Berrios v. Rybacki

• Decision Date: 24 October 1989
• Docket Number: No. 1-88-2918,1-88-2918
• Citation: 546 N.E.2d 651,190 Ill.App.3d 338
• Parties: , 137 Ill.Dec. 706 Francisco BERRIOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ray J. RYBACKI, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 651

546 N.E.2d 651

190 Ill.App.3d 338, 137 Ill.Dec. 706

Francisco BERRIOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ray J. RYBACKI, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-88-2918.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Second Division.

Oct. 24, 1989.

Thomas R. Challos, Jr., and Marshall E. Winokur, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Chicago (Robert J. Ruiz, Valerie J. Peiler and Michael Brennan, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Justice HARTMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the circuit court denying his motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's complaint seeking a declaration that certain directives adopted by the Illinois Industrial Commission (commission), and its chairman, Ray J. Rybacki (chairman), were void, among other claims for relief. Plaintiff's theory is that the directives were, in fact and in law, rules adopted contrary to the provisions of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 127, pars. 1001 et seq.

The principal issues presented on review include whether: this appeal should be dismissed because plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the directives in view of plaintiff's settlement of his underlying worker's compensation claims; ¹ the procedures promulgated by the chairman and adopted by the commission were actually "rules" under the APA, thereby subjecting them to the requirement of notice, comment or hearing and publication; and defendants' motion for summary judgment should have been denied because the motion was not free from doubt.

In late 1985 and early 1986, plaintiff, Francisco Berrios, received injuries while in the scope of his employment at General Mills. In June and September 1986, he filed applications for adjustment of his claims with the commission pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, pars. 138.1, et seq. (Act).

The claims, consolidated on October 14, 1986, were scheduled for trial on October 23, 1987 before a commission arbitrator, who dismissed the claims for want of prosecution when plaintiff and his attorneys failed to appear before her between the hours of 8:45 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. in order to take part in a new procedure denominated the "trial order drawing." The arbitrator told plaintiff's counsel that she was acting according to what were labelled by the commission as the "Chicago Arbitration Rules," (Chicago Rules) made effective on October 1, 1987, ² and made effective statewide as of January 1, 1988. These rules were not filed with the secretary of state nor set for comment or hearing, nor were they published in the Illinois Register pursuant to the APA, according to the chairman.

Plaintiff took no action to refile or reinstate his claims, or to appeal the dismissals to the commission, although those options were available. Instead, he brought this circuit court action against the chairman and the commission (sometimes collectively defendants), seeking: (1) a declaration that the Chicago Rules were void because they were not promulgated in accordance with the APA; (2) a declaration that the dismissal for want of prosecution of plaintiff's claim be declared null and void, and that his claim be reinstated and assigned to another arbitrator; (3) a declaration that all other petitioners' applications for adjustment of claims that were dismissed on or after October 1, 1987 be reinstated and reassigned; (4) a temporary or permanent injunction restraining defendants from attempting to enforce the invalid rules in the future absent compliance with the APA; (5) a temporary or permanent injunction against the commission to prevent it from acting under the Chicago Rules until it complies with the APA; and (6) costs and fees.

Although reference is made in the briefs to plaintiff's lawsuit as a class action, no allegations are set forth in his complaint as to any proposed class, or applicability of statutory prerequisites (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, pars. 2-801 through 2-806); however, in his prayer for relief he does ask,

"For a declaratory judgment declaring that all other petitioners' applications for adjustment of claim, that were dismissed on and after October 1, 1987 be reinstated and randomly reassigned to other Arbitrators for trial, and that said matters be set for trial within 60 days after said reassignment."

Extensive discovery subsequently was undertaken. During his deposition, the chairman explained that the new procedures were created to effectuate a "degree of uniformity which would allow all the parties, petitioners, respondents and their counsel or pro se petitioners to move expeditiously and keeping with the spirit of the act through the Commission." The chairman alluded to the fact that there was no established procedure followed by each arbitrator and that few, if any, rules were actually reduced to writing. He stated that none of the other commissioners were consulted with regard to the proposed rules.

