if the Court were to construe the complaint liberally and interpret the seventh cause of action as a demand for punitive damages, the demand would fail. Punitive damages are not permitted in a breach of contract action in New York absent "fraud `aimed at the public generally', evincing a `high degree of moral turpitude', and demonstrating `such wanton dishonesty as to imply a criminal indifference to civil obligations.'" Durham Indus. v. North River Ins. Co., 673 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.1982) (quoting Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 405, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 491, 179 N.E.2d 497, 500 (1961)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827, 103 S.Ct. 61, 74 L.Ed.2d 64 (1983). See also Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 704 (2d Cir.1983) ( ); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 581 F.Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1984) ( ); Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 358, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833, 353 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1976) ( ); Borkowski v. Borkowski, 39 N.Y.2d 982, 982, 387 N.Y.S.2d 233, 233, 355 N.E.2d 287, 287 (1976) ( ).
Plaintiffs have not alleged any fraud and can suggest no greater public wrong than their own inability to pay the claims of their insured as a result of defendant's breach. This is not the kind of wrong to the public that requires exemplary damages. See Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d at 404, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 490, 179 N.E.2d at 499 ( ).
Defendant's motion to stay pending arbitration is founded upon section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act "Arbitration Act".5 Plaintiffs do not dispute the existence of the arbitration clause or its validity. They oppose the stay on three grounds: (1) New York law precludes arbitration of suits involving insurance companies under rehabilitation; (2) the validity and existence of the reinsurance certificates is an issue for the court; and (3) there exists no arbitrable dispute because defendant has not contested its liability under the certificates.
The first of these arguments is put forward by Horizon and involves only that company. Horizon does not deny that ordinarily the Arbitration Act would preempt state law governing arbitrability of matters in interstate commerce. Id. §§ 1, 3; see Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) ( ). Nor does it dispute that insurance is business in interstate commerce. See United States v. South-Eastern Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440 (1944). Plaintiff's argument is founded upon section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b), which provides:
The McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts from federal law only those state regulations that specifically regulate the "business of insurance", see Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 99 S.Ct. 1067, 59 L.Ed.2d 261 (1979), and only to the extent that a federal statute would "invalidate, impair or supersede" state laws. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); see Miller v. National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. 588 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir.1979); Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.1969). Moreover, despite defendant's argument to the contrary, the McCarran-Ferguson Act by its own terms exempts state law from the supremacy of federal law only when the federal law does not specifically address the insurance business. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); see Hanover Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 598 F.2d 1211, 1218 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct. 229, 62 L.Ed.2d 169 (1979).
The Arbitration Act does not specifically address the insurance business. See 9 U.S.C. § 3. The Court assumes, therefore, without deciding, that Congress did not intend the Arbitration Act to be excluded from the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.6 Thus, if New York has a law that specifically prohibits arbitration in disputes involving the insurance business, arbitration may be precluded in this case.
Plaintiff does not suggest any individual section of the New York Insurance Law that specifically precludes arbitration. Instead, it is argued that New York case law has construed article XVI of the Insurance Law as prohibiting arbitration of claims brought by or against a rehabilitator of an insurance company.
The leading case, In re Knickerbocker Agency, Inc. v. Holz, 4 N.Y.2d 245, 173 N.Y.S.2d 602, 149 N.E.2d 885 (1958), held that, although there is no express statutory provision granting exclusive jurisdiction to the New York Supreme Court in claims brought by a liquidator, the "overall scheme and plan of article XVI" requires such a result. Id. at 252, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 608, 149 N.E.2d at 891. The court further reasoned that this implied grant of exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court further implies a prohibition against arbitration of those claims. Id. The reason for this prohibition, the Court suggested, is that the interests of "creditors, policyholders, stockholders and the public" might be threatened by the fact that "arbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give reasons for their results; the record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial." Id. at 253, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 609, 149 N.E.2d at 892. See also In re All City Ins. Co., 66 A.D.2d 531, 413 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1st Dep't 1979) ( ).
One federal district court has found that an identical state law in Oklahoma precludes federal jurisdiction once liquidation proceedings have begun. See Professional Constr. Consultants Inc. v. Grimes, 552 F.Supp. 539, 541-43 (W.D.Okla.1982). That Court relied upon the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Bank of New York & Trust, 296 U.S. 463, 56 S.Ct. 343, 80 L.Ed. 331 (1963), which held that where the subject matter of a federal suit is a res in the...
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