Bernstein v. State
Decision Date | 22 September 2011 |
Docket Number | 2010.,Misc. No. 1,Sept. Term |
Citation | 29 A.3d 267,113 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 781,422 Md. 36 |
Parties | Charles G. BERNSTEINv.STATE of Maryland, et al. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Cyril V. Smith (A. Paul Pineau of Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Baltimore, MD; Andrew Jay Graham of Kramon & Graham, P.A., Baltimore, MD; Michael Schatzow of Venable LLP, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellant.William F. Brockman, Deputy Solicitor General (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellees.Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.BELL, C.J.
Charles G. Bernstein, the appellant, was appointed on October 10, 2006, by Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, as an associate judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. As required by Article IV, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution, Judge Bernstein stood for election and, on November 4, 2008, was elected for a fifteen-year term of office as an elected circuit court judge. Nevertheless, just over a year into his term, on December 29, 2009, the date of his seventieth birthday, Judge Bernstein was required to retire as a result of that same section of the Maryland Constitution.
Prior to his retirement, on November 3, 2009, Judge Bernstein filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, challenging his mandatory retirement and naming the State of Maryland, Governor Martin O'Malley, and the Maryland General Assembly as defendants. His argument was, and is, that Article IV, § 3 has application only to judges who “attain” the age of seventy while they are in office and, thus, interpreting it as prescribing a mandatory retirement age for all Maryland circuit court judges, as well as for those persons who might aspire to be a circuit court judge, violates the rights he has been guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Noting that there is no Maryland case which provides a “definitive interpretation” of Article IV, § 3, the federal district court certified to this Court the following questions:
At the center of this controversy is Article IV, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution. It provides:
Md. Const. art. IV, § 3. Judge Bernstein views this provision, particularly the second sentence, which he considers the relevant portion, as being “crystal clear” and dispositive of any question pertaining to the retirement of circuit court judges. Thus, he asserts, the “meaning of the [constitutional] provisions [related to the retirement age for judges] can be gleaned from the text of § 3 alone.” Judge Bernstein reads § 3 as clearly and unambiguously requiring retirement only in the case of circuit court judges who “attain” the age of seventy while in office. It follows, therefore, he submits, that a person seventy years of age or older, not currently serving as a circuit court judge, may be appointed to fill a judicial vacancy or, should he or she choose, run for judicial office. Because, he continues, there is no rational basis for the distinction, § 3 fails to comport with the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Judge Bernstein maintains that his interpretation of § 3 is confirmed by reference to other provisions of the Maryland Constitution. He directs our attention to Article IV, § 2, for example, which prescribes the qualifications for judicial service. Section 2 enumerates those qualifications, as follows:
Md. Const. art. IV, § 2. Noting that this provision prescribes a minimum age for judicial service, but not a maximum one, he proffers that formulation as further justification for his interpretation and evidence that the Constitution does not preclude all seventy-plus year olds from seeking judicial office for the first time. He argues, if there were a universally-applicable age limit on judicial service, “one would expect to find it in [Article IV,] § 2, because that section unambiguously lays out the requirements for judicial service.”
The State also views Article IV, § 3 as clear and unambiguous; however, its interpretation produces a result diametrically opposite that espoused by the appellant. Unlike Judge Bernstein, it contends that the section not only clearly precludes a judge from continuing in office, but it does not permit anyone from being elected or appointed to judicial office after he or she “shall have attained the age of seventy.” This follows, the State submits, since, grammatically, “shall have attained” is phrased in the future perfect tense, i.e. the phrase “refer[s] to a past time within a future period,” 1 and, thus, reflects an intent to include all people of, and over, age seventy, not just those who have yet to turn seventy. Therefore, because Article IV, § 3 provides for the expiration of a judge's term at the end of fifteen years or when the judge attains the age of seventy, “whichever may first happen,” the State points out that, read logically, the section would require that the term of a judge appointed or elected after the age of seventy would end before it began. The State concludes that Article IV, section 3 simply does not support the appellant's construction.
The State accuses Judge Bernstein of reading Article IV, § 3 without regard to its context. It also contends that his reading of Article IV, § 3 is the result of a hyper-technical textual analysis that should not be allowed to defeat the obvious intent of the Legislature, which proposed the provision, and the citizens, who adopted it by ratifying the Maryland Constitution. Moreover, the State contends that Judge Bernstein implicitly and improperly inserts into Article IV, § 3, the phrase, “while in office,” following the phrase, “shall have attained the age of seventy years.” The State believes this point to be of particular significance since, at one time, § 3 did include that phrase. Until 1932, it provided:
“Each of the said judges shall hold office for the term of fifteen years from the time of his election, and until his successor is elected and qualified, or until he shall have attained the age of seventy years, whichever may first happen, and be re-eligible thereto until he shall have attained the age of seventy years, and not after; but in the case of any judge who shall attain the age of seventy years whilst in office, such judge may be continued in office by the General Assembly for such further time as they may think fit, not to exceed the term for which he was elected.”
Md. Const. art. IV, § 3 (amended 1932) (emphasis added). The phrase was amended out of the Constitution in 1932. 1931 Laws of Md., ch. 479 (ratified Nov. 8, 1932).
The State argues, in addition, that Article IV, § 3 is part of a constitutional scheme and, thus, must be interpreted in context, as a part of that scheme. So doing, it asserts, supports its interpretation of the section. The State notes, in particular, Article IV, § 5, which provides:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Remson v. Krausen
...interpretation is that a court should not reach a meaning beyond the Constitution unless the relevant section is ambiguous. Bernstein v. State, 422 Md. 36, 43 (2011); see also Reed v. McKeldin, 207 Md. 553, 560, 115 A.2d 281 (1955). (“It is a cardinal rule of construction that where the tex......
-
Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery Cnty. Lodge 35 v. Montgomery Cnty. Exec.
...intent and also avoid construing a statute in a way that is illogical or inconsistent with common sense. See Bernstein v. State, 422 Md. 36, 46, 29 A.3d 267 (2011); Bunting, 168 Md.App. at 142, 895 A.2d 1068. In making this determination, we are not limited to the words of the statute as th......
-
State Bd. of Elections v. Snyder
...public that adopted it. Fish Market Nominee Corp. v. G.A.A., Inc., 337 Md. 1, 8–9, 650 A.2d 705, 708 (1994). See Bernstein v. State, 422 Md. 36, 43–44, 29 A.3d 267, 271 (2011) (citing Buchholtz v. Hill, 178 Md. 280, 285–86, 13 A.2d 348, 351 (1940)) (recognizing that, because the Constitutio......
-
State Bd. of Elections v. Snyder
...the public that adopted it. Fish Market Nominee Corp. v. G.A.A., Inc., 337 Md. 1, 8-9, 650 A.2d 705, 708 (1994). See Bernstein v. State, 422 Md. 36, 43-44, 29 A.3d 267, 271 (2011) (citing Buchholtz v. Hill, 178 Md. 280, 285-86, 13 A.2d 348, 351 (1940)) (recognizing that, because the Constit......