The chairman also indicated that the new procedures were made "available" in writing in September 1987 to attorneys at a seminar, and also at the commission's office. The chairman was familiar with the Illinois Administrative Code (Code) and its prescribed procedures for pre-arbitration, and averred that the Chicago Rules do not amend Sections 7020 or 7030 of the Code, but were meant to "amplify and give direction to the arbitrators" as they applied the rules of arbitration.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Chicago Rules were not "rules" whose adoption required compliance with the APA and that even if the procedures were "rules" under the APA, they fell within the exemption for rules concerning an agency's internal management.

Plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the question of liability, contending that there were no questions of material fact that would preclude judgment for plaintiff; the Chicago Rules, as a matter of law, could not be said to fall within the internal management exception; and any subsequent granting of summary judgment for defendants would be in error since the issue regarding the status of the rules was not clear and free from doubt.

On August 31, 1988 the circuit court granted defendants motion for summary judgment, finding that the chairman is charged with implementing the purpose and objectives of the Act and possessed the authority to issue directives as to the internal management of the commission in a manner consistent with existing rules and statutes. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied. Plaintiff appeals from both orders. I.

Defendants contend that this appeal should be dismissed for a number of reasons. At the outset, they challenge plaintiff's standing to question the validity of procedures other than those utilized in his case. The crux of their argument is that since the application only of Chicago Rules 5 and 12 could have caused any injury to plaintiff, only those rules can be the subject of any subsequent litigation. Defendants assert, therefore, that the validity of the remaining rules or procedures cannot be challenged by this plaintiff.

Standing requires "some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest." (Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority (1988), 122 Ill.2d 462, 492, 120 Ill.Dec. 531, 524 N.E.2d 561.) Specifically, in an action for declaratory relief, there must be "an actual controversy" between adverse parties; and, the party requesting the declaration must possess some "personal claim, status, or right which is capable of being affected by the grant of such relief." (Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill.2d at 493, 120 Ill.Dec. 531, 524 N.E.2d 561.) Here, although plaintiff's claims were dismissed pursuant to Chicago Rules 5 and 12, other rules in question adopted by defendants at the same time impact upon this cause generally, as argued by plaintiff and as will be noted presently. The adoption of these other rules followed the same procedures or lack thereof; they purport to fulfill the same need for uniformity; and they, too, are claimed to fall within the internal procedures exemption.

Defendants next contend that this action has been rendered moot by plaintiff's subsequent settlement of his claims under the Act. They insist that since plaintiff's ultimate legal interest was to receive compensation for his injuries, the settlement he received satisfied all the legal rights and interests in a fair adjudication given to him under the Act, thus making the issues moot.

Plaintiff concedes the settlement of his claims, but argues that the only claim for relief mooted by his settlement is his claim for reinstatement of his case. A case is moot, however, where an actual controversy ceases to exist. (Wheatley v. Board of Education (1984), 99 Ill.2d 481, 484-85, 77 Ill.Dec. 115, 459 N.E.2d 1364.) Any judgment rendered under this factual scenario ordinarily could have advisory effect only. (See Madison Park Bank v. Zagel (1982), 91 Ill.2d 231, 235, 62 Ill.Dec. 950, 437 N.E.2d 638 (discussion on advisory opinions).) Further, courts generally will not review cases merely to establish a precedent or guide for future litigation. (LaSalle National Bank v. City of Chicago (1954), 3 Ill.2d 375, 121 N.E.2d 486; Madison Park Bank v. Zagel, 91 Ill.2d at 235, 62 Ill.Dec. 950, 437 N.E.2d 638.) Plaintiff's sole personal basis for challenging the validity of the rules is grounded in the adjustment of his claims; upon their settlement, his standing to have the rules declared null and void ceased to exist as to his personal claim. Therefore, the issues as to his individual claim are moot.

Plaintiff urges, however, that exceptions to the mootness doctrine be applied, namely, the existence of a substantial public interest in the controversy (People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz (1952), 411 Ill. 618, 622-23, 104 N.E.2d 769), or issues likely to...