Bernstein v. Lime, 1266.

Decision Date04 November 1952
Docket NumberNo. 1266.,1266.
Citation91 A.2d 841
PartiesBERNSTEIN et at v. LIME.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Edward A. Aaronson, Washington, D. C., with whom Mark P. Friedlander, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellants.

Herman Miller, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.

QUINN, Associate Judge.

This was an action for possession of housing accommodations brought on the ground that the tenancy had been terminated by the service of a 30-day notice to quit and that the premises were not subject to the District of Columbia Rent Control Act. The case was tried by jury, and from an adverse verdict and judgment plaintiffs bring this appeal.

At the trial, defendant having conceded the validity of the 30-day notice, plaintiffs attempted to prove that they were entitled to possession since the premises were no longer under rent control. Code 1951, Supp. I, § 45-1611(a) (3) expressly excluded from control any building used as a licensed rooming house, and plaintiffs proved that defendant for four years prior to the filing of this suit had applied for and obtained a license to operate a rooming house. On this showing plaintiffs rested their case.

Defendant testified to the general effect that while the premises were licensed as a rooming house its use was actually that of a tenement house,1 and therefore still under rent control. Defendant stated that she had turned the control of these rooms over to the occupants; that she did not furnish them with linens; nor did she make their beds or clean their rooms. She further testified that the occupants of these rooms had housekeeping privileges and hot plates and refrigerators.

At the conclusion of all the evidence both parties moved for a directed verdict, which motions were denied. The case was submitted to the jury under the following instructions:

"`The term "rooming house" means any building or part thereof other than a hotel, containing sleeping accommodations occupied for a consideration by * * * five or more persons * * * and which accommodations are not under the exclusive control of the occupant thereof.'

"You are instructed that if you find that the premises was licensed as a rooming house and you further find that the premises were used as a rooming house, as I have heretofore defined rooming house, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff * * *.

"If, however, you find from the evidence that the premises, although licensed as a rooming house, was not in fact used as such, in accordance with the definition of rooming house which I have given to you, then your finding should be in behalf of the defendant." (Emphasis supplied.)

The first and principal error alleged is that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiffs must not only prove that it was a licensed rooming house but must also show that it was in fact used as a rooming house. To state the plaintiffs' contention in another way, if defendant had a license to operate a rooming house, that fact alone operated to decontrol the premises regardless of the manner in which the premises were used. We are of the opinion that the judge's interpretation of the law was correct.

In this connection it is well to remember that exemptions from the operation of the Rent Act are to be narrowly construed giving due regard to the plain meaning of statutory language and the intent of Congress. Nor must we forget the rule that the burden rests upon a landlord to prove that the building comes within the decontrolled exception.2

In June 1951 Congress extended the life of the Rent Act and revised it in several respects. In order to discontinue control over certain types of accommodations, Congress expressly excluded particular premises from the definition of "housing accommodations." Two of these exclusions read in part:

"but the term `housing accommodations' shall not include * * * (2) furnished nonhousekeeping...

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7 cases
  • TENANTS v. D.C. RENTAL HOUSING COM'N
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • June 6, 1990
    ...of the rent control statute are to be narrowly construed. Goodman, supra, at 1297; Revithes, supra; see also Bernstein v. Lime, 91 A.2d 841, 843 (D.C.Mun.App. 1952). We think that the provision for substantial rehabilitation in § 45-2524, which effectively permits a landlord to escape the p......
  • Price v. D.C. Rental Housing Com'n
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • July 3, 1986
    ...in light of the intent of the legislature and plain meaning of the legislation." Remin, supra, 471 A.2d at 279; see also Bernstein v. Lime, 91 A.2d 841, 843 (D.C. 1952). Moreover, the landlord has the burden of establishing that an exemption applies. Bernstein, supra, 91 A.2d at Under D.C.C......
  • Revithes v. Rental Housing Com'n, 84-1269.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • December 1, 1987
    ...filed on June 25, 1980, and May 3, 1982. A landlord, of course, bears the burden of proving qualification for exemption. Bernstein v. Lime, 91 A.2d 841, 843 (D.C. 1952). "A landlord's mere assertion that a unit is not a rental unit contained in a claim of exemption will be insufficient" to ......
  • Remin v. D. of C. Rental Housing Com'n
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • January 17, 1984
    ...control laws should be narrowly construed in light of the intent of the legislature and plain meaning of the legislation. Bernstein v. Lime, 91 A.2d 841, 843 (D.C.1952). Moreover, the landlord has the burden of establishing that an exemption applies. Id. The Commission held that Remin had a......
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